Major takeaways from this week’s reading have all been pertinent upon the conceptualisation of transnationalism as a historiographical approach. Transnational history emphasises upon the porous boundaries between nations — namely the interactions, connections and flows that transcend national borders. However, it is crucial to note that this is not so much as a reaction but as a supplement to the conventional methodological nationalism in history. The historiographical salience of the nations, instead of being repudiated, was further enriched and nuanced by historians’ turning towards their interconnection, no longer treating them as compartmentalised monads (both in determining the scope of research and in conducting historical analysis). This leads to the crucial caveat that in transnationalism, the national and the transnational are not diametrically opposed. As Saunier proposed in his discussion on “middle grounds” as sites of transnational connection, the growth of nation-states, while traditionally seen as stifling these liminal situations, could also bolster their vibrance as nationalist enterprises breed new cross-border connections and intermediaries. This was given a more specific elaboration on Kreuder-Sonnen case study on Poland where the transnational engagements of Polish medics were closely bound with the Polish national cause, both before and after Poland was restored to her statehood. Therefore, it is crucial to note that there was not a dichotomy between the national and transnational approaches in terms of the historical importance of nation.
That said, as with all discussions on the nation have to ponder, the acceptance of nation (and inter-nation connection) as subjects of analysis does not mean that the concept is taken for granted. In Saunier’s point of view, the temporal applicability of transnational history is largely confined to the past 200-250 years before which nations and nation-states had barely come to predominate — Bayly was even stricter in saying that applying transnational history to the pre-1914 era would be problematic. Such caution was surely shared by Kreuder-Sonnen when she specifically addressed that when referring to “Poland” and “Polish” in nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century contexts, there was no intention to assign or presume a certain national allegiance or identity at play. However, it is also questionable whether transnationalists are making a rod on their own back by being too obsessed with the qualification of nations. For Seed, despite transnationalism being essentially of present terms and conceptions (i.e. the nation) on to the past, this can still be done legitimately by focusing on the so-called analogous cases. As we can see in two empirical essays this week, there was neither a German nation-state nor a Polish one in the mid-eighteenth century, but this did not prevent Knotter and Kreuder-Sonnen to speak of German cigar-makers and Polish medics. Indeed, this should be proceeded with caution (as Kreuder-Sonnen has excellently done so in the beginning of her work). But more importantly, this might demonstrate to us that the transnational scope can be extended to historical scenarios further back in time that feature extensive cross-border connections (be they between subnational, national or supranational entities), so long as historians constantly guard themselves against certain arbitrary essentialisations pertinent upon the nation. There can never be too much caution with the thorny task of defining the nation, but the transnational historians might lose a great deal of inspiration by focusing solely on the nation and not interaction.
Lastly, one thing I noticed is that the AHR panel formed an interesting conversation with the Clavin essay from last week. For Clavin, the essence of applying a transnational scope to the modern European context is in the globalisation of European events, studying “how European history has been universalized into international agency”. This stands in interesting contrast, if not opposition to his previous statement on transnationalism’s commitment to fragmentation and diversity. Indeed, while Clavin’s suggestion does help to break down the compartmentalisation of European history vis-a-vis the rest of the world, the advocacy of its globalisation (without mentioning the influence the other way around) can be perpetuate Western-centrism by seeing the West as the sole unit that can boast of global significance. In the AHR panel, I would argue, the merits of transnationalism were better appreciated by the spokespeople who in particular warn against the essentialisation of the global experience, especially regarding modernisation and development which have often granted the West the privileged spot as the enlightening beacon. Instead, much more emphasis was laid on multisited modernity, multi-directional flow of ideas, and the instances of domestication and acculturation across localities. As Beckert said convincingly, “Modernity rests just as much on African slaves, Indian peasants, Chinese traders, and Arab mathematicians as on Lancashire mill workers, Scottish philosophers, German chemists, and American political theorists.” Transnational histories could therefore inform as well as benefit from more discussions on “which nations” as well as those on “what is a nation”.