Rethinking the World in East Asia 1850s-1990s

 

The pre and early modern relationship between East Asian feminism, Confucian hegemony and Western imperialism is an extremely intricate one that cannot be dichotomised. While there were and are numerous points of conflict, as well as cooperation, between the mentioned institutions, their orientations and the modes of argument espoused across time, these dynamics must be complicated. By exploring the lived female experiences in Premodern in Korea and China, both rural and urban, and then tracing the emergence of Chinese feminism, we can see the ways in which women oriented themselves against and also alongside the Confucian tradition and, later, Western Imperialism. Indeed, the configuration of power between the latter two institutions can also be located against a gendered global hierarchy. In synthesising these notions, this article delineates women’s complex social roles and the emergence of feminism in East Asia. As well as this, it problematises female and feminist existence under Confucianism and their engagement with Western imperialism, two institutions which are themselves conversant.

The domestic and public spheres do not conceptually exist in a Confucianised East Asia in the same way they do in the Western world. Rather, the scholar JaHyun Kim Haboush has referred to them here as loose “spheres of activity [and/or] signifiers of morality”.[1] The ontological ambivalence of the inner quarters[2] and therefore those who operate within, however, meant that women had a basis from which they could renegotiate their station. The porosity of these boundaries can be seen both regionally and temporally. And of course, the female experience within premodern Korea saw vast difference differences between the rural and urban demographics as well as the upper and lower classes. With respect to that, different sections of the population, operating in those different spaces, were assigned particular class and gender-based roles which have been injected with different moral sentiments. In Korea and China, the establishment of separate moral literature for women was important to consolidating neo-Confucian culture as they were seen to be the transmitters of its particular brand of ethics and Way of life. Women were to fulfil this obligation through, note the androcentrism of the system, imparting a filial education, preserve her violable chastity/body, take care of her affines and servicing her husband.[3] Interestingly, a woman thereby held a position of considerable influence since she was tasked to ensure a conflict-free familial unit and therefore facilitated her husband’s efforts and complete devotion to outside civil affairs. With that appreciated, a woman’s value and role ultimately became heavily based on streamlining and priming the path to success of her male counterparts and she was only to exert more indirect forms of power under this system.[4]

On the note of female instruction, European missionaries and Chinese merchants, among other groups who espoused shifting agendas, began introducing girl’s educational institutions in the late 20^th century.[5] On one hand, they sought to educate rural elite women or those in urban environments on how to be competent wives and wise mothers. On the other hand, they were to be delivered lessons of basic literacy and an understanding of home economy and management.[6] In these two objectives, we can see the dimensionality given to the female role and the ways in which the same forces were both furthering and hindering the feminist cause in different ways. Furthering in the fact that Western imperial projects impacted the female position in East Asia through informing and impressing their feminist framework. Indeed, the works of British liberal men such as John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer were imported into China and arguably formed the foundations of Chinese feminism.[7] He Yin’s engagement with Euro-American models of progress and equality was, however, very critical and she observed them to be societies which simply constituted less visible and economic form of oppression. A case in point, the forces of free market capitalism ruined many [female] livelihoods in China as they could not compete and it led them to working multiple jobs, being sold as wives and losing more of their agency to patriarchal forces.[8]  Simply another form of inequality, the departure from liberalist values is seen at work also in the socio-economic subjugation of China by imperialist colonisers. The Western operations of gunboat diplomacy, opening China up to free market capitalism and the Opium Wars of the 1800s all speak to the gendered and racialised domination of the nation by the west and, in particular, Britain.[9] We can see that the global hierarchy that was being created, through a forceful imposition, emulated the domestic hierarchies. This was while the same imperial forces were in an indirectly cooperative dialogue with feminist thinkers of China.

By taking an in depth look at the lives of women in the Korean and Chinese societies, especially the instructions prescribed to them in the inner quarters, we can understand it as microcosmic of the gendered global hierarchy which began to emerge more clearly in the 20^th century. This is an order which has also shaped the origins of the feminism which seeks to agentically contest and renegotiate the very hegemony that was created. The relationship between feminism, Confucianism and imperialism is therefore heavily intertwined and dense; we should not quickly simplify the individual components nor polarise their dynamics.

[1] Dorothy Ko, Jahyun Kim Haboush and Joan Piggott, Women and Confucian Cultures In Premodern China, Korea, And Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p.7

[2] Ibid, p. 135

[3] Ibid, p.152

[4] Ibid, p.165

[5] Liu, Lydia He, Rebecca E. Karl, and Dorothy Ko. The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts in Transnational Theory (Columbia University Press, 2013) p. 34

[6] ibid

[7] Ibid, p. 36

[8] Ibid, p. 32

[9] Ibid, p.28

In contrast to China and Korea, neither Confucianism nor Neo-Confucianism was fully established as the official ideological foundations of government in Tokugawa Japan. Living in a country where shoguns governed based on his military authority (bui 武威), a Confucian scholar Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666–1728) reconsidered the essence of Confucianism after being dedicated to Confucianism and Jinsaigaku 仁斎学 and formed the linguistic methodologies, namely Kobunjigaku 古文辞学, and the new theory of Confucianism, which is called Soraigaku 徂徠学. Consequently, he restructured Confucianism, which was considered merely one of the accomplishments in the early days of the Tokugawa era, into a governance theory that deals with the specific domain of politics. His innovative interpretation of Confucianism derived from his conservative approach had a significant impact on the thought at the end of the Edo period and beyond.

The significance of the rise of Soraigaku in Japan during the Tokugawa period appears to be that Sorai criticised the interpretation of Confucianism by Neo-Confucianism and Jinsaigaku from the perspective of the interpretation of the Way and between righteousness (gi 義) and profit (ri 利).

Firstly, he saw the concept of the Way in Confucianism as the method of governing a country by sages in ancient China, and he regarded the study of the sage’s ideal rule as the essence of Confucianism. In Distinguishing the Way (Bendō 弁道), Sorai developed his interpretation of the Way as the rites, music, punishments, and ordinances (reigakukeisei 礼楽刑政) established by preceding kings, not the natural way of Heaven and earth as explained by the Zhu Xi and Jinsai.[1] On the basis of his interpretation, in Plan for an Age of Great Peace (Taiheisaku 太平策), he envisioned a plan of the sage’s technique of the grand Way (daidō-jutsu 大道術) to establish a political and social system for radically changing the customs in Tokugawa Japan.[2] The idea of applying Confucianism to the politics of Tokugawa Japan as an academic discipline to investigate the specific domain of politics may have contributed to the necessity of Confucianism in Japan.

Secondly, Sorai offered a governance theoretical interpretation of the Confucian ‘distinction between righteousness and profit’ (giri no ben 義利の弁) and argued that they are not in conflict. Zhu Xi discussed righteousness and profit in the scheme of overcoming human greed according to the heavenly principle (tianli 天理) and claimed from the viewpoint of individual morals that only righteousness is to be pursued. On the contrary, Sorai positively acknowledged the pursuit of profit and suggested that righteousness, as a political virtue, was to govern the people in a way that would benefit them. Furthermore, in Discourse on Government (Seidan 政談), he developed the theory of samurai settlement on their land (bushi dochaku-ron 武士土着論) in light of the status quo in Edo and advocated ideal governance rooted in righteousness to alleviate the budget deficit. It can be said that he established the significance of Confucianism as political studies by proposing a concrete policy based on Confucianism reflecting the reality.

Thus, Sorai can be credited with developing a very new interpretation of Confucious’ teachings, while promoting the understanding of Confucianism by directly approaching the Four Books and Five Classics in his conservative Kobunjigaku. In the face of his duality—the methodology he introduced as a conservative Confucianist and the innovative interpretation of Confucianism presented as a result—the question arises of which side of him indeed would receive more emphasis. One of the scholars who attached great importance to the groundbreaking aspects of his interpretation of Confucianism was Kaiho Seiryō 海保青陵 (1755–1817), a disciple of Sorai.

Seiryō was influenced by Sorai’s perspective to capture the actual situation in Tokugawa Japan, and he advocated the theory to govern the society and ease the people (Keisei Saimin-ron 経世済民論), which extended the positive view of the pursuit of profit from Soraigaku. Furthermore, he advanced Sorai’s concept, which affirmed the pursuit of profit, and developed a utilitarian logic that viewed profit (i.e., economic rationality) as tianli. However, while Sorai, as a Confucian, pursued the Way of prior kings, which he considered the essence of Confucianism, Seiryō deviated from Confucianism and prioritised the practicality of political analysis by focusing on theories that were compatible with the current world, thereby reducing the authority of Confucius’ argument and the Way of sages. In other words, Soraigaku became the ideological foundation of Seiryō’s thought, setting aside the objective of Sorai to grasp more faithfully the teachings of Confucius.

The ideological influence of Soraigaku on Seiryō’s thought reveals its methodological significance as well. Criticising the Neo-Confucianist approach and understandings of Confucianism, Sorai developed his interpretation, which he believed was truer to the teachings of Confucius. In other words, the rise of Soraigaku has significant implications for subsequent diverse critical debates on the interpretation of Confucianism and provided the solid foundation of unfettered and rigorous discussions that led to the development of academic fields in Japan. Moreover, it is important to note that the government system of the Tokugawa shogunate, in which Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism were not officially adopted as its governing ideology, played a role in the development of free and varied academic disciplines including Soraigaku based on a critical review of Neo-Confucianism.

Bibliography

De Bary, Wm. Theodore, Gluck, Carol and Tiedemann, Arthur, Sources of Japanese Tradition: 1600–2000 (New York, 2005).

Lidin, Olof G., ‘Ogyū Sorai: Confucian Conservative Reformer: From Journey to Kai to Discourse on Government’, in Chun-chieh Huang and John A. Tucker (eds.), Dao Companion to Japanese Confucian Philosophy (Heidelberg, 2014), pp. 165–182.

Maruyama, Masao 丸山眞男, Nihon Seiji Shisō Shi Kenkyū 日本政治思想史研究 (Tokyo, 1952).

Kuranami, Seiji 蔵並省自 (ed.), Kaiho Seiryō Zenshū 海保青陵全集 (Tokyo, 1976).

Yoshikawa, Kōjirō 吉川幸次郎 (ed.), Nihon Shisō Taikei 36: Ogyū Sorai 日本思想体系36　荻生徂徠 (Tokyo, 1973).

[1] Kōjirō Yoshikawa (ed.), Nihon Shisō Taikei 36: Ogyū Sorai (Tokyo, 1973), pp. 13–14.

[2] Ibid., p. 473.

When reading Kevin Doak’s Dreams of Difference in week 9, I couldn’t help but notice the similarities between the Japan Romantic School and the French Annales School. In their novel approach to the study of history (informed by economics, sociology, and anthropology), the historians of the Annales School opened Western historiography to a wealth of new disciplines. Though ostensibly a literary group, the Japan Romanic School shared the same multi-disciplinary approach. Their reservations about modern Japan were articulated through a variety of mediums, including historical fiction, poetry, and aesthetics.

In particular, I’d like to draw a parallel between the work of Jinbō Kōtarō and Fernand Braudel, who independently confronted the dominance of narrative time in their respective societies. Jinbō understood that poetry was a “revolutionary epistemology… central to the romantic vision.” As “the voice of youth”, poetry “signified an artistic space in which the romantics could act on their revolutionary impulses.”¹. To Jinbō, words possessed spiritual power and had the power to elucidate meaningful change (similar to the concept of kotodama mentioned during our readings on Japanese Nativism and Oomoto).

Kōtarō’s faith in poetry extended beyond mere literature. He felt poetry was the key to a new logic of spatiality. In his short essay titled “The Acquisition of New Time”, Jinbō suggests nothing less than the “supplanting of narrative history, the logic of developmental time, that lies at the center of modernity.” Like the rest of the Japan Romantic School, Jinbō felt that ancient space had to be defended against the dissociative effects of the modern world. A new conception of poetic time would be the newest weapon in their arsenal.

Braudel approached history from a similarly radical perspective. His groundbreaking history of the medieval France was one in which “the individual was subsumed by the environment”. Philip II was swallowed by the Mediterranean world, in an epic history whose heroes were not men but “grain and cereal crops, disease, technology, and transport, money, housing and clothing.”² Braudel’s Annales schools aimed for nothing less than the “take-over of historical production: a rejection of narrative (histoire événeémentielle)”.³

With his rejection of the history of ‘great men’ and their crowning achievements, Braudel cut a bold course through the study of Western history. The introduction of ‘geologic time’ in its immense impersonality was a way to champion the everyman, and draw new fields of study into the historical discourse. Jinbō shared the same ambition with his suggestion of ‘poetic time’, which he felt could save the soul of Japan through the revival of ancient space. Both men would leave measurable impacts not just on their respective movements, but on the way we measure and memorialize the past itself.

1. Kevin Michael Doak, Dreams of Difference: The Japan Romantic School and the Crisis of Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994),28. [↩]
2. Olwen Hufton, “Fernand Braudel,” Past & Present no. 112 (August 1986): 209-211. [↩]
3. Ibid, 208. [↩]

The conception of ‘westernisation’ is continually associated with the ideas of modernism, progressivism and liberalism. This dynamic has, and continues to, shape our historical and contemporary understanding, as the west symbolises a global benchmark for other peoples and societies. One of the more interesting points that seems to be downplayed in general western discourse is disillusionment with the west, a particularly interesting theme in this week’s reading: Confucian Renewals. Another fascinating notion was the conception of “easternisation” and its emphasis on Confucianism as a major component in establishing a reinvigorated western society with eastern influences. The concept of Confucianism and utopianism, or at least post-modernism, in conjunction with reconstructing western or global society shall form the basis of this discussion. The two specific readings I have chosen are, Qing Jiang’s Confucian constitutionalist order and Robert Neville’s Boston Confucianism, I believe highlight radically alternate perspectives on how to construct this new Confucian society from a western and globalist standpoint. Neville’s takes a liberal outlook illustrating how to integrate Confucian values while respecting the multicultural and cosmopolitan nature of the west. Jiang, on the other hand, has no time for such formalities and is quick to assert Confucianism’s dominance while still integrating notions of western democracy and liberalism.

 

Neville is quick to detach Confucianism from politics, as he outlines that Confucianism has failed because of politcal context of the societies that implement Confucianism rather than Confucianism itself.[1] Therefore, implementing Confucian ideals in western society will not incite traditionalism or conservatism as Confucianism is so often accused of, especially from the feminist community.[2] On the contrary by adopting Confucianism and specifically its ideals surrounding civility and the practice of ritual, western society, according to Neville, will be greatly enhanced.[3] For Boston Confucians civility and ritual act as the founding fabric that can help solve many of the issues multiculturalism brings. For example, Boston Confucians have highlighted that, by committing to cultural diversity, there is a need in the West to create positive social rituals as a means to respect the social diversity.[4] However, although this has been acknowledged, Boston Confucianism has only offered a diagnosis and is yet to provide the cure. Additionally, the civility Confucianism offers needs to be adapted further as it is a conception of a mesocratic society needs to expand beyond the working world and appreciate the complexity and variety of modern social roles, from work to home.[5] This is something too that Boston Confucianism lacks any practical framework on.

Jiang, on the other hand, takes an entirely different approach as he looks to incorporate western connotational liberalism and the Chinese regime into his new world Confucian society.[6] Jiang does want to achieve a western style of democracy, however this seems rather hollow when he quickly declares a hierarchical society based on the rule of a singular Confucian ancestor.[7] The ailments of Western society, democracy based on people’s legitimacy, that Jiang so vigorously wants to cure is stripped of all purpose with his autocratic replacement. He too then looks to offer a Confucian solution to a western issue but, as witnessed with the Boston Confucians, fails when the practicality of these ideas are analysed.

A recurring theme throughout this module has been to understand the discourse the follows when theoretical abstract ideas come into practice with the realities of world. Although, both the above ideas have not been implemented in the west or the east it is still interesting to debate how viable these ideas are and where their greatest pitfalls may lie, as Bell and Neville have done. However, as evidenced from all the weekly readings to date, the discourse that would follow from their implementation can never truly be realised until they have indeed clashed with reality.

[1] Robert C. Neville, ‘Boston Confucianism: Portable tradition in the late-modern world’ New York press: 2000, p. XXIII-XXIV
[2] Ibid
[3] Ibid p. 10
[4] Ibid p. 16
[5] Ibid p. 17
[6] Qing Jiang, Daniel Bell, Ruiping Fan & Edmund Ryden, ‘A Confucian constitutional order: how China’s ancient past can shape its political future’ Princeton University Press, 2012, P. 3
[7] Ibid pp. 7-8

Kita Ikki (北 一輝) was a Japanese author and thinker in the Taisho and early Showa era, commonly credited for being the father of the statist Japanese ultra-nationalism of the Showa era. In 1919 his text “The Reorganization of Japan” he expands upon the ideas to Limit on Private Wealth in his 1906 “Kokutairon and Pure Socialism” text. By introducing the system of the Three Pillars (Limits on private wealth, private property and private industry) he seeks to limit the inequality within Japanese society and build the fundamental economic policy to create harmony within Japanese society. He provides a step by step blueprint on how he implement such a policy from chapter II to IV. 

Firstly, a limit of private wealth up to 3,000,000¥ per family would be set.¹. Adjusted by inflation this would roughly be the value of 20,000,000$ in 2019, thus it would still be possible for a family to amass a considerable amount of privately owned capital.². The state would garnish the surplus amount of capital, land and business to manage it through a state-run bureau that would employ or secure the livelihood of all the citizens.³

Secondly, he would only put a limit on land ownership, but would give no guarantee of land ownership. Strangely Kita Ikki describes the right of land as a god given right to be a baseless assumption, but then explains the relation between tenant and landlord as natural will of god.

“The existence of landlords and tenants can be seen as the will of God and also as a necessary stage in the development of a society”³

Limits on land ownership was therefore not based on principle, but on necessity to maintain national unity through economic equality.  It would depend on a case by case basis if land outside of cities and farmland would be given by the state to new private owners or administered by a state company.⁴

Lastly would a ceiling of 10 000 000¥ be set on all private enterprise. Again equality was the goal, but in this chapter Kita Ikki rejects the fundamental ideas of socialism. Self interest was the core idea driving man according to Kita Ikki, the state served only to contain this within reasonable limits. Society would get the benefit from the individuals risk taking and its adaptability to satisfy public demand in ways the public system could not.⁵ Every nation had big capital managed by huge trusts or cartels, it would be better if the state assumed this function.  Seven ministries of Banks, Navigation, Mining, Agriculture, Industries, Commerce and Railways respectively would replace the current government bureaucracy.⁶ Wilson interprets that this was also intended as a specific attack on the great companies, most commonly refereed to as the Zaibatsu (financial clique, 財閥) that held considerable sway over the Japanese economy after the Meiji period.((George M. Wilson, Radical Nationalist in Japan: Kita Ikki, 1883-1937.,Sophia University, (Tokyo, 1970) p.70))

This hybrid of Capitalism and strict State Socialism would theoretically enable a certain financial stability and limit the excess of social inequality that currently plagued Japan. It has never to this day been implemented to such an extent as Kita Ikki suggests. The coups with Kita Ikki’s backing failed. But while the justification for national harmonization in preparation for war has fallen by the wayside, today the economic ideas of Kita Ikki survived his own lifetime. Wilson points out that the Americans would implement sweeping land reform with a remarkable resemblance to Kita Ikki’s ideas, as well as break up the Zaibatsu after the war. ((James L. McClain, Japan, A modern history, W.W. Norton, (New York, London, 2001) p. 543))⁷ Even today, in South Korea, the Chaebol still presents the social and economic challenges that larger corporations pose to equality within a state. The Three Pillars could perhaps provide an economic model to base reform on.

With it being written in 1919, the “The Reorganization of Japan” presents a remarkably modern and progressive economic solution that aims to achieve a moderate solution between the two extremes of the economic spectrum. It must however be mentioned that I have neglected to bring attention to the darker side of the Reorganization. The methods that would be used to implement the reform were extreme. A three year long martial law would be declare and the seizure of all excess capital, property and holdings would be accomplished by the use of the Army Reservist Association. Those that resisted the reorganization would be given the death penalty as traitors.  The present rule of law and government would be absolved during the reorganization and thus legal protection would be void to the citizens of Japan.³ While radical, these ideas were not uncommon among Japanese nationalist and among great writers of the 20th century like Lenin in the chaotic aftermath of the Great War, the need for imminent action appeared more necessary than ever.

Bibliography:

McClain James L. , Japan, A modern history, W.W. Norton, (New York, London, 2001)
Tankha, Brij,  Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan: A Vision of a Modern Empire, (Kent, 2006)
Wilson, George M., Radical Nationalist in Japan: Kita Ikki, 1883-1937.,Sophia University, (Tokyo, 1970)

 

 

1. Brij Tankha, Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan: A Vision of a Modern Empire, (Kent, 2006) p. 177 [↩]
2. George M. Wilson, Radical Nationalist in Japan: Kita Ikki, 1883-1937.,Sophia University, (Tokyo, 1970) p.71
   https://www.ssb.no/a/histstat/tabeller/24-28.html
   https://www.ssb.no/kpi
   I ran the JPY to USD Wilson provided againts with the USD to NOK historical averages of the bank of Norway exchange in 1920.  Then adjusted for CPI to modern times. Public US and Japanese online financial archives on exchange rates unfortunately only date back to 1974 [↩]
3. Brij Tankha, Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan: A Vision of a Modern Empire, (Kent, 2006) p. 178 [↩] [↩] [↩]
4. Brij Tankha, Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan: A Vision of a Modern Empire, (Kent, 2006) p. 182 [↩]
5. Brij Tankha, Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan: A Vision of a Modern Empire, (Kent, 2006) p. 184 [↩]
6. Brij Tankha, Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan: A Vision of a Modern Empire, (Kent, 2006) p. 189 [↩]
7. George M. Wilson, Radical Nationalist in Japan: Kita Ikki, 1883-1937.,Sophia University, (Tokyo, 1970) p.70 [↩]

In Japan during the 13th Century a new form of Buddhism began to emerge. Led by a single man, this new form of Buddhism would, at first, seem inconsequential, yet centuries later would appear to have great impact upon the world. This, of course, is Nichiren Buddhism. Founded by the monk Nichiren (1222-1282), this sect of Buddhism is dedicated to a text known as the Lotus Sutra, through which Nichiren and his followers believed enlightenment lay.¹ The focus of this piece is not the concepts of the Lotus Sutra, but rather the forms of the Bodhisattva’s from which Nichiren took personal inspiration from and on whose ways he based his teachings and lifestyle around: the Bodhisattva of Superb Action and the Bodhisattva Ever-Abused, as well as how his successors and students model themselves after such examples.²

Nichiren was inspired by both of these figures. For the former, Nichiren was attracted to the man’s actions and stalwart pioneering of Buddhism and propagating the Perfect Truth.³ For the later, Nichiren was attracted to the suffering that the Bodhisattvas underwent due to his beliefs. Through this, Nichiren crafted his own beliefs in Buddhism – one must never waver in their faith and must suffer abuses of some nature – whether they be physical, spiritual, mental, emotional, or verbal – in order to truly understand the words of the Lotus Sutra and be able to properly spread the teachings of Buddha.³ In fact, Nichiren himself often believed himself to be reincarnations of the two Bodhisattva’s, and often tried to perceive his own suffering through them.³ This belief was due to Nichiren’s actions: he spoke out against the established sects of the time as well as being rather outspoken against the rulers of Japan who had become patrons of these “heretical” sects.⁴ These actions caused Nichiren to be arrested – where he was supposedly saved from execution by a bolt of lightning from the heavens – and eventually he was banished to an island in the Sea of Japan.⁵ But this did not deter Nichiren, who continued to write and convey his faith to his followers and students in hopes they would follow in the footsteps of the Bodhisattvas and his own.⁴  

As mentioned above Nichiren encouraged his students to imitate the Bodhisattvas’ ideals of perseverance and self-sacrifice, as he believed that every student should be ready to give their life for the cause.⁶ One of his students, Nichije (1250-?), helped Nichiren in writing down the elder man’s teachings, and even following him in his exile, thus living some form of suffering (abuse).⁶ Nichije also followed the ideals of the Bodhisattva of Superb Action by going on missions throughout Japan (Hokkaido) and eventually making his way to Siberia to spread the teachings of Nichiren.⁶

Another student of Nichiren’s teachings, Nisshin (1407-1488), operated out of Kyushu before making his way to Kyoto.⁶ While in Kyoto Nisshin spoke out against the shogun in his acts as a street-corner evangelist.⁶ He openly challenged the shogun to prosecute the other Buddhist sects and pledge his loyalty and faith to the Lotus Sutra.⁶ Because of this, Nisshin was thrown in jail and tortured by the shogun’s men in order to cease and desist.⁶ When he did not, a pot was jammed over his head so as to keep him from talking, thus giving him the name ”pot-wearer” (nabe-kaburi).⁶ As such, Nisshin lived his life by way of both Bodhisattvas – with his work in Kyushu and Kyoto being signs of Superb Action and his imprisonment, torture, and head accessory being a source of Ever-Abused.⁶  

The final notable follower of Nichiren and the Lotus Sutra was Nichio (1565-1630).⁷ Nichio was uncompromising as he led a sect of Nichiren Buddhism – called the Fuju-fuse.⁷ Nichio was so outspoken and uncompromising that when the Buddhist sects were called by Hideyoshi Toyotomi for a festival of celebration, Nichio refused to allow the Fuju-fuse to attend.⁷ Later, when the shogun Ieyasu Tokugawa unified Japan, Nichio again refused to send the Fuju-fuse for a celebration.⁷ Due to this, Tokugawa exiled Nichio and began to persecute the Fuju-fuse, though the group was able to survive to the 20th Century.⁷ In this way, Nichio was able to imitate the lifestyle of the Bodhisattvas of Ever-Abused. ((Ibid, p.295))

To reiterate, Nichiren and his followers believed that one of the best ways to achieve enlightenment and successfully spread the word of the Lotus Sutra was to follow in the paths of the Bodhisattvas of Ever-Abused and Superb Action. Nichiren and those who believed in the Lotus Sutra were able to follow these paths, as detailed above.  

1. Bary, William Theodore De, Sources of Japanese Tradition: Vol. 1: From Earliest Times to 1600 (Columbia University Press, 2002), p.292 [↩]
2. Bary, Sources of Japanese Tradition, p.293 [↩]
3. Ibid, p.293 [↩] [↩] [↩]
4. Ibid, pp.293-294 [↩] [↩]
5. Ibid. p.294 [↩]
6. Ibid, pp.294-295 [↩] [↩] [↩] [↩] [↩] [↩] [↩] [↩] [↩]
7. Ibid, p.295 [↩] [↩] [↩] [↩] [↩]

During the early 1900s the revival of Chinese traditions was becoming a heated issue for the various political and insurgent groups. One of these traditions – which came under fire from the various groups – was Confucianism. The resurgence of Confucius beliefs was talked about and exploited by all participants of the political spectrum: conservatives, progressives, liberals, communists, and fascists alike all vied to have their personally views of Confucian principles heard – or more accurately they all warred to have their modified Confucian ideals implemented into society in a way that would benefit their goals for China. One of the most prevalent political leaders of the time was Sun Yat-Sen, a powerful and charismatic man who gained quite the following after his death, with his views being explored and exploited by many who had followed him¹. The goal of this post is to explore the thoughts that Sun Yat-Sen held about Confucian ideals in modifying them to fit with a more modern society, as well as the views of others about Confucianism in China during the early 1900s².  

Sun Yat-Sen’s interest in defending and adapting Confucianism first became apparent when he decided to speak and write in protest of the New Culture Movement³. Said movement was a group of students who attacked ethics and institutions associated with the then failing Chinese dynastic system while also promoting science and democracy as the basis for a new national culture³. This eventually led to a total repudiation of Confucianism, and other hegemonic traditions, with members, associates, and allies of the New Culture Movement declaring them to be ‘backward’ and ‘superstitious’, as well as against the ‘spirit of modernity’⁴. This is not the only group that spoke out against such traditions, the May Fourth Movement being another of the primary groups involved in anti-traditionalist movements³.  In response to this, Sun Yat-Sen – among others – began to speak out against the New Culture. Movement and other like it.  

In his 1924 lectures “Three Principles of the People” (Sanminzhuyi) Sun Yat-Sen vocally rebutted the anti-Confucians and expanded upon his views of Confucianism in the present⁵. In this, he states that Confucian ideals and Confucianism as a whole is compatible with many of the wonders of the technological age, a dream which Sun was extremely enthusiastic about⁵.  Much of Sun’s writing and speeches in these lectures involve the relation of Confucianism and the machine age⁵, with his going into detail as to how Confucianism solidifies the cultural nature that is integral to Chinese history⁵. He also explains how those who attack Confucianism – the New Culture Movement and even Sun’s Communist allies – were attempting to destroy the cultural cohesion that bound the Chinese people together⁵. Sun’s writing on the topic garnered much attention from his allies in the GMD, such as Dai Jitao, as well as young up-and-comers like Chen Lifu and He Zhonghan, all of whom jumped on the literary and political bandwagon of attacking their much hated Communist rivals through the values of Confucianism⁶. However, Sun never directly attacked the Communist, merely writing about their anti-Confucian ideals in a passive aggressive style, never outright attacking them through his writing, as such methods would destabilize the United Front⁶. 

However, Sun’s thoughts were not just on criticizing the anti-Confucian organizations, but also about developing and changing Confucianism to match the modern world. His personal viewpoint on the matter was how Confucianism would tie into and increase the national unity and pride of the Chinese⁷. During this time the Chinese people were divided, constantly pulled in multiple directions by various political parties, not to mention the actions of foreign nations, such as the Japanese invasions and their various religious expenditures. As such many prominent Chinese political groups encouraged citizens to adopt their manufactured concepts of national unity, which would be born from a sense of national culture and history⁷. For Sun Yat-Sen, Confucianism fit this bill perfectly. As such, he encouraged citizens to help in efforts to recover China’s “native morality”, which would help the people overthrow the yoke of imperialism and help to reestablish China as a dominate player on the world’s stage⁷. As presented by Sun, native morals were closely interlinked with Confucian ideals and precepts like filial piety⁷. Sun believed that such ideas should be reawakened and transmuted to the basis of national unity, with loyalty and unity for the state overriding the old beliefs of loyalty and unity for the emperor⁷. Thus, Sun Yat-Sen’s ideal of Confucianism was one that, for lack of a better word, was” updated” to suit the purpose of Chinese society as the time.  

In conclusion, Sun Yat-Sen’s ideals for the revival of Confucianism revolved around a core idea of national unity, one that ran contrary to the ideals of the many other groups of political activists during the early 1900s.  

1. Clinton, Maggie, Revolutionary Nativism: Fascism and Culture in China, 1925-1937, 71  [↩]
2. Clinton, Revolutionary Nativism, p.72  [↩]
3. Ibid, p.67  [↩] [↩] [↩]
4. Ibid, p.68 [↩]
5. Ibid, p.72 [↩] [↩] [↩] [↩] [↩]
6. Ibid, p.72-73 [↩] [↩]
7. Ibid, p.73-74 [↩] [↩] [↩] [↩] [↩]