Son Pyŏng-hŭi naive or calculating?

A fascinating issue is raised by Carl F. Young in Eastern Learning and the Heavenly Way: Tonghak and Ch’ondogyo Movements and the Twilight of Korean Independence, where Son Pyŏng-hŭi is criticized for the consequence of evolving the Tonghak to include the ideology espoused by its former enemies, the reformers of the Kabo Reform government. This “association” is claimed to have “made him naive to Japanese intentions” and that his involvement and intrigue with the Japanese was a “very dangerous game to play and would be replete with consequences for the future.”1 With the eventual Japanese conquest of Korea, Young suggests that Son was either blind to Japanese intentions, or he was gambling that he could use the Japanese to his and the Tonghak’s advantage, while not suffering any ill consequences.

It seems likely that the answer was more the latter rather than the former: Son seems to be cynical rather than naive. During Son’s exile in Japan, he calculatingly sought to expand the reach and power of the Tonghak. Finding common cause with his fellow Korean exiles from the Kabo Reform government as well as the Japanese, who were both enemies of the Tonghak during the 1894 rebellion, was a shrewd political move. Indeed, Son sought to use the reformers and the Japanese to assist Tonghak’s efforts to challenge the existing Korean conservative government. The reformers and Son both held personal and, obviously, political grievances against the Korean government.(( Id. at 69.) However, Son saw more than just a common cause with the reformers. It appears that the reformers were a critical connection to Western ideas, which Son believed needed to be utilized for the benefit of Korea. Son wrote that “[t]he Westerners are riding on the destiny of the world, and they are more lucid and thorough than the people of the East.”2 Son’s view was not an abstract appreciation of Western ideas of government, instead, he saw a practical benefit of incorporating such ideas, “if we can now change politics… [we can] cultivate capable people and develop and bring to light their accomplishments, and radiantly bring to light our brilliant culture to the world.”3 Son wasn’t envisioning an entire shift to the West, but to use Western political ideas to assist the Tonghak to establish a better Korean society. Specifically, he applied Western concepts to “reinterpret and expand on ideas existing within Tonghak Tradition.”4 With this in mind, it is understandable why Son would seek to plot with General Tamura for Japanese support to assist the Tonghak in its aborted plans to attack Seoul and take over the government.5 Son is tagged with using the excuse frequently used by the Japanese to justify their policies, that he was trying to “promote peace in the Orient.”3 However, this does not make him a stooge of the Japanese.

The fact that Son, and other Koreans exiled in Japan, looked to Japan as an example of the successful incorporation of Western ideals and accepted Japanese support in their attempt to remake Korea does not mean that they were blind to Japan’s agenda. Indeed, Son and the Tonghak certainly remembered suffering at the hands of the Japanese after the failed rebellion of 1894. However, faced with limited options with a stagnating regime in Seoul and concerns of Western powers, particularly Russia, seeking to gain a foothold in Korea, alignment with Japan was not obviously foolish. In addition, given Japan’s imperialistic ambitions it is likely they would have looked towards Korea for territorial gain with or without Son’s actions.

  1. Carl F. Young in Eastern Learning and the Heavenly Way: Tonghak and Ch’ondogyo Movements and the Twilight of Korean Independence, University of Hawai’i Press, 2014, p.77.
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  2. Id. at 72. []
  3. Id. [] []
  4. Id. at 76.) Son was thus able to use the popularity of the Tonghak with the common people in league with the elite reformers who were imbued with new Westernized theories to reform Korean society and to usher it into the modern world. This was a calculated move by Son, not a naive or fumbling decision.

    Likewise, Son sought to use the Japanese to assist the Tonghak’s triumph over the Korean government and their Russian allies. While in hindsight this might be seen as a fateful decision with tragic consequences for Korea, it is not clear that Son’s decision was unintelligent. Instead, it seems more like a necessary gamble. It is argued that Son anticipated the Russo-Japanese War and reasonably believed it would be advantageous for Korea to be aligned with the power that was more likely to succeed. (( Id. at 65. []
  5. Id. at 66. []