Author: 도깨비

The conception of ‘westernisation’ is continually associated with the ideas of modernism, progressivism and liberalism. This dynamic has, and continues to, shape our historical and contemporary understanding, as the west symbolises a global benchmark for other peoples and societies. One of the more interesting points that seems to be downplayed in general western discourse is disillusionment with the west, a particularly interesting theme in this week’s reading: Confucian Renewals. Another fascinating notion was the conception of “easternisation” and its emphasis on Confucianism as a major component in establishing a reinvigorated western society with eastern influences. The concept of Confucianism and utopianism, or at least post-modernism, in conjunction with reconstructing western or global society shall form the basis of this discussion. The two specific readings I have chosen are, Qing Jiang’s Confucian constitutionalist order and Robert Neville’s Boston Confucianism, I believe highlight radically alternate perspectives on how to construct this new Confucian society from a western and globalist standpoint. Neville’s takes a liberal outlook illustrating how to integrate Confucian values while respecting the multicultural and cosmopolitan nature of the west. Jiang, on the other hand, has no time for such formalities and is quick to assert Confucianism’s dominance while still integrating notions of western democracy and liberalism.

 

Neville is quick to detach Confucianism from politics, as he outlines that Confucianism has failed because of politcal context of the societies that implement Confucianism rather than Confucianism itself.[1] Therefore, implementing Confucian ideals in western society will not incite traditionalism or conservatism as Confucianism is so often accused of, especially from the feminist community.[2] On the contrary by adopting Confucianism and specifically its ideals surrounding civility and the practice of ritual, western society, according to Neville, will be greatly enhanced.[3] For Boston Confucians civility and ritual act as the founding fabric that can help solve many of the issues multiculturalism brings. For example, Boston Confucians have highlighted that, by committing to cultural diversity, there is a need in the West to create positive social rituals as a means to respect the social diversity.[4] However, although this has been acknowledged, Boston Confucianism has only offered a diagnosis and is yet to provide the cure. Additionally, the civility Confucianism offers needs to be adapted further as it is a conception of a mesocratic society needs to expand beyond the working world and appreciate the complexity and variety of modern social roles, from work to home.[5] This is something too that Boston Confucianism lacks any practical framework on.

Jiang, on the other hand, takes an entirely different approach as he looks to incorporate western connotational liberalism and the Chinese regime into his new world Confucian society.[6] Jiang does want to achieve a western style of democracy, however this seems rather hollow when he quickly declares a hierarchical society based on the rule of a singular Confucian ancestor.[7] The ailments of Western society, democracy based on people’s legitimacy, that Jiang so vigorously wants to cure is stripped of all purpose with his autocratic replacement. He too then looks to offer a Confucian solution to a western issue but, as witnessed with the Boston Confucians, fails when the practicality of these ideas are analysed.

A recurring theme throughout this module has been to understand the discourse the follows when theoretical abstract ideas come into practice with the realities of world. Although, both the above ideas have not been implemented in the west or the east it is still interesting to debate how viable these ideas are and where their greatest pitfalls may lie, as Bell and Neville have done. However, as evidenced from all the weekly readings to date, the discourse that would follow from their implementation can never truly be realised until they have indeed clashed with reality.

[1] Robert C. Neville, ‘Boston Confucianism: Portable tradition in the late-modern world’ New York press: 2000, p. XXIII-XXIV
[2] Ibid
[3] Ibid p. 10
[4] Ibid p. 16
[5] Ibid p. 17
[6] Qing Jiang, Daniel Bell, Ruiping Fan & Edmund Ryden, ‘A Confucian constitutional order: how China’s ancient past can shape its political future’ Princeton University Press, 2012, P. 3
[7] Ibid pp. 7-8

There is often a common misconception that nationalism and internationalism are juxtaposed, two separate entities that have no compatibility.^[1] This premise is questionable. As Tomako outlines internationalism is de facto predicated on nationalism, it uses the nation-state as a framework for all internationalist theory.^[2] From our readings this week came the most profound example of this connectivity between nationalism and internationalism, which was found in imperial Japan. My assumptions of Japanese imperialism the readings would have most likely led me to  perceive that Imperial Japan was isolationist and self-sustaining, as evidenced from her self-removal from the League of Nations in 1933.^[3] Japan in this period could almost have been described as a ‘neo-Sakoku’.^[4]
Yet, these assumptions were proven to be misconstrued; Japan was indeed internationalist while simultaneously maintaining her ultra-nationalism. It was all possible because of Japanese understanding of internationalism, or, more specifically, the government’s understanding. The government viewed internationalism through a nationalistic lens; simply put, it could use internationalism as a tool to further Japan’s nationalist agenda in contrast to using internationalism as a means of international co-operation. That is not to say that new liberal internationalism did not exist, as some of the finest examples can be witnessed when analysing Japanese diplomats such as Nitobe Inazo, as Abel outlines.^[5]

With all of this said, the premise of this blog will show how an individual concept acted as a perfect lynchpin between culturally-diplomatic internationalist Japan and the political policies of an ultranationalist Japan. The concept was simple and yet had such a prominent role in 20^th century imperialist Japan: “the Occident did not understand the Orient”.^[6] Surprisingly, this notion was commonplace across the Japanese political spectrum. In Inazo’s book “Bushido”, he criticises the Western scholarship of Dr. George Miller and looks to ‘re-educate’ his Western audiences on Japanese culture.^[7] Although, Inazo’s aims are not interlinked to any Japanese political action, it is nonetheless a cog in the mechanism of instilling this idea of Eastern (re)education.

This concept had more political than cultural overtones in the 1930s, as political leaders looked to use this idea that Japan’s actions have been simply misinterpreted in order to justify their actions to the international community. Not only was this used as a defence against Western criticism, but it was used against Eastern states too, as Japan look to assert itself as the embodiment of the East. Yotoku Matsuoka, a Japanese diplomat, declared in his speech to the League of Nations: “I am afraid that advantage is taken by the Chinese representive of Western unfamiliarity with Eastern psychology”.^[8] This remark, along with many others, acted as a reminder for the West to not intervene in Eastern affairs until a sense of understanding has been gained.

But who was to arbitrate whether an understanding had been reached? And furthermore, who would educate the West on eastern affairs? Japan. This was in itself a self-fulfilling perpetual circle; the West criticised Japan. Japan proclaimed Western ignorance. Japan educated the West through ‘soft power’ or the ‘correct’ perspective, the Japanese perspective, and so forth. This was primarily one of the reasons for the change of directive of the KBS (Kokusia Bunka SkinKikai), as it looked to support Japanese military expansionism through promoting international public relations.^[9] To an extent, between 1934 and 1937, it was astonishingly successful as the KBS managed to cement in American public opinion that Japanese contemporary politics was completely divided in two camps: ‘moderates’ and ‘militarists’.^[10] This in turn created an artificial sympathy of Japanese politics and implanted the idea that change was imminent.
Overall, it can be illustrated from key Japanese institutions and political policies how original Japanese ideas surrounding Japanese cultural exportation came to manifest in wider Japanese foreign policy as a tool to placate the West and justify Japanese imperial expansionism.

^[1] Tomaoko Akami, ‘Internationalizing the pacific: The United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations in war and peace, 1919-1945’ , Routledge: 2002, pp. 8-10
^[2] Ibid p.8
^[3] Jessamyn Abel, ‘The International Minimum: creativity and contradiction in Japan’s global engagement,1933-1964’, University of Hawai’I press: 2015, p.16
^[4] Sakoku, referring to Japan’s ‘closed country’ period from around 1630s to 1850s
^[5] Jessamyn Abel, ‘The International Minimum: creativity and contradiction in Japan’s global engagement,1933-1964’, University of Hawai’I press: 2015, p.5
^[6] Though I am familiar with Edward Said’s Orientalism, I have used such an expression because it is reminiscent of Japan’s contemporary foreign policy. The east was heavily stereotyped and yet Japan not only played up to those stereotypes but used it as a mechanism to attract and divert western attention.
^[7] Nitobe Inazo ‘Bushido, the soul of Japan’, Kodansha: 2012, p. 34
^[8] Yotoku Matsuoka Speech to the League of Nations, Geneva, 6th December 1932
<Https://archive.org/stream/Japanscaseinsino00leag/Japanscaseinsino00leag_djvu.txt>
^[9] Jessamyn Abel, ‘The International Minimum: creativity and contradiction in Japan’s global engagement,1933-1964’, University of Hawai’I press: 2015, p.84
^[10] John Gripentrog ‘Power and Culture: Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy in the United States, 1934-1940’ Pacific Historical review: 84, 2015, p.482

From reading “Zen at war”  by Brian Daizen Victoria, I was struck by lack of responsibility or accountability of Buddhist involvement in Imperialist Japan’s military campaigns from modern Japanese Buddhist sects. This disconnect from imperialism is highlighted in the abstract with Brian’s tutor, Master Niwa Rempo, outlining “Zen priests do not get involved in politics”[1]. Although in context this is directed as a response to Brian’s activism in the anti-Vietnam war movement in Japan, in a wider context it illustrates the contemporary Buddhist disillusionment of their historical actions.

The most poignant example of this disconnect can be understood from Brian’s assertion that there exist only four proclamations from Japanese Buddhists outlining their responsibility and complicity in the war[2]. One of which was the Nishi Honganji branch (1991), which stated in the fourth paragraph:

“Although there was pressure exerted on us by the military-controlled state, we must be deeply penitent before the Buddhas and patriarchs, for we ended up cooperating with the war and losing sight of the true nature of this sect, this can also be seen in the doctrinal sphere, where the [sect’s] teaching of relative truth and absolute truth was put into cunning use”. [3]

What does this recognition actually infer and perhaps more importantly what does it omit? Firstly, the composition of the apology suggests immediately the lack of any real conviction. This can be evidenced by the Nishi Shin sect commencing the acknowledgement with a deflection  in the likely effort of minimising the justifiable criticism that should be levied against them.

In addition, the apology fails to outline the historiographical relationship with the Imperialist state. This is of fundamental importance, as by not doing so not only does this illustrate a lack of understanding of how deeply Buddhist mechanism were manipulated, as Kawase Takaya highlights, but that these same mechanisms can still be manipulated today[4]. That is to say the issue is not solely with the state, but rather with Buddhism itself. It is therefore the ethics and morality of the Buddhism disposition, and not the nation state it chooses to attach itself to that needs to be assessed.

Brian outlines Ichikawa Hakagen nine-point moral criticism of Buddhism, in which the very roots of Buddhism are scrutinised to illustrate how they can be interpreted as justifications for a militaristic and imperialist society[5]. Some of the most important include:

1) Karma: used as a tool to express the morality of social inequalities. Any attempt to implement social equality was dismissed as “evil equality”.[6] This rejection of socialist thought incites a right-wing agenda that can be manipulated to perpetuate militarism. Additionally, it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy by supporting an imperialist structure, in which the emperor’s grandeur and exploitation is easily justified from his current socio-economic position.

6) On, the concept of gratitude to one’s parents, ruler, wider humanity and existence. Due to the imperialist concept of ancestral veneration, gratitude for one’s parents can be easily manipulated to represent one’s ruler as head of the nation’s family. This shifts the emphasis of ‘on’ towards propagating imperialist social structure and weakens the need to express gratitude for the other proponents. In an extreme case, it is possible to argue that, due to imperialisms traditional placement of the emperor as the figurehead of the nation’s military, there exists an indirect correlation of on supporting militarism.

9) Ancestral veneration: the notion that the nation-state is completely interconnected as a result of previous historical links. Ancestral veneration, to a greater extent, can be closely associated with the familiar themes found within ethnic nationalism. It enforces the sentiment of loyalty between the subjects of the state and the sovereign as the authoritative figure in the family structure. A consequence of this is the removal all conception of independent thought, while introducing a ‘command structures’ within the society. This structure then somewhat endorses militarism as the accountability of military action is no longer considered.

[1] Brian D. Victoria, ‘Zen at War’ , Rowman and Littlefield: 2016, p.XIII
[2] Brian D. Victoria, ‘The Post-war Zen Response to Imperial-way Buddhism, Imperial-state Zen, and Soldier Zen’ in Zen at War, Rowman and Littlefield: 2016, p. 152
[3] Ibid p.153
[4] Kawase Takaya, ‘Anti-war and Peace Movements among Japanese Buddhists after the Second World War’, in (eds.) Vladimir Tikhonov and Torkel Brekke, ‘Buddhism and Violence’, Routledge, 2013, p211
[5] Brian D. Victoria, ‘The Post-war Zen Response to Imperial-way Buddhism, Imperial-state Zen, and Soldier Zen’ in Zen at War, Rowman and Littlefield: 2016, p. 171
[6] Brian D. Victoria, ‘The Post-war Zen Response to Imperial-way Buddhism, Imperial-state Zen, and Soldier Zen’ in Zen at War, Rowman and Littlefield: 2016, p. 172

Imperialism: Monster of the Twentieth Century by Kotoku Shusui was undoubtfully one the most innovative and radical publications of its time. This is partly, as Robert Tierney stresses, due to Shusui’s dedication to his beliefs; even in an extremely hostile and oppressive society, he became the forerunner for the Japanese anti-imperialist movement.[1] Unlike his contemporaries, Shusui was the first to acknowledge and condemn Japanese imperialism, as anti-Imperialists had, prior to Shusui, solely fixated their criticisms towards European imperialism.[2] Shuisui’s work specifically focuses upon two characteristics of imperialism, patriotism and militarism, both for which he has often received unwarranted criticism.[3] I, for one, feel that such criticisms that have been levied are outdated and would like to demonstrate this in conjunction with revisionist scholarship. Before this, however, it is best to first analyse Shuisui’s work to understand the roots of said criticisms.

Patriotism

Patriotism is a key theme within Shusui’s text, as he looks to outline the contradictory nature of such an ideology in an imperial context. Foremost, he emphasises the shallowness of patriots, whose love for their country is plainly fuelled out of hatred towards other nation-states. It is this ‘otherness’ complex that Shusui is quick to denounce: “for the sake of those whom one loves, one should attack those one hates. This in a nutshell is the logic of patriotism”.[4] When reflecting internally on Japan, Shusui clearly blames the Japanese elite for spreading patriotic fever as an instrument of war. Surprisingly, however, the Emperor appears to be pardoned, for “he prefers peace to war and values freedom over oppression”.[5] This baffling paradox will be discussed later in reference to secondary scholarship.

Militarism

In “Militarism,” Shusui questions the intellect of modern military tacticians, comparing their armaments to toys, while simultaneously belittling their rhetoric.[6] One of the main criticisms Shusui highlights is the contrived argument that war leads to the progression of humanity. Rather skilfully, Shusui points to a plethora of examples that would denote otherwise; furthermore, he goes on to illustrate the archaisms of warfare and how war is an impediment to global society.

Criticisms

The most vocal critiques of Shusui’s Imperialism can be found amongst Marxist historians, such as Itoya Toshio, who stipulate that Shusui fails to capture the importance of capitalism within the imperialist ideology.[7] Itoya Toshio, in turn, is most likely to have been influenced by a Leninist interpretation of imperialism which underlines imperialism as the “highest form” of capitalism itself.[8]

Additionally, criticism can also be seen from a postcolonial perspective in light that the focality of Shusui’s work is based on the detriment of imperialism on the transgressors and not the indigenous. Only fleetingly are the consequences of imperialism for the indigenous populations mentioned, found at the end of “Militarism”, and they can scarcely be understood as more than an afterthought.

Finally, others, like Max Ward, highlight the emperor paradox and state that the acclaimed “symbolic transcendence” of the emperor implied he could be, and indeed was, used by the proponents of imperialism to galvanise the Japanese populace into supporting war.[9]

Revisionism

Post Marxists would question the degree of impetus placed upon capitalism in a Leninist interpretation of imperialism; a state can be imperialist or have imperialist intentions without economic motivations. One should not view history through teleological lens.

Not much can be said as a retort to the post-colonialist, their criticisms are fair and measured. The emperor paradox, on the other hand, should be redressed in its entirety, a reinterpretation best captivated by John Hennessey. Perhaps instead of viewing Kotoku’s work as a singular publication, it needs to be understood within its surrounding context, namely, that “Imperialism” was, or would have been, censored due to any negative connotations directed against the emperor.[10] Socialism and anarchism were barely tolerated in Japanese society and anything remotely controversial towards the Emperor would have severely diminished Shusui’s reputation. Perhaps Hennessey’s justification also explains the events of 1910, when Shusui was arrested for high treason; otherwise, this abrupt transition in developing a hatred for the emperor would seem rather inconsistent.

[1] Robert. T. Tierney, ‘Monster of the Twentieth Century: Kotoku Shusui and Japan’s First Anti-Imperialist Movement’, University of California Press: 2015, p.2
[2] Ibid., p.3
[3] Ibid., p.8
[4] Ibid., p.149
[5] Ibid., p.157
[6] Ibid., pp.163-165
[7] Itoya Toshio, ‘Kōtoku Shūsui: Hito to shisō (Kōtoku Shūsui: The man and his thought)’, Tokyo Century Books: 1973, p.116
[8] Robert. T. Tierney, ‘Monster of the Twentieth Century: Kotoku Shusui and Japan’s First Anti-Imperialist Movement’, University of California Press: 2015, p.2
[9] Max Ward, ‘Monster of the Twentieth Century: Kotoku Shusui and Japan’s First Anti-Imperialist Movement review)’, The Journal of Japanese studies, 45,(2019), p.409
[10] John Hennessey, ‘Monster of the Twentieth Century: Kotoku Shusui and Japan’s First Anti-Imperialist Movement review)’, itinerario, 40, (2016), p. 157