There is often a common misconception that nationalism and internationalism are juxtaposed, two separate entities that have no compatibility.[1] This premise is questionable. As Tomako outlines internationalism is de facto predicated on nationalism, it uses the nation-state as a framework for all internationalist theory.[2] From our readings this week came the most profound example of this connectivity between nationalism and internationalism, which was found in imperial Japan. My assumptions of Japanese imperialism the readings would have most likely led me to perceive that Imperial Japan was isolationist and self-sustaining, as evidenced from her self-removal from the League of Nations in 1933.[3] Japan in this period could almost have been described as a ‘neo-Sakoku’.[4]
Yet, these assumptions were proven to be misconstrued; Japan was indeed internationalist while simultaneously maintaining her ultra-nationalism. It was all possible because of Japanese understanding of internationalism, or, more specifically, the government’s understanding. The government viewed internationalism through a nationalistic lens; simply put, it could use internationalism as a tool to further Japan’s nationalist agenda in contrast to using internationalism as a means of international co-operation. That is not to say that new liberal internationalism did not exist, as some of the finest examples can be witnessed when analysing Japanese diplomats such as Nitobe Inazo, as Abel outlines.[5]
With all of this said, the premise of this blog will show how an individual concept acted as a perfect lynchpin between culturally-diplomatic internationalist Japan and the political policies of an ultranationalist Japan. The concept was simple and yet had such a prominent role in 20th century imperialist Japan: “the Occident did not understand the Orient”.[6] Surprisingly, this notion was commonplace across the Japanese political spectrum. In Inazo’s book “Bushido”, he criticises the Western scholarship of Dr. George Miller and looks to ‘re-educate’ his Western audiences on Japanese culture.[7] Although, Inazo’s aims are not interlinked to any Japanese political action, it is nonetheless a cog in the mechanism of instilling this idea of Eastern (re)education.
This concept had more political than cultural overtones in the 1930s, as political leaders looked to use this idea that Japan’s actions have been simply misinterpreted in order to justify their actions to the international community. Not only was this used as a defence against Western criticism, but it was used against Eastern states too, as Japan look to assert itself as the embodiment of the East. Yotoku Matsuoka, a Japanese diplomat, declared in his speech to the League of Nations: “I am afraid that advantage is taken by the Chinese representive of Western unfamiliarity with Eastern psychology”.[8] This remark, along with many others, acted as a reminder for the West to not intervene in Eastern affairs until a sense of understanding has been gained.
But who was to arbitrate whether an understanding had been reached? And furthermore, who would educate the West on eastern affairs? Japan. This was in itself a self-fulfilling perpetual circle; the West criticised Japan. Japan proclaimed Western ignorance. Japan educated the West through ‘soft power’ or the ‘correct’ perspective, the Japanese perspective, and so forth. This was primarily one of the reasons for the change of directive of the KBS (Kokusia Bunka SkinKikai), as it looked to support Japanese military expansionism through promoting international public relations.[9] To an extent, between 1934 and 1937, it was astonishingly successful as the KBS managed to cement in American public opinion that Japanese contemporary politics was completely divided in two camps: ‘moderates’ and ‘militarists’.[10] This in turn created an artificial sympathy of Japanese politics and implanted the idea that change was imminent.
Overall, it can be illustrated from key Japanese institutions and political policies how original Japanese ideas surrounding Japanese cultural exportation came to manifest in wider Japanese foreign policy as a tool to placate the West and justify Japanese imperial expansionism.
[1] Tomaoko Akami, ‘Internationalizing the pacific: The United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations in war and peace, 1919-1945’ , Routledge: 2002, pp. 8-10
[2] Ibid p.8
[3] Jessamyn Abel, ‘The International Minimum: creativity and contradiction in Japan’s global engagement,1933-1964’, University of Hawai’I press: 2015, p.16
[4] Sakoku, referring to Japan’s ‘closed country’ period from around 1630s to 1850s
[5] Jessamyn Abel, ‘The International Minimum: creativity and contradiction in Japan’s global engagement,1933-1964’, University of Hawai’I press: 2015, p.5
[6] Though I am familiar with Edward Said’s Orientalism, I have used such an expression because it is reminiscent of Japan’s contemporary foreign policy. The east was heavily stereotyped and yet Japan not only played up to those stereotypes but used it as a mechanism to attract and divert western attention.
[7] Nitobe Inazo ‘Bushido, the soul of Japan’, Kodansha: 2012, p. 34
[8] Yotoku Matsuoka Speech to the League of Nations, Geneva, 6th December 1932
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[9] Jessamyn Abel, ‘The International Minimum: creativity and contradiction in Japan’s global engagement,1933-1964’, University of Hawai’I press: 2015, p.84
[10] John Gripentrog ‘Power and Culture: Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy in the United States, 1934-1940’ Pacific Historical review: 84, 2015, p.482