From reading “Zen at war” by Brian Daizen Victoria, I was struck by lack of responsibility or accountability of Buddhist involvement in Imperialist Japan’s military campaigns from modern Japanese Buddhist sects. This disconnect from imperialism is highlighted in the abstract with Brian’s tutor, Master Niwa Rempo, outlining “Zen priests do not get involved in politics”[1]. Although in context this is directed as a response to Brian’s activism in the anti-Vietnam war movement in Japan, in a wider context it illustrates the contemporary Buddhist disillusionment of their historical actions.
The most poignant example of this disconnect can be understood from Brian’s assertion that there exist only four proclamations from Japanese Buddhists outlining their responsibility and complicity in the war[2]. One of which was the Nishi Honganji branch (1991), which stated in the fourth paragraph:
“Although there was pressure exerted on us by the military-controlled state, we must be deeply penitent before the Buddhas and patriarchs, for we ended up cooperating with the war and losing sight of the true nature of this sect, this can also be seen in the doctrinal sphere, where the [sect’s] teaching of relative truth and absolute truth was put into cunning use”. [3]
What does this recognition actually infer and perhaps more importantly what does it omit? Firstly, the composition of the apology suggests immediately the lack of any real conviction. This can be evidenced by the Nishi Shin sect commencing the acknowledgement with a deflection in the likely effort of minimising the justifiable criticism that should be levied against them.
In addition, the apology fails to outline the historiographical relationship with the Imperialist state. This is of fundamental importance, as by not doing so not only does this illustrate a lack of understanding of how deeply Buddhist mechanism were manipulated, as Kawase Takaya highlights, but that these same mechanisms can still be manipulated today[4]. That is to say the issue is not solely with the state, but rather with Buddhism itself. It is therefore the ethics and morality of the Buddhism disposition, and not the nation state it chooses to attach itself to that needs to be assessed.
Brian outlines Ichikawa Hakagen nine-point moral criticism of Buddhism, in which the very roots of Buddhism are scrutinised to illustrate how they can be interpreted as justifications for a militaristic and imperialist society[5]. Some of the most important include:
1) Karma: used as a tool to express the morality of social inequalities. Any attempt to implement social equality was dismissed as “evil equality”.[6] This rejection of socialist thought incites a right-wing agenda that can be manipulated to perpetuate militarism. Additionally, it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy by supporting an imperialist structure, in which the emperor’s grandeur and exploitation is easily justified from his current socio-economic position.
6) On, the concept of gratitude to one’s parents, ruler, wider humanity and existence. Due to the imperialist concept of ancestral veneration, gratitude for one’s parents can be easily manipulated to represent one’s ruler as head of the nation’s family. This shifts the emphasis of ‘on’ towards propagating imperialist social structure and weakens the need to express gratitude for the other proponents. In an extreme case, it is possible to argue that, due to imperialisms traditional placement of the emperor as the figurehead of the nation’s military, there exists an indirect correlation of on supporting militarism.
9) Ancestral veneration: the notion that the nation-state is completely interconnected as a result of previous historical links. Ancestral veneration, to a greater extent, can be closely associated with the familiar themes found within ethnic nationalism. It enforces the sentiment of loyalty between the subjects of the state and the sovereign as the authoritative figure in the family structure. A consequence of this is the removal all conception of independent thought, while introducing a ‘command structures’ within the society. This structure then somewhat endorses militarism as the accountability of military action is no longer considered.
[1] Brian D. Victoria, ‘Zen at War’ , Rowman and Littlefield: 2016, p.XIII
[2] Brian D. Victoria, ‘The Post-war Zen Response to Imperial-way Buddhism, Imperial-state Zen, and Soldier Zen’ in Zen at War, Rowman and Littlefield: 2016, p. 152
[3] Ibid p.153
[4] Kawase Takaya, ‘Anti-war and Peace Movements among Japanese Buddhists after the Second World War’, in (eds.) Vladimir Tikhonov and Torkel Brekke, ‘Buddhism and Violence’, Routledge, 2013, p211
[5] Brian D. Victoria, ‘The Post-war Zen Response to Imperial-way Buddhism, Imperial-state Zen, and Soldier Zen’ in Zen at War, Rowman and Littlefield: 2016, p. 171
[6] Brian D. Victoria, ‘The Post-war Zen Response to Imperial-way Buddhism, Imperial-state Zen, and Soldier Zen’ in Zen at War, Rowman and Littlefield: 2016, p. 172