Beginning in 1868, the Meiji Restoration was a state-led effort to modernize Japan. As the Tokugawa government was abolished, the Confucian backbone of the state was viciously attacked. Religious persecution grew as the Meiji sought the establishment of Shinto as Japan’s national religion, an idea influenced by the centrality of Christianity for European states. By the late 1880s, Confucian institutions (like schools) and religious practices nearly vanished from Japanese Society.1 The state viewed Confucianism as backward, “the antithesis of Western Modernity,” but this is exactly what led to its revival.
Inoue Tetsujirō (1855-1944) led the Confucian revival in the 1890s. Inoue was a professor at the Tokyo Imperial University and a political commentator in major public debates of the late Meiji Period. His experience studying in Europe for six years (1884-1890) was formative, taking inspiration from the strength of German nationalism through its centrality of Christianity.2 With a long anti-Christian tradition and the Meiji era’s emphasis on Shinto in ‘National Learning’, Christianity could not be replicated in Japan.3. Instead, Inoue would try to replicate Germany’s model by positioning Confucianism as central.
Although the revival of Confucianism was a traditionalist movement, the ‘religion’ was transformed to fit the modern context. Tetsujirō would adapt Confucianism from a religion to a Philosophy. He argued Confucianism was an “ethical system” that would foster “National Morality” while being “scientific” because it does not undermine the modern emphasis on secular education.4 This uniquely Japanese rebrand of the old religion builds on Western ideas and borrows traditional concepts. He argues Confucianism’s secularity and rationalism (through the hierarchical structures of Confucianism akin to Western ideas like Social Darwinism) make it superior to the West’s Christianity.5 The national exceptionalism foundational to Inoue conception made it a uniquely ‘Japanese Confucianism’.
As critical discourse grew in response to the Meiji policy of Westernization (seen in the debates on Overcoming Modernity) traditionalists saw the Confucian Revival as a way to bridge the modern and the idealistic past. Although Confucian Academies never completely recovered from the pre-Meiji times, the state increasingly absorbed the philosophy. Inoue’s influence can be seen through his advisory role in the “official interpretation of the Imperial Rescript on Education” which adapted the 1890 order to teach Confucian values.6 Confucianism grew closer to the state over time and embedded itself as a core ideology alongside Shinto. This can be seen through state, rituals and ceremonies, common in the late 1920s, which were often Confucian or Shinto.7 As the state came to dominate Confucianism, it became susceptible to adoption into the fascist imperial doctrine of the 30s and 40s. The ‘Kingly Way’ became the ‘Imperial Way’
Insoue’s ideas became problematic during the 15 Years War between the Manchuria Invasion and WW2. The revival of Confucianism in Japan justified imperialism in China as defending East Asian values against the Communists (CCP) and Chinese Republicans (KMT) who saw it as the antithesis of their mission.8 The Japanese saw themselves as defending the East from the Western powers. Korea, a nation that was centrally Confucian under the Choson state, was forced to adopt Japanese last names after 1937, going against the values of Filial Piety. This demonstrates the inability of the Japanese to maintain the Eastern Tradition in the way they had justified it previously.9
In the post-war years, Insoue’s ideas became taboo. Confucianism became akin to fascism. The author states the philosophy “was best forgotten”.10 However, it may be time to reconsider the legacy of Confucianism and fascism. Many pre-war figures, like those from the Kyoto School, were rethought and reconsidered in ‘modern’ contexts. A similar attempt should be made with Inoue Tetsujirō and Japanese Confucianism.
- Paramore, Kiri. “Confucianism as Facism (1868-1945).” Japanese Confucianism: A Cultural History. New Approaches to Asian History. Cambridge University Press; 2016: 144 [↩]
- Davis, Winston. “The Civil Theology of Inoue Tetsujirō.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 3, no. 1 (1976): 7. https://doi.org/10.2307/3023095. [↩]
- Paramore, Kiri. “Confucianism as Fascism (1868-1945).” Japanese Confucianism: A Cultural History. New Approaches to Asian History. Cambridge University Press; 2016: 155 [↩]
- Paramore, Kiri. “Confucianism as Facism (1868-1945).” Japanese Confucianism: A Cultural History. New Approaches to Asian History. Cambridge University Press; 2016: 150. [↩]
- Davis, Winston. “The Civil Theology of Inoue Tetsujirō.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 3, no. 1 (1976):7. https://doi.org/10.2307/3023095. [↩]
- Paramore, Kiri. “Confucianism as Facism (1868-1945).” Japanese Confucianism: A Cultural History. New Approaches to Asian History. Cambridge University Press; 2016: 152 [↩]
- Paramore, Kiri. “Confucianism as Fascism (1868-1945).” Japanese Confucianism: A Cultural History. New Approaches to Asian History. Cambridge University Press; 2016: 156 [↩]
- Paramore, Kiri. “Confucianism as Fascism (1868-1945).” Japanese Confucianism: A Cultural History. New Approaches to Asian History. Cambridge University Press; 2016: 159 [↩]
- Paramore, Kiri. “Confucianism as Fascism (1868-1945).” Japanese Confucianism: A Cultural History. New Approaches to Asian History. Cambridge University Press; 2016: 165 [↩]
- Paramore, Kiri. “Confucianism as Fascism (1868-1945).” Japanese Confucianism: A Cultural History. New Approaches to Asian History. Cambridge University Press; 2016: 166 [↩]