Nihonjinron? Japanese Uniqueness and Pan-Asianism.

‘It has been, however, the great privilege of Japan to realize this unity-in-complexity with a special clearness… it is in Japan alone that the historic wealth of Asiatic culture can be consecutively studied through its treasured specimens. The Imperial collection, the Shinto temples, and the opened dolmens, reveal the subtle curves of Hang [sic] workmanship’[1].

Japanese nationalism was intrinsically linked to aspects of Pan-Asianism since the opening of Japan in 1853-1854 until the end of the Pacific war. During this time, Japanese theoreticians and politicians used Pan-Asianism as justification for Japanese territorial expansionism and their colonial projects[2]. Snyder has described pan-national movements as ‘extended nationalisms’[3]. This was arguably the case in Japan, where a number of notable figures, such as Okakura Tenshin and Ishiwara Kanji, saw Japan as maintaining a unique cultural position as ‘a museum of Asiatic civilisation’ and a unique military position as ‘Champion of the East’[4]. More importantly, parts of this movement also saw a turning away from the orthodox Sino-centric order to favour Japanese supremacy in the East. Japan’s suitability for this task was largely based upon its modernisation and ability to adapt to Western encroachment through modernisation; for many Japanese nationalists and Pan-Asianists alike, Western-style modernity was an ‘indispensable condition for success’[5]. However, historically Japanese figures were arguably incorrect to assume that Japan was unique in many of the aspects of Japanese superiority that they espoused.

The Japanese were not unique in their development of nationalist ideas or western learning. Notable figures such as Li Dazhao created Chinese Pan-Asianist movements that continued to foster and encourage nationalism within their respective countries. Although he still argued for Greater-Japanism in a number of his works, he was a leading figure in the foundation of the Chinese Communist party, an ardent internationalist and leading figure in the May Fourth movement; which created a widespread national consciousness and emphasised western ideas of Science and political theory[6]. Although many Chinese Pan-Asianists did place importance upon Japan these figures still fostered a culture of assimilation with Western ideals and practices.

Nor should the Japanese be considered unique in their ability to fuse western political philosophy with Asian ethics or philosophy. Examination of Kang Yu Wei reveals a figure whose unique outlook is arguably influenced by both western and eastern perspectives. Although he was arguably the first to advocate for Western ideas of Communism in China, his work remains grounded in Confucian ideals of Ren (Benevolence) whilst advocating for technological advancement – a decision that sets him apart from his fellow Confucian scholars in China[7]. Kang Yu Wei arguable represents a unique example that demonstrates that Japan was not alone in its synthesis and adaptation to Western ideals in the 19th century. Furthermore, Chinese fascists and GMD members were able to foster and create ideas of nationalist identity without relying on a Japanese or European perspective.  Examination of Chinese fascists reveals that their policies and uses of Confucianism set them apart from simply being ‘mere imitators of Europeans or Japanese[8]. Chinese Fascists were acutely aware of the problems of imperialism and racism that were inherent with Japanese and European imperial projects, for example, admiring Italy’s economic developments but opposing its decision to invade the nominally independent non-white nation of Ethiopia[9]. This resulted in a nativist approach that was popular amongst the GMD right wingers in from the 1920s to 1937.

This post does not seek to dispute the extent to which Japan was economically advanced or more politically powerful when compared to the rest of Asia in the 19th and early 20th century. However, it seeks to elucidate the extent to which Pan-Asianism fostered a culture of intellectual development and borrowing throughout Asia and focuses on several examples from China to demonstrate this. In reality Japan’s turning away from the west left them ignorant to important developments that began to effect China in this time that arguably reduced the extent to which Japan should be considered unique amongst the Asian nations in its ability to react and adapt to western ideas and culture.

[1] Okakura, Tenshin, ‘Japan is a Museum of Asiatic Civilisation’ In Theodore De Bary, H Paul Varley, Carol Gluck, Arthur Tiedemann, George Tanabe & Ryusaku Tsunoda (Eds.), Sources of Japanese Tradition: Volume 2, 1600 to 2000, (Columbia, 2005), p802.

[2] Saaler, Sven & W. A. Szpilman, Christopher, Pan-Asianism, a Documentary History, Volume I: 1850-1920 (Westport, Rowman) p13.

[3] Ibid, p13.

[4] Okakura, Tenshin, ‘Japan is a Museum of Asiatic Civilisation’ in Japanese Tradition, p804.

‘Personal Opinion on the Manchuria-Mongolia Problem,’ in Theodore De Bary, H Paul Varley, Carol Gluck, Arthur Tiedemann, George Tanabe & Ryusaku Tsunoda (Eds.), Sources of Japanese Tradition: Volume 2, 1600 to 2000, (Columbia, 2005), p986.

[5] Saaler, Szpilman, Pan-Asianism, p38.

[6] Li Dazhao, “Greater Asianism and New Asianism,” in Saaler, Sven & W. A. Szpilman, Christopher, Pan-Asianism, a Documentary History, Volume I: 1850-1920 (Westport, Rowman), pp179-182.

[7] K’ang, Yu-Wei,  The one world Philosophy of K’ang Yu Wei ed. & trans Laurence G Thompson, (London, 1958).

[8] Clinton, Maggie.  Nativism: Fascism and Culture in China, 1925-1937. (Duke, 2017) p13.

[9] Ibid, pp13 & 60.