Author: Rikidōzan

In Zen at War Brian Victoria attacks the post-war revisionist version of the role of Religion in modern Japan by examining the relationship between Zen and War in the modern period, with particular reference to Zen’s endorsement of Japanese warfare and the Japanese Imperial project. Although at times problematic, its role in exposing the intellectual dishonesty of Japanese Buddhists and their collusion with the Japanese War effort is significant, as Victoria remarks ‘the book you are about to read is simply not a book about religious history but also one that has made history’[1]. However, there are a number of issues within Victoria’s work that could lead to a misunderstanding of the extent to which Zen was responsible for Japanese atrocities during the war. As Victoria overtly focuses on the Buddhist religious justifications for the Japanese imperial vision he runs the risk of inducing readers into believing that the explanations for the political atrocities of the Japanese can be found purely within their religious doctrines. He also risks inducing readers into believing that only Buddhism should be held responsible for its involvement in the Japanese war effort. Although Victoria mentions shinto and confucianism within his works he does not explore this fully.

In reality state Shinto, played an equally damning role in the Japanese war effort and imperial project through its prominence within the Kominka movement, repressing traditional religions within Taiwan and Korea by replacing shrines and temples[2]. The Kominka movement and Shinto thus permeated colonies through the importance of youth groups in which youths were expected to perform the Misogi[3]. The State Shinto saw the religion utilised as ‘a major force for mobilizing imperial loyalties on behalf of nation building’[4]. Although State Shinto was technically ended with the end of World war II its importance in the Imperial project of Japan should not be understated.

Victoria’s interpretative strategy thus runs the risk that readers will ignore the normality of Imperialist violence within the development of the Japanese Modern state irrespective of the involvement of Buddhism and the involvement of other religions including Shinto. Although Victoria’s work could largely be considered a polemical attack on Buddhist denial rather than one with a work with historical intentions; there is still a possibility that readers will not consider the broader participation of religions in the imperial project alongside Buddhism.

[1] Brian Victoria, Zen at War, (2^nd Edition) (Oxford, 2006), pxi.

[2] Jo-Ying Chu, ‘Japan’s colonial policies – from national assimilation to the Kominka Movement: a comparative study of primary education in Taiwan and Korea (1937–1945)’ in International Jounral of Historical Education, Vol, 53, 2017, 4.

[3] Sayaka, Chatani, ‘Between “Rural Youth” and Empire: Social and Emotional Dynamics of Youth Mobilization in the Countryside of Colonial Taiwan under Japan’s Total War’ in The American Historical Review, Volume 122, Issue 2, 1 April 2017, p381.

[4] Wilbur M. Fridell, “A Fresh Look at State Shintō”, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 44.3 (1976), p548.

 

‘Today, 40 years after the end of World War II, the Japanese are on the move again in one of history’s most brilliant commercial offensives, as they go about dismantling American industry. Whether they are still only smart, or have finally learned to be wiser than we, will be tested in the next 10 years. Only then will we know who finally won the war….’[1]—Thomas H. White, “The Danger From Japan”.

The 1980s marked the climax of a Japanese Economic Boom. The stunning success of what came to be known as ‘Samurai Capitalism’ caused many in the west to fear that Japan was ‘calling western modernity Into question and claiming the franchise on the future’[2]. More than simply an economic fear, the ‘Japan Panic’ caused a rise in the phenomenon known as ‘Techno-Orientalism’ that continues to be seen in western portrayals of Japan to this day. The culmination of these portrayals, were most prominently seen in the cyberpunk and dystopian productions in the west such as Blade Runner. Interestingly Japan has in some instances adapted and remoulded these genres and produced Japanese cyberpunk, with which parallels can be drawn to Japanese adaptations of Utopian literature in the Meiji period.  Although Japan’s economic prominence has faded in recent years, ceding its prominence to the ‘Four Tigers’ of South-East-Asia, ideas of Techno-Orientalism remain prominent in our culture today[3].

Techno-orientalism is a term coined by David Morely and Kevin Robins in their contribution to the editorial Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes, and Cultural Boundaries (London & NY: Routledge, 1995). In their chapter, ‘Techno-Orientalism: Japan Panic’, Morely and Robins demonstrate the recent development of contrarian stereotypes surrounding Japan; its premodern culture of Samurai and Geisha and its contemporary position as a forerunner in technological advancement[4]. These contrarian stereotypes arose from fundamental issues with perceptions of modernity and orientalism, particularly in the States. Previous stereotypes around the oriental nature of Japan had ceased to apply, and older xenophobic and racial tropes could no longer be used to attach the ‘techno-capitalist savvy’ Japanese[5]. As a result of this, Morely and Robins argued that Westerners produced ‘techno-orientalism’ that sought to critique the oriental whilst acknowledging the modern.

Although it is not possible to say with certainty that Cyberpunk was a direct reaction to the 1980s economic growth of Japan, the Techno-Orientalism of the west was certainly reflected in the cyberpunk genre amongst others[6]. Blade Runner was arguably the forerunner in this endeavour, with its influential image of dystopian Los Angeles resembling Tokyo[7]. The 1982 film arguably marked the first of a number of ‘Japonised’ novels and films, including William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984). The work begins in the outskirts of Tokyo, and although the novel swiftly leaves Japanese technology and iconography predominates[8]. To Morley and Robins this was a reflection of the fears of Japanese dominance amongst the west in the 1980s[9]. Although, critique of Gibson has somewhat mellowed over time, his work still reflects the ideas of ‘Techno-Orientalism’ despite the author’s professed ‘Japanophilia’[10].

Interestingly, these ideas and the genre of Cyberpunk has been somewhat appropriated by the Japanese. Cyberpunk’s ‘cartoonish’ nature appealed to the Japanese Science fiction manga and anime genres[11]. Furthermore, the Japanese have expanded and arguably adapted many aspects of cyberpunk to suit their own narratives. This can clearly be seen in Shirow Masamune’s Ghost in the Shell (1991), in which the strong Japanese cyber-heroine is supported by a cast of weaker male figures[12]. The substitution of the traditional Male hero of American Cyberpunk with a Japanese Herione arguably reflects Japanese adaptation of the Cyberpunk genre for its own messages such as the ‘subjectivity of Japaneseness’[13].  As such, although Techno-Orientalist Western works may have been influenced by Xenophobic ideas of the West, as a genre cyber-punk was both assimilated and adapted by the Japanese. As previously mentioned similar trends have also been seen in Utopian Works. Although Western models were originally imported to Japan during the Meiji period and Japanese Utopian literature was moulded on these Western models, Japanese writers were profoundly affected by their own social situations, as demonstrated by Akutagawa’s Kappa, a utopian vision and social critique of Japan that reflects the insecurities felt as a result of the decline of Taisho democracy and rise of Japanese imperialism[14].

Finally, it is interesting to note that for the most part these ideas of ‘Techno-Orientalism’ have pervaded popular culture to a far greater extent than the ideas that caused their inception. Although this cannot be explored fully, examination of recent films reveals that many of the aspects of this view are still prominent, despite Japan’s fall from economic prominence. A highly notable recent example could be Hollywood’s The Wolverine (2013) in which the American superhero travels to Japan, and as a result of the actions of a technologically advanced Ziabatsu is stripped of his mortality and forced to fight Samurai and Ninjas[15]. The final encounter between the wolverine and a suit of robotic samurai armour, perfectly demonstrates the contrarian stereotypes of Japanese technology and premodern culture[16]. Seen in such a light the controversial decision to cast Scarlett Johansson in the reboot of Ghost in the Shell (2017) has a broader-implications.

Arguably the re-envisioning of the popular Manga, could be seen to reflect more than simply ‘whitewashing’ of a film, as with its new cast the film reflects many of the older tropes of Techno-Orientalism, albeit with less damning motivations[17].

[1] Charles Paulk, ‘Post National Cool: William Gibson’s Japan’, Science Fiction Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3 (November 2011), p479.

[2] Ibid, P480.

[3] David Morley, Kevin Robins, ‘Techno-Orientalism: Japan Panic’ in David Morley & Kevin Robins, Spaces in Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries (London, 1995), p173.

[4] Kumiko, Sato, ‘How Information Technology Has (Not) Changed Feminism and Japanism: Cyberpunk in the Japanese Context’ Comparative Literature Studies, Volume 41, Number 3 2003, p354.

[5] Paulk, ‘Post National Cool: William Gibson’s Japan’, p480.

[6] Kumiko, ‘How Information Technology Has (Not) Changed Feminism’, p340.

[7] Christopher Bolton, Istvan Csicsery-Ronan Jr. and Takayuki Tatsumi, Robot Ghosts and Wired Dreams, (Minneapolis, 2007), pix.

[8] Paulk, ‘Post National Cool: William Gibson’s Japan’, p481.

[9] Morley & Robins, ‘Techno-Orientalism: Japan Panic’, p169.

[10] Charles Paulk, ‘Post National Cool’, p479.

[11] Bolton, Csicsery-Ronan Jr. & Tatsumi, Robot Ghosts, pix.

[12] Kumiko, Sato, ‘How Information Technology Has (Not) Changed Feminism’, p347.

[13] Ibid, p352.

[14] Yoriko, Moichi, ‘Japanese Utopian Literature from the 1870s to the Present and the Influence of Western Utopianism’, Utopian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1999), p92.

[15] The Wolverine, James Mangold, 2013

[16] The Wolverine, James Mangold, 2013

[17] Anne-Maries Tomchak, ‘Is Scareltt Johansson casting Hollywood ‘Whitewashing’?’, 19^th April, 2016, < https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-36083113> [21^st April4 2019]

‘It has been, however, the great privilege of Japan to realize this unity-in-complexity with a special clearness… it is in Japan alone that the historic wealth of Asiatic culture can be consecutively studied through its treasured specimens. The Imperial collection, the Shinto temples, and the opened dolmens, reveal the subtle curves of Hang [sic] workmanship’[1].

Japanese nationalism was intrinsically linked to aspects of Pan-Asianism since the opening of Japan in 1853-1854 until the end of the Pacific war. During this time, Japanese theoreticians and politicians used Pan-Asianism as justification for Japanese territorial expansionism and their colonial projects[2]. Snyder has described pan-national movements as ‘extended nationalisms’[3]. This was arguably the case in Japan, where a number of notable figures, such as Okakura Tenshin and Ishiwara Kanji, saw Japan as maintaining a unique cultural position as ‘a museum of Asiatic civilisation’ and a unique military position as ‘Champion of the East’[4]. More importantly, parts of this movement also saw a turning away from the orthodox Sino-centric order to favour Japanese supremacy in the East. Japan’s suitability for this task was largely based upon its modernisation and ability to adapt to Western encroachment through modernisation; for many Japanese nationalists and Pan-Asianists alike, Western-style modernity was an ‘indispensable condition for success’[5]. However, historically Japanese figures were arguably incorrect to assume that Japan was unique in many of the aspects of Japanese superiority that they espoused.

The Japanese were not unique in their development of nationalist ideas or western learning. Notable figures such as Li Dazhao created Chinese Pan-Asianist movements that continued to foster and encourage nationalism within their respective countries. Although he still argued for Greater-Japanism in a number of his works, he was a leading figure in the foundation of the Chinese Communist party, an ardent internationalist and leading figure in the May Fourth movement; which created a widespread national consciousness and emphasised western ideas of Science and political theory[6]. Although many Chinese Pan-Asianists did place importance upon Japan these figures still fostered a culture of assimilation with Western ideals and practices.

Nor should the Japanese be considered unique in their ability to fuse western political philosophy with Asian ethics or philosophy. Examination of Kang Yu Wei reveals a figure whose unique outlook is arguably influenced by both western and eastern perspectives. Although he was arguably the first to advocate for Western ideas of Communism in China, his work remains grounded in Confucian ideals of Ren (Benevolence) whilst advocating for technological advancement – a decision that sets him apart from his fellow Confucian scholars in China[7]. Kang Yu Wei arguable represents a unique example that demonstrates that Japan was not alone in its synthesis and adaptation to Western ideals in the 19^th century. Furthermore, Chinese fascists and GMD members were able to foster and create ideas of nationalist identity without relying on a Japanese or European perspective.  Examination of Chinese fascists reveals that their policies and uses of Confucianism set them apart from simply being ‘mere imitators of Europeans or Japanese[8]. Chinese Fascists were acutely aware of the problems of imperialism and racism that were inherent with Japanese and European imperial projects, for example, admiring Italy’s economic developments but opposing its decision to invade the nominally independent non-white nation of Ethiopia[9]. This resulted in a nativist approach that was popular amongst the GMD right wingers in from the 1920s to 1937.

This post does not seek to dispute the extent to which Japan was economically advanced or more politically powerful when compared to the rest of Asia in the 19^th and early 20^th century. However, it seeks to elucidate the extent to which Pan-Asianism fostered a culture of intellectual development and borrowing throughout Asia and focuses on several examples from China to demonstrate this. In reality Japan’s turning away from the west left them ignorant to important developments that began to effect China in this time that arguably reduced the extent to which Japan should be considered unique amongst the Asian nations in its ability to react and adapt to western ideas and culture.

[1] Okakura, Tenshin, ‘Japan is a Museum of Asiatic Civilisation’ In Theodore De Bary, H Paul Varley, Carol Gluck, Arthur Tiedemann, George Tanabe & Ryusaku Tsunoda (Eds.), Sources of Japanese Tradition: Volume 2, 1600 to 2000, (Columbia, 2005), p802.

[2] Saaler, Sven & W. A. Szpilman, Christopher, Pan-Asianism, a Documentary History, Volume I: 1850-1920 (Westport, Rowman) p13.

[3] Ibid, p13.

[4] Okakura, Tenshin, ‘Japan is a Museum of Asiatic Civilisation’ in Japanese Tradition, p804.

‘Personal Opinion on the Manchuria-Mongolia Problem,’ in Theodore De Bary, H Paul Varley, Carol Gluck, Arthur Tiedemann, George Tanabe & Ryusaku Tsunoda (Eds.), Sources of Japanese Tradition: Volume 2, 1600 to 2000, (Columbia, 2005), p986.

[5] Saaler, Szpilman, Pan-Asianism, p38.

[6] Li Dazhao, “Greater Asianism and New Asianism,” in Saaler, Sven & W. A. Szpilman, Christopher, Pan-Asianism, a Documentary History, Volume I: 1850-1920 (Westport, Rowman), pp179-182.

[7] K’ang, Yu-Wei,  The one world Philosophy of K’ang Yu Wei ed. & trans Laurence G Thompson, (London, 1958).

[8] Clinton, Maggie.  Nativism: Fascism and Culture in China, 1925-1937. (Duke, 2017) p13.

[9] Ibid, pp13 & 60.

‘Our Holy Prelates [say that God’s word] causeth insurrection and teaches the people to disobey’[1]

Writing in the 15^th century, there is a certain irony in Tyndale’s statements, given the impact of the vernacular bible both at home and abroad. This is particularly true of the Taiping Rebellion, in which over a period of 13 years from 1851 to 1864 twenty million lost their lives. Previous historiography has been quick to stress the alien nature of the Taiping faith as a factor in the eventual failure of the rebellion[2]. However, recent historiography has attempted to challenge this view, arguing that it fails to account for the popularity of the Taiping rebellion and its popularity with the ‘multitude of followers’ that it accumulated throughout its duration[3]. Reilly’s work is a notable example of this in which he argues for the centrality of Taiping Ideology as a motivating factor for the rebellion. During his work, Reilly remarks on an interesting comparison between the English revolution and the Taiping rebellion; two radically different rebellions in terms of their origins and yet both were heavily influenced by fresh exposure to the bible. Although according to Reilly this similarity ‘cannot be applied too strictly’ the comparison provides interesting explanations for the popularity of the Taiping religion at the time[4].

One of the things observed in Christopher Hill’s The English Bible and the Seventeenth Century Revolution was the revolutionary impact of the bible, on sectarian documents at the time, through the transmission of biblical concepts themes and passages. The most notable example of this being Hobbes Leviathan, which contained over 657 references from the Bible[5]. Hill’s justification for this impact is “the political and cultural empire of the Bible in seventeenth-century England”[6]. Although a similar result can be observed within the Taiping Empire, 19^th century China was not exposed enough prior to the rebellion to have its own ‘political and cultural empire surrounding the Bible’. Although not necessarily comparable with the Leviathan in their emphasis on citations, Taiping government documents and reforms are framed with ‘biblical’ idea, but retain their Taiping influence. For example, the Taiping Economic program states, ‘If there is a drought there, draw upon the abundant harvest here in order to relieve the distress there. Thus all the people of the country may enjoy the great blessings of the Heavenly Father, Supreme Ruler and Lord God-on-High’[7]. This demonstrates the emphasis on biblical terminology but lacks the citations of biblical texts prevalent within Hobbes’ Leviathan. Although a similar result can be observed within the Taiping Empire, 19^th century China was not exposed enough prior to the rebellion to have its own political and cultural empire surrounding the Bible. Reilly does little to expand on this explanation, acknowledging the infiltration of the Bible within Taiping Secular literature, but not explaining the discrepancies in cultural influence that have not been accounted for. How then did the bible acquire such weight within the rebellion, without such a cultural empire?

Arguably the political and cultural empire from which the Taiping drew their support was classical Chinese texts. As Reilly observes, following the religion’s germination under Hong Xiuquan ‘the Taiping faith, albeit kindled by Anglo- American Protestantism, developed into a dynamic new Chinese religion’[8]. Although not explored by Reilly, Taiping Religious and government texts have groundings within classic religious Chinese texts. The Taiping Economic Program uses the nine grades specified in the “tribute of Yu” section of the Classic of Documents (Shujing)[9].  Examining the Taiping religious Primer in Verse (Youxue Shi) reveals similar influences, with the familial relationships being expressed in the form of short maxims for prayer, emphasising and extolling relationships previously supported in Confucian Classics[10]. Although anti-Confucian, the Taiping rebellion accepted many aspects of Confucianism, allowing itself to not only be recognised and understood by Chinese Confucians, but also present itself as a more appealing than the political and economic upheaval under the decaying Ch’ing state[11].

This then arguably challenges the arguments surrounding the ‘alien nature’ of the Taiping contributing to the downfall of the period and accounts for the permeation of the Bible within Taiping documents at the time. Taiping’s success and popularity can be seen in their ability to relate an existing corpus of political and cultural influence to the alien, through their use relation of western biblical ideas to the political and cultural empire of China’s classical religions. Although more work may need to be undertaken, there are perhaps greater similarities between the English seventeenth century rebellion than have previously been speculated by Reilly.

[1] William Tyndales, The Obedience of a Christian Man (1528), in H. Walter (Ed.), Doctrinal Treatises, (Cambridge, 1848) p163.

[2] Thomas H. Reilly The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, (Seattle, 2014), p3.

[3] Ibid, p4.

[4] Ibid, p57.

[5] Christopher Hill, The English Bible and the Seventeenth Century Revolution, (London, 1993), p20.

[6] Ibid, p7.

[7] ‘The Taiping Economic Program’ in William, De Bary (eds), Sources of Chinese Tradition Vol 2: From 1600 through the 20^th Century, (New York, 2000), p225.

[8] Reilly, The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, p4.

[9] ‘Taiping Economic Program’ in De Bary, Sources, p224.

[10] ‘A Primer in Verse’ in De Bary, Sources, pp221-223.

[11] Philip A. Kuhn, “The Taiping Rebellion” in Cambridge History of China v10 Late Qing Part 1, pp264-267.