Around 1920s, the Chinese society witnessed a surge of reformative intellectual ideas among the young descendent of the elite class, most of which either oriented towards or, at least, consciously involved a reform of the traditional model of a Chinese family. Traditional theories have it that such a trend was set off by the rising nationalism and romantic individualism sensation , stimulated by external political threats as well as inspired by foreign social movement. A prominent example amongst these intellectual currents is the New Culture Movement, which sees familial reform as a crucial mean to exterminate the chronic corruption and vices in the Chinese society resulted from patriarchy and distorted Confucianism teachings.
The New Cultural Movement deemed the traditional Chinese family as a major obstacle for individuals to discover their creativity and to develop their personhood, which in turn hinders China’s development as a nation in the long term. The patriarchal oppression of one’s personal interests and the patriarchal intervention of one’s private affairs—such as career choices and marriage partners—deprives individuals of their motivations and subsequently stagnates the progress of the nation. The matter became all the more urgent when intellectuals of the early twentieth century viewed China as facing an existential threat. They also advocated the view that the extended family model is outdated and counterproductive. In order to catch up with the more developed states in the world, they believe that a new model of a smaller conjugal family (Xiao jiating) is necessary for the modernisation and industrialisation of China. By analysing the origin of the traditional family model, early twentieth century intellectuals situate the concept in a historical process of formation, which helped them to problematise its perpetuity. Viewing it as a social construction then allows the deconstruction and reformation of the Chinese family model.
Furthermore, this association between family structure and economic productivity led twentieth century intellectuals to shed a different light on the origin of this desire for familial reform. Susan Glosser highlights that, instead of nationalism and individual romanticism, the desire to reshape the family model is actually pushed by socioeconomic factors. The educated and progressive younger generation of the 1920s had increasingly drew associations between an accommodating family, the good citizens, and a strong nation. Following this logic, the familial reform had also encompassed the liberation and education for women, as “good wives and wise mothers” are considered as crucial for the production of fit citizens that can contribute to the development of the nation.
However, from my observation, although the advocation for familial reform had a idealistic starting point of strengthening the nation and help individuals to realise a complete personhood, it is still rather utilitarian and patriarchal in its core. The “individual”, in this case, implicitly refers to educated male Chinese citizens. The old family model was used almost as a scapegoat for China’s degeneration, and the deconstruction of it as a sooth for the male intellectuals’ insecurity under the force of Western political and intellectual influence. This view is also manifested in twentieth century feminist He Zhen’s critique that, educated elite Chinese men were using women’s liberation as a mean to demonstrate their own progressiveness, instead of advocating it for women’s own end.
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