{"id":378,"date":"2019-11-22T14:05:12","date_gmt":"2019-11-22T14:05:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/?p=378"},"modified":"2019-11-22T14:13:47","modified_gmt":"2019-11-22T14:13:47","slug":"the-totalitarian-potential-of-jiangs-confucian-constitutionalism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/2019\/11\/the-totalitarian-potential-of-jiangs-confucian-constitutionalism\/","title":{"rendered":"The Totalitarian Potential of Jiang\u2018s Confucian Constitutionalism"},"content":{"rendered":"

In \u201cA Confucian Constitutional Order\u201d, Jiang Qing rejects the state and governmental model of liberal Western democracies in favour of a Confucian system that he thinks is better suited for the Chinese case. The ground for this argument seems to be Jiang\u2019s perception of Western systems as essentially unstable mob-rules \u2013 a claim he justifies by asserting that \u201cdemocratic legitimacy is based on the sovereignty of the people. This is said to be unique, supreme, absolute, exclusive and alienable.\u201d1<\/a><\/sup> A Confucian Constitutional Order, on the contrary, could be more beneficial to China, as it would be based on three legitimacies, represented in three parliamentary chambers: That of heaven (a \u201ctranscendent ruling will and a sacred sense of natural morality\u201d), of earth (\u201chistory and culture\u201d) and of the human (\u201cthe will of the people\u201d).2<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

While we could argue that Jiang\u2019s argument is constructed upon a false understanding of what liberal democracies actually are,3<\/a><\/sup> it might also be worth to just take a closer look at the system he proposes and consider its political implications, which, despite being downplayed by Jiang himself, seem to have a highly authoritarian, if not totalitarian, potential:<\/p>\n

From reading chapter 3, \u201cA Confucian Constitutionalist State,\u201d it becomes clear that Jiang has one primary concern, a premise upon which his political system is designed, and that is restoring a Confucian understanding of the State as being \u201cformed naturally and reasonably over a long period of history owing to the cooperation of heaven, earth, and the human element.\u201d4<\/a><\/sup> Its character, therefore, is \u201csacred, mysterious, whole, awe-inspiring, and enduring.\u201d5<\/a><\/sup> The governmental system which best accommodates this understanding, according to Jiang, is republicanism under a symbolic monarch<\/strong>, the monarch being a direct heir of Confucius who will embody the nature of the state and have a largely representative and symbolic role.6<\/a><\/sup>
\nIf the monarch\u2019s power is only symbolic, however, then we would expect that in a system labeled \u201crepublican\u201d a significant part of the power would lie with the people, or at least representatives of the people. This, however, is not the case either in Jiang\u2019s model: He relies on a three-dimensional legitimation system based on heaven, earth and the human (as outlined above), and while the will of the people is therefore indeed politically represented in one of the three proposed chambers of parliament, it can hardly be said to bear much political significance: The will of the heaven, in the House of Ru<\/em>, is prioritized by having veto rights over the suggestions of the House of the People7<\/a><\/sup>. Jiang deems this important, since he describes the will of the people as being characterized by \u201cextreme secularization, contractualism, utilitarianism, selfishness, commercialism, capitalization, vulgarization, hedonism, mediocritization, this-worldliness, lack of ecology, lack of history, and lack of morality\u201d8<\/a><\/sup> \u2013 in short, he does not trust the competency of the people enough to delegate them any real political power. This is further emphasized in Jiang\u2019s statement that his Confucian constitutional order \u201ccan ensure that the ruler\u2019s authority and the people\u2019s obedience are seen, respectively, as right and duty.\u201d9<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

But if neither the people, nor the symbolic monarch, maintain real political power in Jiang\u2019s system, then who does?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The answer becomes clear when we look at the Confucian constitutional order in its entirety and recognize another significant institution, the role of which is consistently downplayed by Jiang as being merely \u201csupervisory\u201d10<\/a><\/sup> \u2013 the Academy<\/strong>:<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

This diagram, designed purely based on the description of Jiang\u2019s system provided by Bell in the introduction of the book, shows that the Academy receives an overwhelmingly large share of power.<\/p>\n

The Academy would be composed of scholar-officials, a (presumably meritocratic) elite with the power to control the tricameral legislative \u2013 by training and supervising its members and even, in the case of \u201cdereliction of duty\u201d, by being able to \u201crecall all top leaders of state institutions.\u201d11<\/a><\/sup> Especially interesting is the fact that their control of one of the chambers, the House of Ru<\/em>, even surpasses that of the other two, since its members are directly nominated by the Academy. \u00a0The House of Ru<\/em>, in turn, as mentioned above, has a disproportionate amount of power compared to the other two parliamentary chambers, mainly thanks to its veto-rights.<\/p>\n

One of the Academy\u2019s most impressive powers that seems to be overlooked by both Jiang and Bell is linked to the Historical Records Office, \u201cthat would record the words and deeds of the highest decision makers so that they would be answerable.\u201d12<\/a><\/sup> In other words, there would be no immunity for the members of parliament, something that is usually considered a central right in any republican system, and they could be held responsible for opposing the transcendent will of the heaven \/ the Academy.<\/p>\n

Lastly, I would like to highlight the Academy\u2019s power to issue final verdicts. This essentially turns the institution into a constitutional court of justice. In combination with its control over the other institutions and the fact that Jiang\u2019s model lacks any real executive power (the king would certainly be an executive organ, yet his real power is only symbolic), I believe we can conclude that the Academy would essentially constitute a government of judges, ruling based on a religious or heavenly law set out by Confucianism.<\/p>\n

If Jiang\u2019s Confucian constitutional order were to be implemented in reality, the result would thus certainly be a theocratic system where all power is merged in the hands of the Academy. The fact that it is based on an all-encompassing ideology (Confucianism), makes no real provisions for the rule of law or the separation of powers and, on top of that, requires popular participation in support of the \u201cheavenly will\u201d of the Academy, even gives it, in my opinion, a certain totalitarian potential.<\/p>\n

  1. Qing, Jiang. A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China\u2019s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future<\/em>. Edited by Daniel A. Bell and Ruiping Fan. Translated by Edmund Ryden. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2012, p. 29. [↩<\/a>]<\/span><\/li>
  2. Bell, Daniel. China\u2019s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society<\/em>. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 6. [↩<\/a>]<\/span><\/li>
  3. After all, the addition \u201cliberal\u201d to the term \u201cdemocracy\u201d does not simply refer to the rights that are guaranteed to citizens of a liberal democracy, but more importantly to the fact that the political system was constructed on the principles of liberalism<\/em>, which emphasizes the importance of a constitution that sets out the separation of powers, thus working precisely against<\/em> the concepts of mob-rule and an excess of democracy [↩<\/a>]<\/span><\/li>
  4. Qing 2012, p. 71. [↩<\/a>]<\/span><\/li>
  5. Ibid., p. 71. [↩<\/a>]<\/span><\/li>
  6. Cf. Ibid., p. 71, 74-75. [↩<\/a>]<\/span><\/li>
  7. Cf. Bell 2008, p. 7. [↩<\/a>]<\/span><\/li>
  8. Qing 2012, p. 33. [↩<\/a>]<\/span><\/li>
  9. Ibid., p. 28. [↩<\/a>]<\/span><\/li>
  10. Cf. Bell 2008, p. 8. [↩<\/a>]<\/span><\/li>
  11. Bell 2008, p. 8. [↩<\/a>]<\/span><\/li>
  12. Ibid., p. 8. [↩<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><\/ol>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    In \u201cA Confucian Constitutional Order\u201d, Jiang Qing rejects the state and governmental model of liberal Western democracies in favour of a Confucian system that he thinks is better suited for the Chinese case. The ground for this argument seems to be Jiang\u2019s perception of Western systems as essentially unstable mob-rules \u2013 a claim he justifies … Continue reading “The Totalitarian Potential of Jiang\u2018s Confucian Constitutionalism”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-378","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/378","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=378"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/378\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":386,"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/378\/revisions\/386"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=378"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=378"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=378"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}