Although Wang Hui (b. 1959) and Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990) wrote in different locations and schools of thought, similarities can be found in the ways they saw the world around them. They saw their surroundings in a state of decay, and wished to return to traditional ideas in order to solve their contemporary problems, with modernity playing a key antagonist role in both their ideas.<\/p>\n
In The End of the Revolution: China and the Limits of Modernity<\/em>, Wang saw a significant problem in the form of \u2018depoliticization\u2019, which he believed has acquired \u2018worldwide predominance\u2019 in today\u2019s world.1<\/a><\/sup> The main example he cited is the effect depoliticization has had on democracy. He argued that political parties were becoming less and less representative of their ideas and values under market conditions. These parties have become mere mechanisms of power, and now \u2018the representative system of democracy exists now in name only\u2019.2<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0 Wang looked to Chinese history to find a solution to depoliticization. He argued that while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has expressed regret over the Cultural Revolution, \u2018it does not repudiate either the Chinese Revolution, socialist values, or Mao Zedong thought\u2019.3<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0 The effect of this, Wang continued, was that \u2018the socialist tradition\u2019 continued in China\u2019s current government, and \u2018functioned […] as an internal restraint on state reforms\u2019 as well as allowing \u2018workers, peasants, and other social collectivities some legitimate means to contest or negotiate the state\u2019s corrupt or inegalitarian marketization procedures\u2019.4<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n Wang saw this \u2018socialist tradition\u2019 as a way to counter depoliticization, because it provided \u2018an opening for the development of a future politics […] to break the hold of a depoliticized political ideology after the end of the revolutionary era\u2019.\u00a04<\/a><\/sup> In this way, Wang hoped to use China\u2019s history and tradition of socialism to achieve a democracy that could translate well under China\u2019s contemporary conditions.<\/p>\n The problem Nishitani saw in his world was not the lack of politics, as he illustrated in his essay \u2018My Views on \u201cOvercoming Modernity,\u201d but the lack of a worldview. He believed that Japan stood in a spiritual vacuum, and required a worldview that would put Japan on its correct path. Nishitani began this discussion with an examination of a standpoint that he called \u2018the religiosity of spiritual nothingness\u2019.5<\/a><\/sup> First, by \u2018religiosity,\u2019 he meant an idea that could transcend science in order to be authentic. Anything that transcended science was inherently subjective, and once \u2018the standpoint of true subjectivity appear[ed] within us [..] [it] represent[ed] the one thing that cannot […] be objectified\u2019.6<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0 This leads us to the third part of the equation: \u2018nothingness\u2019. In using this word, Nishitani did not wish to indicate this standpoint was nothing but that it \u2018signifie[d] that which cannot be objectively apprehended as \u201cbeing\u201d\u2019.7<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0 Overall, this \u2018religiosity of spiritual nothingness\u2019 was something that Nishitani believed Japanese people had within them, and was \u2018the deepest aspect of Japanese spirit\u2019, and rooted in Japan\u2019s history and \u2018particular circumstances\u2019.8<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n Nishitani related this religiosity back to his fear of the Japanese lack of worldview. He believed that once this religiosity could permeate the people\u2019s sense of ethics, it would form a kind of moral energy that would be the backbone of the Japanese nation and consequently, a new worldview. This is what Nishitani meant when he asserted that \u2018[t]here is something at the deepest roots of Japan\u2019s traditional spirit that can provide a course of resolution to these present world problems\u2019.4<\/a><\/sup> Once this worldview is formed, Japan would be well on its way towards \u2018its mission\u2019 of \u2018founding a new world order and constructing Greater East Asia\u2019.4<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n Evidently, both Wang and Nishitani looked to tradition and the past in order to find a solution to the world\u2019s current problems. While Nishitani looked inwards, Wang posited a problem and a solution external to the self. However, both Nishitani and Wang were clear on painting modernity as an antagonist. Wang believed that modernity, and its associated Western trends of neoliberalism and globalization, were the reason why depoliticization occurred. Nishitani also drew parallels between what is thought of as modernity and the West, writing: \u2018In general, what is called \u2018modern\u2019 means European\u2019.9<\/a><\/sup> He criticized this modernity as being \u2018divided\u2019 and its religiosity as not transcendent enough – too \u2018secularized\u2019 – to form an authentic worldview.10<\/a><\/sup> Nishitani saw Western modernity as the reason why the West\u2019s worldview had become fragmented. Overall, both Wang and Nishitani viewed modernity as a significant factor as to why these problems existed and persisted, choosing to look towards the past in order to better face their future.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Although Wang Hui (b. 1959) and Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990) wrote in different locations and schools of thought, similarities can be found in the ways they saw the world around them. They saw their surroundings in a state of decay, and wished to return to traditional ideas in order to solve their contemporary problems, with modernity … Continue reading “Returning to the Past and Modernity in the Ideas of Wang Hui and Nishitani Keiji”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-366","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/366","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=366"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/366\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":756,"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/366\/revisions\/756"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=366"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=366"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/transnationalhistory.net\/world\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=366"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}