Tag: philosophy

Confucianism as a World Philosophy: Is This East Asian Tradition Portable to the West?

There is a belief that the Confucian tradition can only be understood under an East Asian context—that only by being raised in East Asia, could one truly understand Confucianism. However, the existence of the Boston Confucians contradicts this assumption. The demonstration of how aspects of Confucianism are present within Boston (and, more widely, America), such as in Robert Neville’s connection between ritual propriety and pragmatic semiotics and the articulation of ren and filial love, which can be related to Christianity, illustrates how Confucian tradition is apparent in Western culture, ultimately proving that it is possible as a world philosophy.

In his book, Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World, Neville draws a link between li, or “ritual propriety”, and pragmatic semiotics.1 By highlighting this connection, Neville reveals Confucian virtues that relate to Western philosophies. Furthermore, this relation exemplifies the West’s ability to conceive Confucianism; thus, it emphasizes Confucian’s possibility as global philosophy. In order to recognize this relationship, let us look at Neville’s definition of both, ritual propriety and pragmatic semiotics. The deeper meaning of ritual propriety to Neville is that it ‘creates culture, is conventional, and is a particular kind of harmony’.2 In other words, rituals are not simply having “good manners” and following some grand exhibition of rites. Rather, ritual propriety should be understood as simpler and common. For instance, rituals transform procreation into the concept of a family. Certain actions which indicate a family dynamic, like parents caring for the wellbeing of their children, are culturally understood. Hence, ritual propriety is communicated through socially acceptable demonstrations of larger concepts, such as family, friendship, and respect.

Pragmatic semiotics holds a similar definition. Pragmatism views language and interpretation as the creation of meaning rather than mirroring reality. Moreover, pragmatic semiotics studies how signs and symbols constitute meaning.3 For example, the difference between mere cooperation and a close friendship are the signs, like a person’s actions, which portray the difference. Certain signs are culturally understood as equating friendship, such as levels of intimacy and trust. In this context, pragmatic semiotics creates culture, is conventional, and is harmonious. These signs symbolize higher associations, like family and friendship, similarly to ritual propriety. Therefore, a formulation of ritual propriety exists in Western culture. This existence shows that vital parts of Confucianism can be perceived outside of the Eastern context. Thus, Confucianism is portable into a world philosophy.

The similarities between Confucianism’s ren and Christianity’s underscore of family also illustrate a Western understanding of Confucian values. Ren is often translated into a benevolent, human “love”, yet it is also a differentiated form of love, which means that it recognizes a difference between a stronger love for one’s family compared to love for a stranger. Still, ren maintains a compassion for others. In Book One, Confucius states that ‘a young person should be filial when at home’ and that ‘he should display a general care for the masses’.4 In Confucian tradition, filial piety plays a vital role as a virtue.5 Likewise, Christianity emphasizes agape and parental love. The Bible contends that ‘thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself’6; additionally, the Bible instructs people to ‘honour thy father and thy mother’.7 Both traditions hold parallel beliefs pertaining to love. Furthermore, both acknowledge the necessity of filial piety to this love. Hence, an essential aspect of Confucianism, that of ren, is already understood in the Western context under Christianity. This understanding allows the West to grasp the teachings of Confucianism—without the requirement of an Eastern context. Thus, Confucianism is possible as a global philosophy.

  1. Robert Neville, Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World (Albany, 2000), p. 2. [↩]
  2. Ibid., p. 9. [↩]
  3. Ibid., p. 12. [↩]
  4. Confucius, ‘The Analects’, in Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden (eds), Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (Indianapolis, 2001), p. 22. [↩]
  5. Tu Weiming, Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Chung-yung, (Honolulu, 1976), p. 55. [↩]
  6. Leviticus 19: 18 (KJV). [↩]
  7. Exodus 20: 21 (KJV). [↩]

Reimagining Tradition: Boston Confucianism’s Transformation of Global Thought

Boston Confucianism illustrates a significant transformation of philosophical traditions in order to be more applicable and relevant to modern intellectual projects. Robert C. Neville and Tu Weiming treat Confucianism as a “portable tradition” that addresses the ever changing multicultural late-modern world.¹ The transformation of ancient philosophical traditions specifically Confucianism occurs through acts of translation, reconstruction, and intercultural dialogue and Neville and Weiming argue that these processes are necessary to unbind Confucianism from the Sinocentric ideas seen in the historical interpretations of Confucianism. 

First, Neville argues that Confucianism shouldn’t be exclusively tied to the East in both historical and ethnic contexts but rather put into dialogue with Western philosophers to foster a multicultural understanding of Confucianism.² Neville argues that Confucianism should be approached similarly to Western philosophers who for example, commonly use Greek philosophies in their works without being Greek or knowing classical Greek. The same framework of reinterpreting ideas from thinkers outside one’s own geographic origins should be applied to Confucianism. By restrategizing how Eastern philosophies and intellectual works are studied and interpreted in academia, Confucianism is reframed as a “world philosophy” or a philosophy that is able to reach and transcend cultural and linguistic boundaries while maintaining its integrity and cultural significance.³ Tu Weiming builds upon Neville’s point by emphasizing the importance of breaking through linguistic barriers through translation of works.  Weiming states that Confucianism cannot survive the changing modern ideologies and stay culturally relevant without being accessible to other cultures through language. If Confucianism was to never be translated into other languages the philosophy would be “linguistically forever inscribed in a Sinitic mode”.⁴ The vitality of Confucianism depends on the intercultural exchange of ideas that is only gained through accessibility in new languages and cultural environments. Therefore, translation according to Weiming is not only a semantic technicality but an essential to Confucianism’s current relevance and modernization. 

Along with intercultural exchange through translation, Neville highlights the transformation of Confucianism through reconstruction as seen in Boston Confucianism. Confucianism tradition has always leaned towards being more dynamic and open to reform as seen through critiques such that of the Zhou ritual and Neo-Confucianist metaphysics.⁵ This internal dynamic of critique leads Confucianism to be able to adapt well into new cultural settings. Boston Confucianism demonstrates Confucian adaptation through the feminist critiques at the Berkeley conference.⁶ Boston Confucians responded to the criticism by separating Confucianism from the traditional patriarchal East Asia history and argued that Confucian principles represent reciprocity and harmony over oppressive hierarchies. Through internal structures of criticism and adaptation, Neville demonstrates how Confucianism is reinterpreted to contemporary ethical and social concerns. 

Through using intercultural intellectual resources made available through translation and adaptability Confucianism is transformed into a global philosophy. Neville and Weiming stress the creation of a “world culture of philosophy” which reconstructs all traditions and allows for all ancient philosophies to address late-modern concerns.⁶ Confucianism as seen through Boston Confucianism becomes indispensable among many emerging discourses and displays how tradition can maintain a connection with its heritage and culture while also reshaping itself to be applied in new contexts. 

  1. Tu Weiming, “Foreword,” in Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World, p. xii.
  2. Neville, Boston “Preface” Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World, p. xxii.
  3. Ibid, p. xxx.
  4. Ibid, p. xii-xiii.
  5. Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Neo-Confucian Philosophy,” in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
  6. Neville, Boston “The Short Happy Life of Boston Confucianism” in Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World p. 21-22.

Nationalism and Propaganda: The Flaws of Kuki Shūzō’s Iki no kōzō as a Nationalistic Ideology

Nationalist undertones are clearly evident in Kuki Shūzō’s Iki no kōzō, or The Structure of Iki; however, critiques on his exploitation of hermeneutic methodology and his universalization of a term concerning a minority for the whole of Japan undermine his book’s ability to serve as nationalistic ideology.

Published in 1930, Iki no kōzō explored the cultural meaning of iki in order to reconcile Japan’s past against the infringing influences of Western modernity. Kuki argues that iki is a Japanese sensibility of taste which can be symbolized through objectification but only truly understood by personal experience. In other words, one may be able to find attributes of iki in Western aesthetics, yet the works would lack the hermeneutic meaning of iki, ‘as a phenomenon of consciousness’.1 Thus, iki becomes a ‘distinct self-expression of an oriental culture,’ —a uniquely Japanese phenomenon.2 In this exposition as a Japanese exclusive taste, Kuki presents a nationalist view: the realization of iki separates Japan from the vulgarity of the West. Hence, in terms of aesthetics, Japan was culturally superior. Nevertheless, this nationalism fails to successfully manifest into nationalist ideology.

In her article ‘In a Labyrinth of Western Desire: Kuki Shūzō and the Discovery of Japanese Being’, Leslie Pincus critiques a paradox in Kuki’s employment of hermeneutics. Although Pincus’s interpretation is contested as ironic and overreaching— ‘[Pincus] removes Kuki’s work from the Japanese context… and tries to build a culturalscape of Japan’s fascism and imperialism in a discourse of Japan’s aesthetics, that may not have existed exactly as she portrayed’ —her evaluation of the hypocritical impact of hermeneutics in Kuki’s argument should not be discounted.3 The paradox stems from Kuki’s revelation that ‘iki has no place in Western culture as a certain meaning in its ethnic being’ and his assertion ‘the study of iki can exist only as a hermeneutic study of ethnic being’.4 The problem, then, lies in the fact that hermeneutics is a Western mode of analysis. Therefore, Kuki ironically ‘the terms in which he articulated Japan’s difference from the West were clearly marked by a long and productive apprenticeship to European letters’.5 If Kuki must rely on European methodology in order to extract Japan’s distinctive aesthetic, iki, then the question of whether this concept would exist without Western modernity emerges. Since Kuki posits iki in direct opposition to Western influences—that iki remains untainted by the West—this question undercuts his book’s appeal to nationalistic ideology. How can Kuki’s argument purport a superiority of Japanese aesthetics, or issue iki as a national defense, when the only way to comprehend this mode of being is through a Western lens. Thus, Western influence infiltrates the very thing Kuki argues it does not, ultimately weakening his nationalistic argument.

Moreover, Kuki’s decision to universalize a term pertaining to a small selection of Japan’s population, hinders his overall assessment of iki as a national mode of being. Iki, as an aesthetic, grew in popularity during the Edo period of Japan. Denoting a specific style of the mercantile class in the city of Edo, iki represented a resistance to the samurai bureaucracy.6 In other words, historically, iki resided in the sentiments and style of the Edo merchant class—a class holding great wealth but lacking status. By choosing a word associated with one social class in one city, Kuki severely limits the inclusive aspect of his argument. How can iki constitute the mode of being for all of Japan when it is only linked to a small percentage of the population? In employing iki as a cultural signifier, Kuki enlarges this minority group to portray Japan. He essentially fabricates a national identity. The lack of consideration for other groups diminishes Kuki’s declaration of iki as a national phenomenon, for iki does not truly represent all of Japan. Consequently, Kuki’s book is unsuccessful as nationalistic ideology.

  1. Shūzō Kuki, ‘The Structure of Iki’, in Hiroshi Nara, J. Thomas Rimer, and Jon Mark Mikkelson (eds), The Structure of Detachment: The Aesthetic Vision of Kuki Shūzō (Honolulu, 2004), p. 58. [↩]
  2. Ibid., p. 17. [↩]
  3. Yukiko Koshiro, ‘Fascism and Aesthetics – Leslie Pincus: Authenticating Culture in Imperial Japan: Kuki Shūzō and the Rise of National Aesthetics’, The Review of Politics, 59: 3 (1997), p. 608. [↩]
  4. Kuki, ‘The Structure of Iki’, pp. 58-59. [↩]
  5. Leslie Pincus, ‘In a Labyrinth of Western Desire: Kuki Shuzo and the Discovery of Japanese Being’, boundary 2, 18: 3 (1991), p. 144. [↩]
  6. Ibid., p. 143. [↩]