Tosaka Jun and the concept of ‘Everydayness’

Tosaka Jun’s exploration of the concept of ‘everydayness’ was a noteworthy philosophical study that reconceptualised everyday life in early 20th century Japan. It emphasised reducing individual experiences of time to the immediacy of ‘today’, likening it to a worker focused on meeting their immediate tasks that are necessary for survival, unaffected by the concerns of ‘yesterday’ or ‘tomorrow’1 This focus on the present highlights the importance of factual reality over abstract notions of time, which Tosaka argued was essential for conceptualising historical time and social change. Harootunian critically examines Tosaka’s distinct contribution to Japanese philosophy, emphasising his advocacy for a rational, efficient modern culture in Japan.

The growth of a new social life in Japan, with new subject positions in Japanese society, from “the people (minshu ̄), the masses (taishu ̄), the modern boy (mobo), modern girl (mogaru ̄), cafe waitress, bar maid, and so on”, made Japanese life increasingly unprecedented2. Tosaka argued that these growing modern customs were constantly reshaping society, and couldn’t be accounted for in philosophical analysis without the presence of ‘everydayness’. He evaluated key dimensions of Japanese life, particularly the culture of the masses in their customs, social relationships, work and leisure life, and consumption habits, as well as the role of science in this new order3. Tosaka’s utilisation of the concept of ‘everydayness’ was therefore pivotal to move away from a more abstract understanding of philosophy, and towards a deeper engagement with the dynamic, lived realities of society. His work was not just an expression of enthusiasm for modern life; it embodied a strong conviction about the evolving nature of Japanese social life in the 1920s and how this was constantly building towards a new future.

Tosaka was not alone in his philosophical study of ‘everydayness’; his work derived from Heidegger’s prior articulation in Sein and Zeit (1926), and formed part of a widespread enthusiasm in the concept of custom (genjitsu) in Japanese intellectual and popular discourse4. What distinguished Tosaka, however, was his preference to the term ‘actuality’ over ‘gentjitsu’ to express a more factual understanding of everyday life.

Tosaka’s understanding of ‘everydayness’ shaped his approach to custom; he did not see it merely as a record of popular social practices, but as a concept with concealed historical and moral significance. For Tosaka, acknowledging everyday cultural practices (fūzoka, or custom) served as an “agent of…actuality” (genjitsu), providing an understanding of the reality of the masses that phenomenology couldn’t tap into5. He critiqued newspapers for oversimplifying the idea of custom by focusing on its popular aspects, which then failed to integrate the underlying economic and social structures underpinning these practices. Prostitution was a critical example of this, as Tosaka argued that it has been consistently overlooked as a vulgar and “transcustomary” practice, without interrogating it as a modern social problem worthy of philosophical analysis3.

This critique underscores his argument that an analysis of custom must incorporate the “character of the popular” (taishūteki) in order to reflect the thoughts and sentiments of the Japanese people.6.His focus on this topic highlights his broader effort to redirect Japanese philosophy towards its core purpose, serving as a lens that could access the overlooked realities of everyday life.

  1. Robert Stolz, “The Principle of Everydayness and Historical Time”, in Ken C Kawashima, Fabian Schafer, Robert Stolz (ed.) Tosaka Jun: A Critical Reader (East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2013) p.13 []
  2. Harootunian, Harry D. Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan (Princeton University Press, 2001) p. 97 []
  3. Ibid. [] []
  4. Ibid. p.127 []
  5. Ibid. p. 122 []
  6. Ibid. p.121 []

A Culture Crystallized over Centuries: The Role of Edo Political Thought in Watsuji Tetsurō’s The Way of the Japanese Subject

Like much of the Kyoto School, Zen Buddhism and concern about modernity played a deep role in the philosophy of Watsuji Tetsurō, with his description of Japanese culture as having “passed through several fires”, positioning “world religions” as an agonistic threat.1. However, The Way of the Japanese Subject was not written in a vacuum, defining Japanese culture through differentiation from its East Asian counterparts predates the Meiji restoration and can be seen throughout the Edo period.

The “Japanization” of Confucianism is a concept on which Tetsurō’s draws from extensive Tokugawa writings.2. Before the Meiji restoration, many Japanese writers had to contend with the idea of China being the “central flowering” of culture, making peripheral nations around China barbarians.3 Due to this reputation as Dōngyí or Eastern Barbarians, Japanese writers up to Watsuji Tetsurō made a conscious effort to argue that Japanese cultural imports had been distinctly differentiated, making them on par with China. An example of this can be seen in the writings of Katsube Seigyo (1712-88), who argued that “Japan is an ingenious nation. We may not be particularly good at inventing things, but we can take something from China, study and learn from it, and make something that works even more splendidly”.4 Similarly, Hattori Taiho (1770-1846) summarized Japanese culture as excelling at “at taking something that someone else has made, utilizing it fully, and adding our own ingenuity to it”.5 Tetsurō takes this idea a step further that while Confucianism is the origin of Japanese obedience, this philosophy “was not an original strain of Chinese Confucianism. It was the Japanese samurai who gave shape to the concept from their own experience.”6

Whilst they reach the same conclusion, the argument that “bushido” was the “living embodiment of the Confucian Way” and the method to which it was Japanized is a major distinction from earlier authors and worth examining.7 The aforementioned emphasis on Bushido is emblematic of the widening cult of the samurai in Japanese culture following the 1890s, however this concept is somewhat anachronistic and therefore the role of warrior codes is less common in Tokugawa writings.8 This could partly be explained with Tokugawa insecurities about being identified with barbarians, as if they overemphasized violence it could play into negative Confucian tropes.9

However, not all Tokugawa writers attempted to define Japan relative to China, the importance of Imperial worship in Japan was emphasized before the Meiji restoration and the Sonnō jōi movement.10. Japan’s position at the “eastern crown” of Asia gave it’s unique claim to the land of the rising sun, and some Edo authors would emphasize its unique position to define Japanese culture 11  . Aizawa Seishisai (1782-1863) would write that the sun was “the source of the primordial vital force sustaining all life and order. Our Emperors, descendants of the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu, have acceded to the Imperial Throne in each and every generation, a unique fact that will never change. Our Divine Realm rightly constitutes the head and shoulders”.7 This statement of Japanese particularism which would put it above its neighbours to the west mirrors the writings of Watsuji Tetsurō that “venerating the emperor embodies the absolute in the Japanese nation” and that this way was “already understood by our ancestors more than one thousand years ago.”6 Even if the Meiji and Showa eras saw a distinct rise in imperial worship, these ideas did not spring out of nowhere but developed naturally from philosophy written during the Shogunate. Similarly grappling with the Japanese place in the world predates contact with Europeans and the crisis of “Modernity”. 

  1. James W. Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis, and John C. Maraldo, eds., Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, vol. 22, Nanzan Library of Asian Religion and Culture (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011), 581
    Wm Theodore De Bary, Carol Gluck, and Arthur Tiedemann, eds., Sources of Japanese Tradition: 1600 to 2000 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 997. []
  2. Ibid []
  3. Watanabe Hiroshi, A History of Japanese Political Thought, 1600-1901, trans. David Noble (Tokyo: I-House Press, International House of Japan, 2012) 279. []
  4. Ibid, 281-282 []
  5. Ibid 282 []
  6. De Bary, Gluck, and Tiedemann, Sources of Japanese Tradition, 998. [] []
  7. Ibid. [] []
  8. Oleg Benesch, Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushidō in Modern Japan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 76. []
  9. Watanabe, A History of Japanese Political Thought, 279-280 []
  10. Robert N. Bellah, “Japan’s Cultural Identity: Some Reflections on the Work of Watsuji Tetsuro,” The Journal of Asian Studies 24, no. 4 (August 1965): 573-74. []
  11. Watanabe, A History of Japanese Political Thought, 283. []

Can intellectuals avoid totalitarian instrumentalisation? Nishida’s thought and Japanese imperialism

Can an intellectual avoid instrumentalisation of their thought under totalitarianism? That is the problem faced by intellectuals in an environment of totalitarianism, whose options are few and trying: to join or be co-opted by the totalitarian project, to retreat in the face of power, or resist and risk persecution. For Nishida Kitarō, and for the philosophers associated with the Kyoto School, this was the prospect faced under Imperial Japan. As an examination of the activities of the philosophers and their period writings show, many were co-opted into providing an intellectual basis for Japanese imperialism, and for Nishida, who intellectually resisted the procession of totalitarianism and ultranationalism of the period, still found his resistance to be ineffectual, and his thoughts ignored or co-opted in service of justifying Japan’s imperial project.

In the context of Japan from the 1920s onwards, this totalitarianism appeared in the form of rising ultranationalism that policed the boundaries of acceptable public discourse, and thus the limits and language within which academic philosophy, as practised by Kyoto School philosophers, must reside. A number of events marked the rise of nationalism and its intrusion into the academic space. The 1925 Peace Preservation Law, the establishment of the Superior Special Police Force and the Research Centre for National Spiritual Culture, as well as the Takikawa Incident and Minobe Incident, saw the gradual tightening of the bounds of acceptable discourse in academia.1 This was the effective prohibition of support for liberalism and questioning of the Emperor’s divine authority. The publishing of the Fundamentals of the National Polity set most explicitly the lines and language of political orthodoxy, effectively within which academia must preside.2 It is within this context which Nishida and other Kyoto School intellectuals operated, and in which their response to totalitarianism should be understood.

One consideration may be whether the weaponization of the Kyoto School’s thoughts was deliberate, either by Nishida himself or by other intellectuals associated with his philosophical thoughts. For Nishida, who had fundamental disagreements with the political orthodoxy, participation in politics implied much resistance and persuasion within the acceptable discursive language, though resistance was ineffectual and co-option still pervasive. The case of the Principles of the New World Order is a pertinent case. Written in 1943 with the prospect of influencing the Tōjō government, Nishida’s initial essay was rejected on grounds of being too difficult to understand, and on revision by Tanabe Juri, an associate, was submitted to the government’s audience. Nishida would be disappointed by Tōjō’s understanding of his writing.3 Accounting for Nishida’s indifference towards Tanabe’s draft, Principles stand as a case of the inability of intellectuals to resist and effect change in a totalitarian environment. Both because of its rewriting and the need to follow the language of political orthodoxy, such as Nishida’s use of hakkō ichiu, in its subversion leaves open the space for misinterpretation in support for Japanese imperialism.

For other philosophers of the Kyoto School, their divergent treatment of Nishida’s thoughts is emblematic of the different approaches to working in a totalitarian context. Miki Kiyoshi, a student of Nishida, argued for a theory of cosmopolitanism based on Nishida’s thoughts that privileged Japan’s position as a leader of Asian countries as a product of its unique good qualities.4 For Tanabe Hajime, who drew on Nishida’s concepts of negation, the dialectic between state and individual, particularly one’s absolute rejection in death, could be construed to advocate for the sacrifice of individuals in service of the state.5 In both such cases the co-opting of philosophy in service of totalitarianism was deliberate, as Nishida’s thoughts are taken beyond the control of its originator. Thus is the limit of an intellectual’s ability to avoid instrumentalisation in totalitarianism.

  1. Christopher S. Goto-Jones, Political philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and co-prosperity (New York, 2005), pp. 73-75. []
  2. Ibid., p. 77. []
  3. Ibid., pp. 79-81. []
  4. John Namjun Kim, ‘The Temporality of Empire: The Imperial Cosmopolitanism of Miki Kiyoshi and Tanabe Hajime’, in Sven Saaler, J. Victor Koschmann (eds), Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, regionalism and borders (London, 2007), pp. 156-160. []
  5. Ibid., pp. 163-166. []

American Films in Japan: A Dilemma for ‘Overcoming Modernity’

Shortly after the Pearl Harbor attacks in 1941, leading Japanese academics and writers assembled at a round table to discuss the topic of “Overcoming Modernity”. This symposium demonstrates the daunting, improbable, and often paradoxical attempts to counter and move beyond Westernization to retrieve the lost Japanese cultural identity. However, these discussions occurred when Western culture, values, and technology were firmly entrenched in Japanese society, long after the Meiji era’s Bunmei Kaika (Civilization and Enlightenment) policy ‘modernized’ the nation.1

On day 2 of the discussions, the scholars criticize the Americanization of Japan through film. The global cultural power of the United States’ cinema industry reveals the complex and paradoxical nature of overcoming modernity: The symposia rejects film as a Western technology that has corrupted their culture, while also advocating for film in Japan to foster a return to tradition or ‘True Japanese Identity’.

The roundtable suggests that Western technology, like the camera and film, has corrupted Japanese culture and identity. Nishitani, a prominent Kyoto school member, opens the discussion by calling on Tsemura, a well-known film critic. Tsemura views Japan as a superior culture, lamenting the popularity of ignorant, low-brow American media. He detests the Western “machine society” that values quantity over quality and suggests the lack of historical tradition and multiracial makeup in the US as a reason for its films’ “global universality.”2 Tsemura views Americanization and Western technology as a poison to their traditional culture.

In the symposia there is a conservative desire to return to an idyllic, pure Japanese origin. The panelists suggest this can be accomplished through the spread of traditional representations, like the Japanese classics.3. However, the symposia acknowledges that the classics are unappealing to Japan’s young generation – the same “modern boys” and “modern girls” shaped by their appeal to the “optimism, speed, and eroticism” of American cinema.4 American film’s widespread appeal and the public’s general disinterest in the classics represent a core dilemma for the roundtable.

Recognizing the need to overcome the spread of Americanization through the medium of film, Tsumura surprisingly suggests that film could be adapted to instill the Japanese spirit.  Tsumura cites the Newsreels on the Greater East Asian War and its use in medical schools as evidence of the educational importance of film for Japanese society.5 He argues that film cannot be rejected because it emerged from the US; Like many technologies, it is ubiquitous and embedded into everyday life – “undeniable”.6 Instead, film must be adapted to promote a “higher culture” in Japan.7 Thus, to return culture to its idyllic past, away from the poisonous influence of the West, Japan must use a popular Western technology (film) to instill a traditional, ‘True Japanese Identity’ in modern boys and girls.

This, of course, is paradoxical; However, it does reveal the complexity of the roundtable’s dilemma. For the Kyoto School, ‘Overcoming Modernity’ was accomplished through “passing through modernity” – neither turning back to an idyllic past nor embracing Westernization, but moving forward by embracing both.8 Cinema represents one Western medium that the panel both rejects and embraces to overcome modernity. However, living through a time of ‘world-historical importance’ at the opening of World War 2, the symposium offers no clear solution to Japan’s predicament.

 

  1. Calichman, Richard. Overcoming Modernity: Cultural Identity in Wartime Japan. (New York: Columbia Press, 2008), p.8 []
  2. Calichman, Richard. Overcoming Modernity: Cultural Identity in Wartime Japan. (New York: Columbia Press, 2008), p.201 []
  3. Calichman, Richard. Overcoming Modernity: Cultural Identity in Wartime Japan. (New York: Columbia Press, 2008), p.200  []
  4. ibid  []
  5. Calichman, Richard. Overcoming Modernity: Cultural Identity in Wartime Japan. (New York: Columbia Press, 2008), p.202 []
  6. Calichman, Richard. Overcoming Modernity: Cultural Identity in Wartime Japan. (New York: Columbia Press, 2008), p.203 []
  7. Calichman, Richard. Overcoming Modernity: Cultural Identity in Wartime Japan. (New York: Columbia Press, 2008), p.203 []
  8. Davis, Bret W. “The Kyoto School.” Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kyoto-school/. []

Leslie Pincus: review of Shuzo Kuki

Shuzo Kuki, a prominent Japanese philosopher of the early twentieth century, is best remembered for his seminal work, ‘Iki no Kozo’ (The Structure of Iki). His book was published in 1930; it explores the aesthetic concept of ‘iki’, which is a term that encompasses a sophisticated style prevalent in the late Edo urban culture of Japan. Kuki argued, that ‘iki’ embodied both ideas of cosmopolitanism and modernity, comparable to that of Western cultures.1 Furthermore, especially after the second world war, Kuki’s work would become more well known on the global scale, sparking recognition as a successful synthesis of both Western and Japanese aesthetics.

Leslie Pincus, in her work ‘Fascism and Aesthetics’, critiques the general presupposition of a favourable western interpretation of Kuki’s philosophy. Indeed, she makes the argument that there is a link between Kuki’s modern aestheticism and political fascism, believing that Kuki both admired and was antagonistic towards the West, fearing complete cultural colonization, which is why he tried to assert Japan’s cultural superiority over the West.2Pincus calls for a reevaluation of Kuki’s legacy; to reexamine the extent to which his work influenced cultural nationalism in Japan. She believes that by romanticizing the imperial rule as having ‘traditional harmony’, it led to the Japanese assertion of fascist ideologies,3 who sought to impose these ideas that perhaps never even existed in history to begin with. Pincus offer’s a critical look on Kuki’s work, relating it to still have prevalence in the discussion of Japanese nationalism, modernity, and the ongoing dialogue between the West and Japan nowadays.

 

 

 

 

  1. Koshiro, Yukiko. Review of Fascism and Aesthetics, by Leslie Pincus. The Review of Politics 59, no. 3 (1997), p. 606 []
  2. Koshiro, Review of Fascism and Aesthetics, p. 606 []
  3. Koshiro, Review of Fascism and Aesthetics, p. 606 []

The Role of Contingency in Kuki Shūzō’s Philosophy of Japanese Identity and Aesthetics

Kuki Shūzō was a philosopher on the fringes of the Kyoto School in 20th century Japan. He pursued a uniquely Japanese aesthetic identity amidst the assimilation of Japanese culture to Western modernization, combining Western philosophical frameworks and Japanese sensibilities in his construction of iki–an identity made up of pride and restraint calling back to Edo-period lifestyles. Kuki’s philosophy negotiates contingency in defining Japanese identity, and his use of contingent aesthetics–particularly in his exploration of iki–can be both a source of cultural insight and critique.

Kuki’s major philosophical writings celebrated difference and individuality, defining the concept of contingency as the gap between analysis and experience which is generally opposed to universal judgments.1 Though this particular discussion is heavily metaphysical, it is useful in understanding Kuki Shūzō’s contributions to identity during the interwar era. Iki was seen as possessing unstable qualities of being, which centered the role of tradition while moving into the future. Because every contingency is unlabeled, its existence is fragile and faces an inevitable realization of destruction.2 This abstract concept relates to Kuki’s engagement with iki as a necessary but fluid development of Japanese culture and, in a contradictory manner, as a source of stability during the rapid development of the 20th century.

Kuki’s exploration of contingency allows his construction of Japanese identity to remain fluid and free from the essentialist constraints seen in Western identity frameworks.3 Kuki understood iki as contingent on historical and social factors, highlighting the inherent fluidity of the non-essential characteristics which shape Japanese cultural identity. From this perspective, iki became a tool to signify a unique sense of Japaneseness against the encroaching influence of Western universalism, yet Kuki relied on the frameworks of Western aesthetic to explore and justify it.4 Pincus further problematizes iki’s cross-cultural contingent foundations by arguing that Kuki’s exploration of the subject was built off of ‘Western desire’. She elaborates that Japan had spent a significant period assimilating to the West, which forced them to “delineate Japaneseness against, and within, Western discursive modes”5 Kuki reached for iki as an aesthetic style which preceded direct Western engagement with Japan, elevating it as the last distinctive signifier of Japanese culture.6 This makes iki contingent upon the West even as it reaches to establish itself as wholly Japanese, further complicating the role of contingent identity in establishing a cultural standard.

This is additionally explored by Koshiro, who critiques how the iki aesthetic could be used within Japanese nationalist ideologies by attempting to fix a contingent identity as a pure authentic ideal. As one example, Kuki has been criticized for his aristocratic worship of the emperor and his portrayal of it as an integral part of Japanese tradition in iki.7 The implications of using unstable aesthetics to define identity draws into question whether Kuki’s construction of iki has the potential to serve Japan’s authoritarian ends by masking contingency as pure authenticity, interacting with nationalist endeavors and Japan’s imperial identity. Thus, the role of contingency in Kuki’s work is both an intellectual asset and an obstacle, whose analysis offers insights into the complexities of building a stable cultural identity in a globalized world.

  1. John C. Maraldo, ‘Kuki Shūzō’ in James W. Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis, and John C. Maraldo (eds) Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Honolulu, 2011) pp. 829, 834. []
  2. Ibid., p. 846-847. []
  3. Leslie Pincus, ‘In a Labyrinth of Western Desire: Kuki Shuzo and the Discovery of Japanese Being’, Boundary 2 18: 3 (1991), p. 147. []
  4. Ibid., p. 148. []
  5. Ibid., p. 144. []
  6. Ibid. []
  7. Yukiko Koshiro, ‘Fascism and Aesthetics’ Review of Leslie Pincus, The Review of Politics, 59: 3 (1997), p. 607. []

Imperial Internationalism in Japan: The Bahai Faith Meets the Concordia Movement

The Bahai faith originated in Iran in the mid-19th century led by its living prophet Baha’u’llah. His teachings called for the unification of the world’s religions, viewing all faiths as different manifestations of God.1 The eldest son of Baha’u’llah, Abdu’l-Baha, succeeded his father and led a campaign to spread the teachings of Bahai to the United States and Europe. Agnes Baldwin Alexander, a young American woman from Hawaii, would spread the religion in Japan in the 20th century. The faith’s humanist, internationalist doctrine fit neatly within the nation’s imperial ideology.

In London in 1912, Agnes B. Alexander wrote an account of the meeting between Abdu’l-Baha and Jinzo Naruse, President of Japan’s Women’s College. Naruse was a liberal educator who sought support for Japan’s Concordia Movement, an internationalist project intending to find “Common ground on which all nations could harmonize”.2 Abdu’l voiced his support for Naruse’s movement, positioning the Bahai cause as central to the peace and unity of the human race while stressing the need for a “Divine Power” to put these principles into practice. He signed Naruse’s autograph book with the following prayer:

“O God! The darkness of contention, strife and warfare between the religions, the nations and the people has beclouded the horizon of Reality and hidden the heaven of Truth. The world is in need of the light of Guidance. Therefore, O God, confer Thy favor, so that the Sun of Reality may illumine the East and the West” (December 30, 1912. Translated by Ahmad Sohrab)

Abdu’l’s prayer demonstrates the faith’s capacity to justify Japan’s imperial internationalism. The symbolic power of light for human purification, “The Sun of Reality”, is central to the Bahai teachings. Likewise, the Sun has great symbolic importance in the history of Japan. The Japanese imperial army’s adoption of the ‘Rising Sun Flag’ illustrates the nation’s mission to bring peace, unification, and modernity to Asia. This ideology would materialize in the ‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,’ positioning the Japan as the protector Asia, uplifting the East (through political, social, and economic reforms) to make it competitive with the West.3  Similar to the imperial ideology, the Bahai faith is a humanist religion. Abdu’l-Baha shows his humanist values by denouncing the war and hatred that stems from national and religious differences. In ‘Bahai World Faith’ he argues the spread of Bahai to all nations will birth a unified “heavenly civilization” and saw the Japanese as possessing a unique capacity to enact it – unifying the East and West.4 Abdu’l-Baha’s successor, Shongi Effendi, gifted several Bahai books to Emperor Hirohito in 1928 with a message encouraging him to use the Bahai teaching as inspiration and to “arise for its worldwide recognition and triumph”5. The utopian vision of Japan leading world peace and unity aligns with Naruse’s Concordia Movement.

Historians like Mark Lincicome are critical of 20th-century Japanese liberal internationalists (like Naruse) for the paradoxical justification of imperialism on humanist, anti-war grounds. Lincicome shows how during the Taisho Democracy Era, educators advocated for Japan’s unique capacity in promoting world peace through the cultural, political, and economic assimilation (Doka) of weaker Asian nations.6 This internationalism adapted to become hyper nationalism after the Manchurian Invasion in 1931. The Concordia Association of Manchukuo, originally established to promote left-leaning ideas of Pan-Asianist racial equality (Pan-Asianism) and self-determination would become a totalitarian puppet regime after the Japanese Kwantung Army’s occupation of Manchuria.7 Like the Taisho educators, Naruse’s Concordia movement turned away from its liberal values through political pressure and liberal internationalism’s adaptability.

Both Naruse and Abdu’l-Baha viewed Japan as a unique, divine power to bring God’s purifying light for an international utopia. Combining Japanese exceptionalism with humanist logic explains Japan’s ability to justify “world war in the name of world peace”.8 Although Naruse and Abdu’l-Baha criticized war, nationalism, and militarism, it becomes clear how a nexus of universalist, cosmopolitan, and internationalist rhetoric in the Taisho Era would easily adapt and be consumed by the Showa Era’s Imperialist ideology, justifying a campaign for a Greater East Asia.

  1. Abdu’l-Baha, ‘Baha’i World Faith’ (1975), pp.254-257 []
  2. Agnes B. Alexander “Abdu’l Baha meets President Naruse of Japan Women’s College.” Bahai Reference Library (1912) p. 113. []
  3. Lawson, Konrad. ‘Reimagining the Postwar International Order: The World Federalism of Ozaki Yukio and Kagawa Toyohiko’ (2014):9 []
  4.   Abdu’l-Baha, ‘Baha’i World Faith'(1975), pp.254-257 []
  5. Barbara M. Sims, ‘Traces That Remain’ Bahai Publishing Trust of Japan (1989): 81 []
  6. Mark Lincicome, “Imperial Subjects As Global Citizens: Nationalism, Internationalism and Education in Japan.” Lexington Books (2009) p. 40 []
  7. Young L., “When Fascism met empire in Japanese-occupied Manchuria.” Journal of Global History 12, no.2 (2017) pp. 282-283 []
  8. Mark Lincicome, “Imperial Subjects As Global Citizens: Nationalism, Internationalism and Education in Japan.” Lexington Books (2009):104 []

Zhang Tianran and Li Yujie: Models of Sainthood in Redemptive Societies

Charismatic sainthood was a tool used by redemptive societies in the twentieth century to construct magnetic leadership for emerging salvationist organisations.

‘Redemptive societies’ is a western term for the wave of religious activity that sought to save China and the wider world from social decline and apocalypse. For redemptive societies, sainthood provided a middle ground where modern science and technology could legitimate a religious leader’s authority, while referencing a familiar cultural heritage of sainthood practices, such as establishing a lineage, constructing a hagiography or the practice of spirit writing.1 In this way, redemptive societies reframed traditional conceptions of religious leadership to survive in the modern context.
David Ownby isolates the systematic construction of charisma in religious leadership, defined as ‘the embodiment of the qualities of leadership, the attraction of followers, the representation of their interests and dreams in real or utopian projects’.2 The two leaders discussed in this blog post, Zhang Tianran and Li Yujie, used their charismatic power to influence the actions of the divine and the humans around them. Under Zhang Tianran’s leadership, the redemptive society Yiguandao became the largest religious organisation in China, while Li Yujie successfully guided and established Tiandijiao as a redemptive society organised around spiritual healing and science. Nonetheless, both leaders offer very different forms of charismatic authority, providing a fascinating comparison in terms of their relationship with the divine, their interactions with the political system and their long-term legacy.

Both Li and Zhang were highly skilled at establishing relationships with the secular power structures around them, utilising their charisma to foster support from the state, academia and business. However, while Li maintained a more mediatory role as an interlocutor between the divine and the earthly realm, Zhang consciously assimilated into the traditional religious hierarchy. Zhang claimed to be the reincarnation of the Living Buddha Jigong, a twelfth century Buddhist monk associated in popular religion with eccentricity and spirit possession cults. Jigong’s image has been used extensively as symbolic representation of Zhang, who has thus become deified as a transcendent omnipresent, omniscient figure. This was strengthened after his death when Zhang appeared in spirit writing sessions, directly interacting with his disciples and interfering with the present organisation of the movement. While there is an abundance of documentary evidence of Li, Zhang remains ‘elusive’3, with sources about his life restricted to hagiographical accounts or propaganda pieces against him. This, combined with mystery around the location of his burial site, results in a further intangibleness attributed to his self that elevates him beyond the earthly realm.

On the other hand, Li Yujie’s time as leader of the Tiandejiao movement was grounded in his political principles and institutional ties. While Li would also appeal to traditional perceptions of holy men by preaching about the intimate relationship between god and man, retreating for a few days every year to ascend to heaven and wearing dark glasses to protect others from his blinding healing gaze, he was also engaged in earthly matters to a very high degree, as listed in President Li Denhui’s eulogy in 1994.4 He served as a member of the Finance Ministry under the GMD, owned and edited a newspaper that extensively advocated for freedom of the press, and used scientific language to frame his religious treatises. As Ownby argues, this did not appear to be a contradiction for Li, and in fact, his secular contacts served to strengthen his religious goals as in the case of gaining approval from the Taiwanese government to operate as a public religious institution despite their martial law.5

This differing use of charisma, the relationship between the leader and their followers, from these two saints demonstrates the abundance of approaches to sainthood amongst redemptive societies at the time, all seeking to aid China and rescue the world from apocalyptic decline.

  1. David Ownby, ‘Introduction’, in Making Saints in Modern China, eds. David Ownby, Vincent Goossaert, and Ji Zhe (New York, 2017), p.7. []
  2. ibid. p.17. []
  3. ibid. p.229. []
  4. David Ownby, ‘Sainthood, Science, and Politics: The Life of Li Yujie, Founder of the Tiandijiao’, in Making Saints in Modern China (New York, 2017), p.252. []
  5. ibid. p.249. []

“Roaming through the Heavens”; Kang Youwei’s Imagined Cosmos and Global Unity

In Datong Shu, Kang Youwei highlights his lineage from a “tradition of literary studies for thirteen generations” and his survey of “several tens of nations of the earth,” giving him intimate knowledge of the world1. Yet in this preface, he also delineates the limitations of his discussion, and in doing so also defines the limits of his global unity, the heavens. He admits he has no connection to “the living creatures on Mars, Saturn, Jupiter, Uranus, Neptune”, and that his Jen or Wisdom “can extend [only] to [this] earth.”2 The achievement of his global unity does not represent the ‘end of history’ but instead the perfection of one singular world in a complex cosmic system filled with “uttermost happiness” and “uttermost suffering.”.3 It’s hard not to link this view of the universe with his view of distinct civilizations and his utopia’s emphasis on racial unity and natalism. When considering the framework of these imaginary worlds with their unique “states, men and women, codes of social behavior (Ii), music, civilized pleasures”, one can appreciate how Kang hasn’t abandoned the paradigm of competing civilizations but instead projected it from the earth onto the heavens.4

Kang Youwei’s interest in astronomy dates back to 1886, when he began writing the Book of the Heavens.5 Cited in Datong Shu by name, the book opens with Kang gazing at Mars through a telescope, and deducing that “the heavens being infinite in number, they then must be hosting an infinite number of peoples, governments and religions, customs and traditions, rituals, tunes, and written records”.6 The book weaves Confucian doctrine with modern scientific discoveries, asserting in chapters 10 and 11 the existence of extragalactic heavens and God, who resided above all the heavens.7 Lecturing on the subject in Shanghai, Kang was deeply attuned to Scientific debates at the time, refuting Einstein in the final chapter of his book and citing the discovery of “Martian canals” as proof of extra-terrestrial civilization.8

Whilst he does occasionally pull from these imagined communities to mirror mankind’s flaws such as war, more often this focus on Earth represents a place in contrast with the “vast and boundless” space around it.9 Similar to how Kang describes the expansion of “our Yellow Emperor race” displacing the Hmong-Mien peoples and filling geographic space, he recognizes that the earth constitutes the final geography boundary.10 This historic expansion of the Han from the Central Plain to all of China through incorporation and extermination is the model for the spread of a single “superior race” to encompass a single planetary state.11 He envisions this super race inheriting the best traits from the “silver” and “gold” race, embodying all the qualities of the world as he sees it.12

Furthermore, Earth’s place among a family of imagined communities ties with Kang’s championing of natalism. The primary goal of his great unity is to relieve suffering which is independent of population growth, however Kang’s vision for a unified society emphasizes childbirth, something he believed would increase once certain social barriers were lifted. Despite praising the power of the “silver race”, he is deeply critical of Western family structures, describing how many Westerns did not wish to get married and that “Frenchwomen do not wish to bear children; the population of France is declining”.13 Kang relates the danger of population decline with the metaphor that whilst those who dedicated themselves to Buddhism are “noble”, if everyone did so “China would not be inherited by the Chinese” and “all the vastness of the Divine Land would for ever be a colony of a different race.”14 Kang’s interpretation of Divine Land transcends China however, made clear when he applies the latter principle to the whole world, arguing “inside of fifty years mankind would become extinct”.15

He argues just as it would be a betrayal to let Chinese people die out and their land be occupied, so too would it be a betrayal of the earth to not grow its population. Why Kang Youwei insists on smelting the “silver” and “gold” races together was their supposed balance in power, with the white race being “assuredly superior, while the yellow race is more numerous”, showing he recognized population size as a strength in and of itself.16 Social Darwinism assumes that if one group can successfully propagate more relative to another group, they are self-evidently superior, and therefore global population growth is occurring in the context of the “billions” of lives on Mars and other planets.17 This is why Kang applies special emphasis to how his abolishment of family and marriage would liberate families from the “toil of nurturing” and therefore encourage “human propagation”.18

Even if Kang concedes the limits of his knowledge in Datong Shu, elsewhere in his writtings he asserted that “There must be wireless electronic devices to communicate with our earth and other planets”, and given his global vision transcends millennia, he almost certainly believed contact was inevitable.19 These glimpses into his vast spatial imagination are invaluable to understanding his perspective on humanity and global relations, just as Confucianism is to understanding his philosophy. His ideal world was deep within the context of and theoretically modeled against the many competing civilizations of his imagined galaxy. Kang’s universalist philosophy was limited by the pace of scientific progress and his ability to imagine a cosmos, and yet that did not prevent him from applying his principles of universal brotherhood to all life;

“All us earthlings are heavenlings: we truly are creatures of the heavens…when all of us will realize that the Earth is but one celestial body [among many] in the heavens, we will then understand ourselves as celestial beings.”20

  1. Laurence G. Thompson, Ta t’ung Shu: The One-World Philosophy of K’ang Yu-wei (London: Routledge, 2005) 67-68 []
  2. Ibid, 66-80 []
  3. Ibid, 67 []
  4. Ibid, 67. []
  5. Lorenzo Andolfatto, “Kang Youwei’s Book of the Heavens and the Porous Epistemological Grounds of Early-modern Chinese Science Fiction,” in Chinese Science Fiction: Concepts, Forms, and Histories, ed. Mingwei Song, Nathaniel Isaacson, and Hua Li (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024), 39. []
  6. Thompson, Ta t’ung Shu, 40. []
  7. Zheng Wan, “The Relationship between Science and Religion in Kang Youwei’s Confucianism” (PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 2019), 222. []
  8. Ibid,
    Andolfatto, “Kang Youwei’s Book of the Heavens”, 48. []
  9. Thompson, Ta t’ung Shu, 67 []
  10. Ibid, 142 []
  11. Ibid, 147 []
  12. Ibid, 141 []
  13. Ibid, 174-175. []
  14. Ibid, 157. []
  15. ibid. []
  16. Ibid, 141. []
  17. Ibid, 80. []
  18. Ibid, 165-186 []
  19. Andolfatto, “Kang Youwei’s Book of the Heavens”, 48. []
  20. Ibid, 49. []

How Do We Utilize Historical Figures? Comparing and Contrasting Two Narratives of 20th century Kyoto School Philosophers

Hi all! This blog post finds itself pondering over the ways in which we, as historians, write about historical figures. There’s such a wealth of different styles, methodologies, frameworks, and so on, all with their own different merits and drawbacks on analysis and narrative levels, that it can get a bit overwhelming. A social history or a political history or microhistory or a biography? A microhistorical biography? A biographic microhistory? Oh my. Terminology is not the subject of this blog post, but it feels worth mentioning how the language around history-writing-that-focuses-on-one-figure is already a bit confusing sometimes.
Today, I want to consider two different takes on this genre of historical writing, both concerning similar figures from a similar corner of the historical record: two twentieth century Japanese philosophers, both part of an intellectual network called The Kyoto School. The first is an incredibly influential figure in the philosophical world, the founder of said Kyoto School, a man named Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945). The other was a close student and contemporary of his, a man named Miki Kiyoshi (1897-1945). The books that I’ll be looking at are, respectively, Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School and co-prosperity (Routledge, 2005) by Dr. Chris Goto-Jones and Miki Kiyoshi 1897-1945 (Brill, 2009) by Dr. Susan Townsend. These two pieces engage with their chosen figures in very different ways, and I’ve found myself wondering how both books can engage directly with such similar figures (demonstrated by a principal focus on the mens’ own writings as primary sources) yet feel like such different final products. So, let’s get into it.
First, a look at Political Philosophy in Japan. Dr. Goto-Jones adopts a flexible, interdisciplinary approach to his work which marries together philosophical, historical, and religious lenses of analysis. His argument is focused on the idea of Nishida and his philosophies in wartime Japan: I would argue that while the man Nishida is, of course, crucial to this book, it is the idea of Nishida the philosopher and the different cultural connotations and judgements which surround that idea which Goto-Jones is fundamentally engaging with. His language choices reflect this when he writes : “The purpose of this re-examination of Nishida’s political thought…” or “Nishida’s thought, particularly his political thought, has been oppressed…”.1 Dr. Goto Jones is not re-examining the man, but the ideas, and he makes this very clear in his writing. I believe that this is the principal reason why this book, despite being focused wholly on Nishida, does not feel like a microhistory, biography, or any other style of life writing.
Townsend also adopts a bit of an interdisciplinary approach to her analysis of Miki Kiyoshi, but where Goto-Jones zigged toward philosophy she instead zags toward psychoanalysis and cognitive psychology.2 Townsend is deeply concerned with the motivations, machinations, and inner workings of who she deems “Japan’s itinerant philosopher”, a query which directs her down a road of Miki’s familial connections, emotional turning points, and intellectual points of struggle, all explored primarily through his surviving writings.3 This is not to diminish her work: this is the first biography concerning Miki to ever be published in English, and offers insightful and well-conducted historical work into the brilliant and tragic figure up (he died in prison in the death throes of the Second World War).
Both of these pieces harness disciplines beyond the strictly historical to craft their narratives. Both are concerned with deeper truths of the lives of their subjects. These subjects are remarkably similar men, yet, once again, the two pieces read completely differently. When I started working on this post, I was fully intending to conclude with a definitive statement about the more compelling, ‘better’ of the two books. Yet now, on the other side of the process, I can only find a lesson on the versatility of historical figures and the stories we may responsibly attempt to glean from them. Political Philosophy in Japan is an example of the legacy, memory, and impact of a historical figure taking center stage. Biographic undertones are still present: they serve the narrative by offering a sense of timeline and keeping the figure of Nishida firmly rooted in the reminder of his humanity. Meanwhile, Miki Kiyoshi draws us into the intimate space of a man’s mind, ideals, and intellectual grapples throughout a Japan in flux. It offers us insights into both his reality and, by proxy, suggests dimensions of the lived experience of those around him.
Thanks for joining me for this exploration, and until next time! Have a great week.

  1. Christopher Goto-Jones, Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-Prosperity (London, 2005), p. 2. []
  2. Susan Townsend, Miki Kiyoshi 1897-1945: Japan’s Itinerant Philosopher (Brill, 2009), p. 8. []
  3. Ibid., p. 61. Townsend’s focus on the “full emotional impact” of Miki’s studies provides an example of her focus throughout the book. []