Succession and development of East Asian intellectual traditions: Kōtoku Shūsui’s Monster of the Twentieth Century

From the viewpoint of people after World War II, it is easy to disapprove of imperialism that swept the world in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. However, at a time when this idea was considered standard, a Japanese socialist Kōtoku Shūsui developed a logical criticism of the problem in his first work, Monster of the Twentieth Century: Imperialism(Nijusseiki No Kaibutsu Teikokushugi 廿世紀之怪物帝国主義). In this book, Shūsui describes the Chinese, Japanese,and European history and the trend in Japan and Europe at the time and argues that imperialism is an ideology woven with patriotism and militarism.

One of the most notable features of Monster of the Twentieth Century: Imperialism is its foresight. Prior to the British economist John A. Hobson’s Imperialism: A Study (1902) and Vladimir Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917), Shūsui identified the complex structure of imperialism and raised the alarm. However, this work by Shūsui presently tends to be appreciated for its lack of economic analysis and its strong moral and ethical aspects through comparison with Hobson’s and Lenin’s analysis of economic factors of imperialist behaviour[1]. However, this work can also be regarded as an intellectual attempt to integrate literature and social science. This is well illustrated by the fact that Shūsui refers to the Chinese classics such as Mengzi and Shiji, as well as multiple Japanese literary works as the basis of his logic. For example, Shūsui cites Mengzi: Gong Sun Chou I. Accepting Mengzi’s teaching on the innate benevolence of all people, that anyone who sees an infant about to fall into a well will run to save him, he argued that patriotism is highly egoistic and is distinguished from the innate, pure benevolence. He also attempts to construct a more comprehensive argument fusing the West and the East by combining those works with the European counterparts.

What provides a distinctive philosophical depth to Shūsui’s Monster of the Twentieth Century is that he unravels the unique characteristics of Japanese imperialism while grounding it in the historical events and ideas of Japan and China. Shūsui’s approach to developing the logic can be traced to his teacher, Nakae Chōmin 中江兆民. Chōmin, about whom Shūsui wrote a biography called Chōmin Sensei 兆民先生, had re-evaluated the Confucian tradition in the face of concepts such as ‘civil rights (minken 民権)’ and ‘equality and freedom (byōdō jiyū 平等自由)’. In Ichinen Yūhan, he regards civil rights as the principle (shiri 至理) and equality and freedom as the righteousness (taigi 大義) and argues that these ideas are not idiosyncratic to the West, as they have existed in the Confucian tradition of East Asia since they were detected by Mencius and Liu Zongyuan[2]. Accordingly, he seeks ways to develop the idea of democracy (minpon shugi 民本主義) as well as freedom and equality based on the Confucian tradition. In Mengzi: King Hui of Liang II, ‘the theory of the expulsions of disqualified monarchs by King Tang and King Wu (tōbu hōbatsu ron 湯武放伐論)’ is developed, which discusses whether subjects and people ought to remain submissive even when the monarch is a tyrant in accord with Confucianism, which emphasizes the importance of the relationship between sovereign and subject as one of the five relationships. Chōmin sheds light on the potential for ultimate democracy, which has been inherent in this Confucian philosophy.

Whereas Chōmin reexamines the Confucian tradition of East Asia for its possibility of modernity, Shūsui revisits that tradition and criticises Japanese imperialism for deviating from it, assuming that prosperity and happiness, which are national honours, lie in a high degree of morality and nobility of ideals. In other words, while following Chōmin’s methodology of using the Confucian tradition as the basis for the realization of his ideals, Shūsui used it to criticize the actual situation in Japan.

Although Shūsui criticises the spread of imperialism as a global phenomenon, the significance of Monster of the Twentieth Century is that it highlights the peculiarity of Japanese imperialism on an East Asian intellectual basis and develops an analysis that focuses on its ideological aspects. His progressive argument, which is underpinned by his literary flair, has a continuity with the lengthy intellectual history of East Asia, as a result of overlooking imperialism from an ideological point of view and succeeding his teacher’s method of rethinking Confucianism, and hence gained profundity.

Bibliography

Dirlik, Arif, Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution (California, 1991).

Nakae, Chōmin 中江兆民, Sansuijin Keirin Mondō 三酔人経綸問答, trans. and ed. Kuwahara, Takeo 桑原武夫, Shimada, Kenji 島田虔次 (Tokyo, 1983).

Nakae, Chōmin 中江兆民, Ichinen Yūhan, Zoku Ichinen Yūhan 一年有半・続一年有半, trans. and ed. Ida, Shinya 井田進也 (Tokyo, 1995).

Tierney, Robert T., Monster of the Twentieth Century: Kōtoku Shūsui and Japan’s First Anti-Imperialist Movement(California, 2015).

[1] Robert T. Tierney, Monster of the Twentieth Century: Kōtoku Shūsui and Japan’s First Anti-Imperialist Movement (California, 2015), p. 7

[2] Chōmin Nakae, Ichinen Yūhan, Zoku Ichinen Yūhan, trans. and ed. Shinya Ida (Tokyo, 1995), p. 56.

Modernising China: Why Discourses Surrounding Love and Sex were Central to Republican China’s National Rejuvenation.

In Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China Prasenjit Duara maintains that the nation is often conceived as the primordial subject of history: the foundation upon which a multiplicity of social, political and economic phenomena may be analysed[1]. As such, historiography surrounding nationalism has often taken a ‘top-down’ approach, suggesting that the reification of nationalist sentiments is instantiated by governing bodies or international events[2]. Hence historians such as Lloyd Eastman, Maggie Clinton, Frederick Wakeman Jr., and William Kirby have analysed China’s quest for modernity as a response to the dynamic rise of fascist states in Europe, as Germany and Italy’s rapid national rejuvenation provided a model for nationalists in China who coveted national development[3].

However, these analyses provide an impoverished account of China’s ineluctable path to modernity. Most notably, they overlook how apparently superfluous cultural phenomena such as love, and sex could contribute to China’s national development. Frank Dikötter’s Sex, Culture and Modernity in China provides a necessary response to such historiography by demonstrating how ideas related to sex and sexual desire contributed significantly to China’s modernising discourse[4].

Dikötter argues that in Republican China interest in the subject of sex grew exponentially, as evidenced by the proliferation of new periodicals such as The sex periodical, The sexual desire weekly, The sex journal bi-weekly and ‘The sex journal’[5]. This interest was grounded in the belief that the control of sexual desire was somehow integral to the restoration of a strong China, for if ‘evil’ sexual habits could be eliminated, then Chinese citizens could sacrifice their attention to the development of the nation[6]. For example, great interest was placed upon reproductive health and the procreative behaviour of couples, as medical scientists sought to understand the optimum conditions with which healthy offspring could be produced, as such offspring could then be successfully integrated into China’s fledgling industrial workforce[7].

Contra Eastman, Clinton, and others, one cannot fail to see that discourses around sex and China’s national well-being were inextricably linked. Chinese nation-building was not simply a process of emulating Europe, rather, it embodied certain indigenous cultural transformations such as more open discourses surrounding sex and changing attitudes towards love. Haiyan Lee develops this argument in Revolution of the Heart: A Genealogy of Love in China, 1900-1950 in which she demonstrates the significance of love in the discourses surrounding national development. The May Fourth Movement (a political and cultural movement emanating from Beijing in 1919) is one such example, where love and its free expression became symbolic of equality and autonomy from foreign interference[8].

Therefore, an intellectual history of the discourses surrounding China’s national development in the Republican period cannot and should not overlook these cultural factors. The history of Republican China should not be a history of competing political ideologies, viewing Chinese nationalism as a tabula rasa upon which a European creed could be imprinted. The Chinese path to modernity is more complex than this, and, in like manner to Dikötter and Lee, explanations which reflect these complex cultural and social dynamics are imperative.

[1] Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China, (Chicago, 1995), pp. 27-29

[2] Jing Tsu, Failure, Nationalism, and Literature: The Making of Modern Chinese Identity, 1895-1937, (Stanford, 2005), p.1

[3] Lloyd Eastman, Fascism in Kuomintang China: The Blue Shirts, The China Quarterly, 49: 1 (1972), pp.1-31. Maggie Clinton, Revolutionary Nativism: Fascism and Culture in China, 1925-1937, (Durham, 2017). Frederick Wakeman Jr., A Revisionist View of the Nanjing Decade: Confucian Fascism, The China Quarterly, 150: special issue: Reappraising Republican China (June, 1997), pp.395-432. William Kirby, Germany and Republican China, (Stanford, 1984)

[4] Frank Dikötter, Sex, Culture and Modernity in China, (London, 1995), p.2

[5] Ibid., p.1

[6] Ibid., p.2

[7] Ibid., pp.62-71

[8] Haiyan Lee, Revolution of the Heart: A Genealogy of Love in China 1900-1950, (Stanford, 2007), p.5

The Tonghak and the Chinese Communist Party: Parallels in Tactics and Historiography

A comparison can be drawn between the evolution of the Tonghak movement from 1894 to 1910 in Korea and developments in the family reform debate in China from 1915 to 1953, particularly in reference to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) role in this debate. Although these two historical developments might appear unrelated, in both of the periods examined a radical reformulation of important precedents takes place. The Tonghak religion “presented itself as incarcerating the best of Korean and Eastern tradition in a new and accessible way to regenerate both individuals and society.”1 In China, the CCP propagated a new version of the xiao jiating ideal which has been introduced decades earlier by New Culture intellectuals. While the specific policies of the Tonghak and the CCP differed, both groups sought societal regeneration, largely in the form of modernization, as their final goal. Key to both Tonghaks and the CCP was the importance of individual change and societal change. What differentiated the CCP, however, is their linking of these two factors in a casual relationship. 

In both cases, the strategy employed to achieve this goal was ideological manipulation according to what the historical moment made available to that group. In the Tonghak’s case, an ideological repositioning took place under the leadership of the third patriarch, Son Pyong-hui, in which the group abandoned it’s former anti-foreign stance in favor of Japanese intervention in Korea. Carl Young points out that the activities of the Chinbohoe, an offspring of the Tonghak which merged with the Ilchinhoe in 1905, “saw the war between Russia and Japan as an opportunity to advance their agenda by using Japanese support to overthrow the conservative government surrounding Emperor Kojong and take over government”2 The anti-foreign sentiment of the Tonghak gives way to a policy of supporting Japanese rule due to a desire to realize its goal of preserving Korean sovereignty. Just like the Tonghak reformulate their policy in order to best position themselves for success, the xiao jiating ideal is adapted by the CCP to serve their political and social goals. While the Tonghak engaged in ideological repositioning, the CCP re-imagined the ideological underpinnings of an existing ideal in order to subsume the activities of individuals under the interest of the state: “the state became the beginning and the end, the mode of social organization, and the object of all energies and loyalties.”3 This allowed the CCP to exert control in every aspect of its citizen’s lives under the guise of family reform. The ideological manipulation pursued by the Tonghaks and the CCP allowed both groups to formulate policies which were most beneficial to them at the time.  

In addition to similar ideological tactics employed by the Tonghak and the CCP, what this discussion reveals is a tendency to disregard specific historical trends in order to preserve an all-encompassing narrative. In his work on the split in the Tonghak religion, Young observes, “the fact that there were some elements of Tonghak that actively cooperated with the Japanese is disturbing and is often not discussed because it does not fit with the simple structure of history that has often been framed by Korean political ideologies.”4 In relation to Chinese visions of family and state in the early 20th century, Susan Glosser points out that there has been a lack of scholarship which connects the New Cultural intellectual’s linking of the individual and the state in their propagation of the xiao jiating ideal in the early twentieth century, with the CCPs subsequent policy. Glosser argues that this provides the basis for CCP policy, “although the CCP was most effective in lengthening the reach of the state, the invasive potential of the state was not peculiar to the CCP.”5 Despite similarities discussed above, the Tonghak and the CCP are very different organizations which existed in distinct contexts. However, a close analysis reveals a connection between the ideological distortions pursued by each group and the treatment of these in historical writing on the topic. 

  1. Carl Young, ‘Eastern Learning Divided: The Split in the Tonghak’, in Emily Anderson (ed.), Belief and Practice in Imperial Japan and Colonial Korea (Springer, 2016), p. 80. []
  2. Young, ‘Eastern Learning Divided’, p. 83. []
  3. Susan Glosser, Chinese Visions of Family and State, 1915-1953 (University of California Press, 2003), p. 186 []
  4. Young, ‘Eastern Learning Divided’, p. 80. []
  5. Glosser, Chinese Visions of Family and State, p. 200. []

Nannü and Modern Gender: How He-Yin Zhen’s Concept Anticipated Current Understandings of Gender

In The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts of Transnational Theory, Lydia Liu, Rebecca Karl, and Dorothy Ko claim that He-Yin Zhen’s conceptualization of nannü ‘signifies not only gendered social relations between man and woman but also, more broadly, the relationship of the past to the present, of China to the world, of politics to justice, of law and ritual to gendered forms of knowledge, interaction, and social organization’.1 The concept of nannü, He-Yin argued, worked within patriarchal discourse as a means of legitimizing men’s oppression of women. This incredibly broad definition leaves room for multiple discussions to develop around nannü. Though the authors try to move the conversation away from its traditional male-female translation, this idea has some interesting similarities to modern evolving understandings of gender. In particular, the breaking of the binary view that has long held in the West and the growing acceptance of gender as a societal category.

He-Yin Zhen saw the world ‘as an always-already gendered time-space of social activity, production, and life’; her views align well with conceptions gender and its effects on society that have been pushed into the mainstream by the LGBTQ+ community. Rather than an intrinsic quality or set of qualities, gender has come to be understood as a means of categorizing people, sometimes incorrectly. Using the framework of nannü helps create room for this more complex formulation of gender because it inherently recognizes that society enforces the gender construct constantly. For He-Yin, the effects of nannü were present in every experience that a person has because it formed ‘the foundation of all patriarchal abstractions and markings of distinction’.2 Any trans individual who has ever felt the pressure to ‘pass’ as their preferred gender identity or person who has felt they were ‘not masculine/feminine enough’ can recognize the truth in this statement immediately. These feelings, among many other reasons, have led the LGBTQ+ community and their allies, especially among feminists, to raise awareness about the negative effects of gender norms. Nannü offers another way to explain these effects to people. It could be especially impactful for presenting how gender norms and distinction effect society beyond simply feeling comfortable in public spaces, which those who take for granted see sometimes see as frivolous. With this concept, the effects on the economy and politics could be expressed better.

In particular, He-Yin’s argument that ‘gendered’ identities separated people into socioeconomic groups in a similar way to class could aid current discussion surrounding gender relations. Anyone who is cognizant of the effect of perceived gender on all aspects of daily life would likely agree with Zhen’s worldview. This sentiment is clearly evidenced by the continued frustrations over the gender-wage gap. For modern feminists, He-Yin’s assertion that gender may function as an economic distinction is a statement of the obvious. Even if she was not directly concerned about a wage gap between men and women, her concept of nannü anticipated this issue, as well as the modern global shift towards viewing gender as a complex set of societal and cultural expectations.

  1. Lydia Liu, Rebecca Karl, and Dorothy Ko, The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts of Transnational Theory (New York, 2013), p. 10 []
  2. Liu, Karl, and Ko, The Birth of Chinese Feminism, p. 11 []

Anarchism as Modernity: The Arishima Cooperative’s Contribution to a Global Narrative.

On Arishima Takeo’s liberation of his tenant farmers in 1922 and declaration of cooperative ownership, he created a space for the proliferation of anarchist thought in a completely new and undefined sphere.[1] Consequently, the Arishima cooperative farm in Hokkaido can be used to redefine traditional notions of anarchism as ‘anti-modern’ and trace the movement of Japanese anarchism into a global sphere.

20th Century anarchism was characterised by a total rejection of state in favour of social revolution.[2] Revolutionary discourse focused on a cultural transformation with emphasis on the individual. In historiography, therefore, it has been misunderstood as introspective and anti-modern due to anarchist’s intellectual isolation from the recognised structure of the state.[3] Furthermore, the proliferation of isolated Japanese anarchist communities has resulted in depictions of these groups as remote spheres with little connection to the globalised world or political trends.[4]  These ideas were reversed by Sho Konishi, who traces the expansion of anarchism to the ‘opening’ of Japan in the 1950s (Kaikoku) where the cultural and intellectual spheres of Russia and Japan merged.[5] He believed that anarchism adopted a transnational and global character which propelled it into modernity.

This is exemplified in the development of the Arishima cooperative farm and its creation of a new space and time. This did not isolate the community but distinguished them from their origins as tenant farmers and consequently propelled them into the sphere of modernity with a new identity. The Cooperative Living Handbook contained a history of the farm and was used to affirm membership in the cooperative.[6] As such, it became a physical demonstration of the connection with a shared heritage that had been constructed around the new freedom of the cooperative. The book served to create a new timeline of history as a reconstruction of the past that legitimised their liberation and placed them firmly in a trajectory of modernisation.

Additionally, the division of space was significant in the construction of a new space and time. Monuments and objects commemorating original members of the cooperative were placed in the centre of the community and used to mark out meeting forums.[7] These were viewed as symbolic objects which affirmed the overturning of the old ideological order in favour of liberation. They reflected the desire for a similar process in the wider political structures of Japan. The physical demarcation of space with such objects suggests that tenants sought to separate their new freedom as a new sphere of possibility which had no relation to the community’s past constraints as tenant farmers. It further implies that for the Arishima farmers, time renewed and began again upon their liberation. As such, this demonstrates that, far from internalised, the cooperative saw itself at the forefront of progress, looking forward into a devolved era of change.

Moreover, the Arishima cooperative did succeed in integrating itself into a wider global narrative. The farm held festivals, including the Autumn Harvest Festival and children’s Olympic festivals, which were open to outsiders and became known throughout the region.[8] Not only did the cooperative look forwards, but it aimed to do so in conjunction with surrounding communities. The proliferation of anarchist thought across the region is exemplified in the adoption of Anarchism by the Hokkaido-wide industrial cooperative in 1926.[9] Additionally, the Agricultural Industrial Cooperative Association published its journal ‘Kyoei’, which sought to promote ‘world thinking’ amongst agricultural labourers. Within this, we can see the Arishima anarchist thought centred within global anarchist thought as the communities sought to educate and connect with the wider world as their practices of mutual aid ‘sogo fujo’ united with wider global narratives of mass liberation.

The Arishima anarchist cooperative can therefore be used to trace the evolution of anarchist thought from a local sphere to global narrative. The vision of the farmers at the forefront of progress allowed for the creation of a new space and time through physical means. This allows for a revision of Japanese anarchism as modern and international. Throughout its evolution, the Arishima Cooperative remained engaged with the intellectual spheres around them as they forged their community to become a vehicle of progress which symbolised a new modernity.

[1] Sho Konishi, “Ordinary Farmers Living Anarchist Time: Arishima Cooperative Farm in Hokkaido, 1922–1935.” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 47, no. 6, (2013), p.1845.

[2] Arif Dirlik, Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution, (London 1991), p.29.

[3] Sho Konishi, “Ordinary Farmers”, p.1848.

[4] James Scott in Sho Konishi, “Ordinary Farmers”, P.1848

[5] Sho Konishi, Anarchist Modernity: Cooperatism and Japanese-Russian Intellectual Relations in Modern Japan, (Massachusetts 2013), p.2.

[6] Sho Konishi, “Ordinary Farmers”, P.1858.

[7] Ibid, P.1867

[8] Ibid, p.1878, p1882.

[9] Ibid, p.1884.

‘Bushido’ anarchists: The irony of rebellious martyrdom in Imperial Japan

Post-Meiji restoration Japan is known for being a highly nationalistic society with limited freedom of expression and little room for other ideologies than the nationalistic ideology promoted by the state. In Mikiso Hane’s Reflections on the Way to the Gallows we meet, among others, Kanno Sugako (1881-1911) and Kaneko Fumiko (1903-1926) – two women who lived in this time of nationalism and who ungrudgingly gave their lives for their beliefs and rebellions against the Japanese state and society. What struck me the most when reading the stories Kanno and Kaneko is their unyielding faith in their ideological cause right up to their deaths and, their honesty and transparent witness statements, and their bravery. Ironically enough, the way in which Kanno and Kaneko met their deaths can be argued to be exemplary of the values propagandised by the Japanese government at the time. Indeed, as Kanno was executed and Kaneko committed suicide in prison they displayed similar characteristics to the modern ‘Bushido’ values1 which had been integrated into Japanese society in this period as they fostered a ‘Japanese spirit’.2

 

The perhaps most famous anarchist in this period was Kotoku Sushui, who’s idea of anarchism was rooted in various critiques of imperialism, nationalism and militarism – he also had a complicated personal relationship with Kanno Sugako. Kanno’s and Kaneko’s anarchist beliefs were more personally motivated and more shaped by their individual animosity towards the authorities and hierarchies of the Japanese society they lived in, unlike Kotoku who was arguably more ‘intellectually’ motivated. Kanno exemplifies her opposition towards the existing society by writing, during her time as substitute editor of the newspaper Muro Shimpo, that ‘[w]omen in Japan are in a state of slavery. Japan has become an advanced, civilized nation, but we women are still denied our freedom by an iron fence’.3 Her critique is clearly a personal, and radical feminist one, attacking Japan’s modernity for not being thoroughly modern – particularly when it comes to its treatment of women. This feminist anarchism is particularly personal to Kanno since the social pressures and expectations put on women in this Japanese society instilled her with shame and guilt as she was raped at age 15. Kaneko’s beliefs were, likewise, shaped by her difficult upbringing where she was the subject of abuse and neglect from both her parents and grandmother. This led her to reject the contemporary ideals of the family hierarchy and filial piety – which was also supposed to permeate Japanese society as a whole. During her interrogation she explicitly draws the connection between what she sees as the unjust morality expected from the weaker part, both in society and in the family when she says:

From the standpoint of the weak, morality means an agreement that calls for one’s submission to the strong. This moral principle is common through all ages and all societies. The primary aim of those in power is to preserve this moral principle as long as possible. The relationship between parents and children is also based on this principle. It is only coated over with the attractive-sounding term ‘filial piety.’4

 

For their spreading of radical ideas and their alleged participation in conspiracies to assassinate the emperor, they were both tried and sentenced to death. It is not entirely clear whether these conspiracies were real or not, but they nevertheless both unrepentantly admitted to their involvement. Kanno, in her final statement, articulated that she had no regrets, she likened herself to a martyr giving her life to a higher cause, that she would ‘die without whimpering. This is my destiny’.5 Kaneko also admitted to the accusations levelled at her. In her interrogation she states that, because of her own experiences with ‘oppression by all sources of authority – I decided to deny the rights of all authority’ and ‘[f]or this reason I planned to eventually throw a bomb and accept the termination of my life’.6

Kanno was executed along with 11 other conspirators in 1911. Kaneko was, together with her ‘co-conspirator’ Pak Yeol, initially sentenced to death. However, the emperor pardoned them and they were offered life sentences in prison instead. Pak Yeol accepted the offer but Kaneko tore the pardon to shreds and committed suicide instead. Both of these faithful sacrifices to the cause of anarchism and defiance to Japanese society are, tragically and ironically, very similar to the warrior ethos promulgated by the very same society they were rebelling against.

  1. Christopher Ives, Imperial-Way Xen: Ichikawa Hakugen’s Critique and Lingering Questions for Buddhist Ethics (Honolulu, 2009), p. 32 []
  2. Ibid., p. 13 []
  3. Mikiso Hane, Reflections on the Way to the Gallows: Rebel Women in Prewar Japan (Berkeley, 1988), p. 53 []
  4. Ibid., p. 119 []
  5. Ibid., pp. 56-57 []
  6. Ibid., p. 122 []

Abandoning Family for the Cause – A Look at Kanno Sugako and Kaneko Fumiko

Though historian Arif Dirlik recognized anarchism as a body of widely varying ideas, he argues that all anarchist thought contains a ‘repudiation of authority, especially of the state and the family’.1 By this definition, anarchists must reject connection to their own families for the cause of total social revolution. While many would find this task difficult, looking at the lives of two anarchist thinkers, Kanno Sugako and Kaneko Fumiko, one can see why they may have been driven towards anarchist thought; at the least, one can see how the spurning of family could be so easily accepted by these revolutionaries. I’d like to make it clear that I’m not suggesting an individual must have had a difficult homelife in order to become an anarchist, but I would like to draw attention to its role in the lives of these particular anarchist women.

Both Kanno and Kaneko faced a great deal of hardship in their youth, which contributed to the shaping of their worldviews as teenagers and adults. In the case of Kanno Sugako, she lost her mother at ten, which soon left her at the mercy of a cruel stepmother.2 By the time she was fifteen, Kanno was the victim of rape by a miner who worked for her father. This experience, possibly encouraged by her stepmother, left Kanno with a deep-seated sense of shame, which she coped with by reading Sakai Toshihiko’s essay, ‘in which he counseled rape victims not to be burdened with guilt’.3 The comfort she found through Sakai’s work led her to read his other essays on socialism, therefore exposing her to the ideology for the first time. If it had not been for the cruelty of her stepmother and her sexual assault, Kanno may not have read any of Sakai’s works and may have been less likely to join in the movement as a young adult. What’s more, if she had grown up in a loving family environment, she would have been less likely to agree with the devaluation of family that is essential to anarchist thought. Instead, Kanno proudly claimed that ‘even among anarchists I was among the more radical thinkers’.4 That she found comfort in socialist/anarchist thought rather than in her familial network can only be taken as guiding her towards a more radical way of organizing society. However, how much of Kanno’s radicalism could be attributed to her personal background cannot be determined by this short of an examination.

As for the life of Kaneko Fumiko, she suffered through multiple years of poverty in her early childhood due to her father’s alcoholism before being put under the care of her grandmother.5 While living with her grandmother as Japanese colonists in Korea, Kaneko’s extended family treated her as little more than a maid and often physically abused her. This treatment compounded with her anger over ‘the arrogant manner in which the Japanese occupiers treated the native Koreans’.6 Like Kanno, Kaneko ‘s childhood experiences certainly primed her to accept the anarchist rejection of family’s authority in society. It is no wonder that she questioned why one should remain loyal to a person simply because they are a relative, when hers had always treated her so heartlessly. Instead, she would seek to revolutionize society to equally respect all people. This view in turn connects to her refusal to recognize the authority of the state. After viewing firsthand the abuses enacted on the Koreans, it is understandable that Kaneko would desire a nonhierarchical society based on mutual respect.

Anarchism’s tenet of individual abandonment of family as a central authority, according to Dirlik’s definition, doubtlessly drew in the loyalties of Kanno Sugako and Kaneko Fumiko. As two women who had received years long abuse at the hands of their biological families, it should be no surprise that they were drawn to a social framework that decentralized the family. While all anarchists may not have had comparable experiences, it remains intriguing that both of these Japanese anarchists did share this background. With more comparison of anarchist thinkers’ personal lives, we could learn more about why they were drawn to this seemingly impracticable social ideology. As for now, this observation is interesting but simply coincidence.

  1. Arif Dirlik, Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution (Berkeley, 1991), p. 12. []
  2. For all biographical information found here see Mikiso Hane, Reflections on the Way to the Gallows: Rebel Women in Prewar Japan (Berkeley, 1988), pp. 51-2. []
  3. Hane, Reflections, p. 51 []
  4. Ibid., p. 56. []
  5. For all her biographical information see: Ibid., 75-79 []
  6. Ibid., p. 78 []

A Complicated History: Feminism, Confucianism and Western Imperialism

 

The pre and early modern relationship between East Asian feminism, Confucian hegemony and Western imperialism is an extremely intricate one that cannot be dichotomised. While there were and are numerous points of conflict, as well as cooperation, between the mentioned institutions, their orientations and the modes of argument espoused across time, these dynamics must be complicated. By exploring the lived female experiences in Premodern in Korea and China, both rural and urban, and then tracing the emergence of Chinese feminism, we can see the ways in which women oriented themselves against and also alongside the Confucian tradition and, later, Western Imperialism. Indeed, the configuration of power between the latter two institutions can also be located against a gendered global hierarchy. In synthesising these notions, this article delineates women’s complex social roles and the emergence of feminism in East Asia. As well as this, it problematises female and feminist existence under Confucianism and their engagement with Western imperialism, two institutions which are themselves conversant.

The domestic and public spheres do not conceptually exist in a Confucianised East Asia in the same way they do in the Western world. Rather, the scholar JaHyun Kim Haboush has referred to them here as loose “spheres of activity [and/or] signifiers of morality”.[1] The ontological ambivalence of the inner quarters[2] and therefore those who operate within, however, meant that women had a basis from which they could renegotiate their station. The porosity of these boundaries can be seen both regionally and temporally. And of course, the female experience within premodern Korea saw vast difference differences between the rural and urban demographics as well as the upper and lower classes. With respect to that, different sections of the population, operating in those different spaces, were assigned particular class and gender-based roles which have been injected with different moral sentiments. In Korea and China, the establishment of separate moral literature for women was important to consolidating neo-Confucian culture as they were seen to be the transmitters of its particular brand of ethics and Way of life. Women were to fulfil this obligation through, note the androcentrism of the system, imparting a filial education, preserve her violable chastity/body, take care of her affines and servicing her husband.[3] Interestingly, a woman thereby held a position of considerable influence since she was tasked to ensure a conflict-free familial unit and therefore facilitated her husband’s efforts and complete devotion to outside civil affairs. With that appreciated, a woman’s value and role ultimately became heavily based on streamlining and priming the path to success of her male counterparts and she was only to exert more indirect forms of power under this system.[4]

On the note of female instruction, European missionaries and Chinese merchants, among other groups who espoused shifting agendas, began introducing girl’s educational institutions in the late 20th century.[5] On one hand, they sought to educate rural elite women or those in urban environments on how to be competent wives and wise mothers. On the other hand, they were to be delivered lessons of basic literacy and an understanding of home economy and management.[6] In these two objectives, we can see the dimensionality given to the female role and the ways in which the same forces were both furthering and hindering the feminist cause in different ways. Furthering in the fact that Western imperial projects impacted the female position in East Asia through informing and impressing their feminist framework. Indeed, the works of British liberal men such as John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer were imported into China and arguably formed the foundations of Chinese feminism.[7] He Yin’s engagement with Euro-American models of progress and equality was, however, very critical and she observed them to be societies which simply constituted less visible and economic form of oppression. A case in point, the forces of free market capitalism ruined many [female] livelihoods in China as they could not compete and it led them to working multiple jobs, being sold as wives and losing more of their agency to patriarchal forces.[8]  Simply another form of inequality, the departure from liberalist values is seen at work also in the socio-economic subjugation of China by imperialist colonisers. The Western operations of gunboat diplomacy, opening China up to free market capitalism and the Opium Wars of the 1800s all speak to the gendered and racialised domination of the nation by the west and, in particular, Britain.[9] We can see that the global hierarchy that was being created, through a forceful imposition, emulated the domestic hierarchies. This was while the same imperial forces were in an indirectly cooperative dialogue with feminist thinkers of China.

By taking an in depth look at the lives of women in the Korean and Chinese societies, especially the instructions prescribed to them in the inner quarters, we can understand it as microcosmic of the gendered global hierarchy which began to emerge more clearly in the 20th century. This is an order which has also shaped the origins of the feminism which seeks to agentically contest and renegotiate the very hegemony that was created. The relationship between feminism, Confucianism and imperialism is therefore heavily intertwined and dense; we should not quickly simplify the individual components nor polarise their dynamics.

[1] Dorothy Ko, Jahyun Kim Haboush and Joan Piggott, Women and Confucian Cultures In Premodern China, Korea, And Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p.7

[2] Ibid, p. 135

[3] Ibid, p.152

[4] Ibid, p.165

[5] Liu, Lydia He, Rebecca E. Karl, and Dorothy Ko. The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts in Transnational Theory (Columbia University Press, 2013) p. 34

[6] ibid

[7] Ibid, p. 36

[8] Ibid, p. 32

[9] Ibid, p.28

Managing Confucian Virtue: Women’s Roles in the Transmission of Confucianism.

Women are seemingly afforded a meagre role within the intellectualism and Confucian ideals of Song China. Their position in the lineage-family structure meant that their function was commanded by the dominance of their male counterparts. However, when examined in closer detail, women’s role in coordinating the household meant that she had a significant influence in the dissemination of Confucian ideals through direct access to the familial environment through which Kongzi’s ‘virtue’ was developed.

The organisation of the Song dynasty (960-1279) was primarily structured by ‘jiazu’, or lineage-family which favoured patrilineal relations.[1] Families were organised and divided by the allocation of a father’s property to his sons and family dynamics were governed by the relations between men. By the necessity of performing rites to a common male progenitor, female autonomy was restricted entirely by the dominance of males within these local structures. Consequently, women initially seem to have a limited role in the Confucian dynamics of family.

‘Discord arises in families mostly when women provoke…with words’.[2]

This implies that women were seen as an obstruction in the ordered arrangement of society and that they purposefully aimed to disrupt the predetermined Confucian family setting, especially if they engaged with the intellectual privilege of ‘words’. It suggests that, based on societal organisation, women would not achieve the ‘individual perfection’ which Kongzi promoted that lead to an ordering of the world based on Confucian morals.[3] This further suggests that women were disengaged with Confucian ideals and on a local level were seen as selfish and untrustworthy. Their key value was in the continuation of the family line with the birth of a son. This afforded them no place in either the household hierarchy or the evolution of Confucian thought.

However, despite the role of the female being dismissed by the moral conduct and expectations of society, women’s role did become increasingly prevalent as they became vital for the transmission of Confucian ideology within the family dynamic. Particularly in the countryside, the importance of family and kinship was expressed through ancestral rituals and conjugal relations. Philosophical thought acted to transform this into a Confucian ideology which could be transmitted locally. Lineage-family divisions presented an opportunity for women to gain more autonomy within a smaller circle of power. When a husband passed away, mothers claimed increased authority over their descendants. It thus simplified relations within the family and decreased the risk of female conflict with in-laws which had previously acted as a curb on women’s power. Moreover, the idea of ‘Zhueni’, or the ‘women’s charge’ became characterised by the ability of women to directly transmit Confucian values and influence the behaviour and structure of their family.[4] They were responsible for the allotment of domestic power and allocation of living space, physically governing Kongzi’s desire for virtue to be transmitted by those closest by blood relation. Consequently, women adopted a significant role in the transmission of Confucian values as they became managers of the family sphere, the place where virtue was propagated.

To live in the neighbourhood of Good is fine…’.[5]

With increased presence and action within the family, women were the creators and upholders of the Confucian ‘Good’ and responsible for the family’s collective realisation of wisdom. This is exemplified in the production of female didactic texts in the Song. ‘Mr Yuan’s Precepts’ and ‘Zeng Family Instructions’ established the parameters of female autonomy within the family sphere and exerted a Confucian influence over the function of women in this period.[6] Their social significance may have been decreased by the level of gender control and separation in these texts, but it is increased by the very fact that women were integral to the dissemination of the Confucian message.

[1] Dorothy Ko, Kim JaHyun Haboush, Joan Piggott, Women and Confucian Cultures in Premodern China, Korea and Japan, (California, 2003), p.125.

[2] Ibid, p.127.

[3] Philip Ivanhoe, Bryan Van Norden (Eds.), Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, (2005), p.3.

[4] Dorothy Ko, Kim JaHyun Haboush, Joan Piggott, Women and Confucian Cultures, p.128.

[5] Philip Ivanhoe, Bryan Van Norden (Eds.), Readings, p.10.

[6] Dorothy Ko, Kim JaHyun Haboush, Joan Piggott, Women and Confucian Cultures, p.128.

An innovative Confucian interpretation by a conservative Confucianist: Soraigaku and its ideological influence on Kaiho Seiryō

In contrast to China and Korea, neither Confucianism nor Neo-Confucianism was fully established as the official ideological foundations of government in Tokugawa Japan. Living in a country where shoguns governed based on his military authority (bui 武威), a Confucian scholar Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666–1728) reconsidered the essence of Confucianism after being dedicated to Confucianism and Jinsaigaku 仁斎学 and formed the linguistic methodologies, namely Kobunjigaku 古文辞学, and the new theory of Confucianism, which is called Soraigaku 徂徠学. Consequently, he restructured Confucianism, which was considered merely one of the accomplishments in the early days of the Tokugawa era, into a governance theory that deals with the specific domain of politics. His innovative interpretation of Confucianism derived from his conservative approach had a significant impact on the thought at the end of the Edo period and beyond.

The significance of the rise of Soraigaku in Japan during the Tokugawa period appears to be that Sorai criticised the interpretation of Confucianism by Neo-Confucianism and Jinsaigaku from the perspective of the interpretation of the Way and between righteousness (gi 義) and profit (ri 利).

Firstly, he saw the concept of the Way in Confucianism as the method of governing a country by sages in ancient China, and he regarded the study of the sage’s ideal rule as the essence of Confucianism. In Distinguishing the Way (Bendō 弁道), Sorai developed his interpretation of the Way as the rites, music, punishments, and ordinances (reigakukeisei 礼楽刑政) established by preceding kings, not the natural way of Heaven and earth as explained by the Zhu Xi and Jinsai.[1] On the basis of his interpretation, in Plan for an Age of Great Peace (Taiheisaku 太平策), he envisioned a plan of the sage’s technique of the grand Way (daidō-jutsu 大道術) to establish a political and social system for radically changing the customs in Tokugawa Japan.[2] The idea of applying Confucianism to the politics of Tokugawa Japan as an academic discipline to investigate the specific domain of politics may have contributed to the necessity of Confucianism in Japan.

Secondly, Sorai offered a governance theoretical interpretation of the Confucian ‘distinction between righteousness and profit’ (giri no ben 義利の弁) and argued that they are not in conflict. Zhu Xi discussed righteousness and profit in the scheme of overcoming human greed according to the heavenly principle (tianli 天理) and claimed from the viewpoint of individual morals that only righteousness is to be pursued. On the contrary, Sorai positively acknowledged the pursuit of profit and suggested that righteousness, as a political virtue, was to govern the people in a way that would benefit them. Furthermore, in Discourse on Government (Seidan 政談), he developed the theory of samurai settlement on their land (bushi dochaku-ron 武士土着論) in light of the status quo in Edo and advocated ideal governance rooted in righteousness to alleviate the budget deficit. It can be said that he established the significance of Confucianism as political studies by proposing a concrete policy based on Confucianism reflecting the reality.

Thus, Sorai can be credited with developing a very new interpretation of Confucious’ teachings, while promoting the understanding of Confucianism by directly approaching the Four Books and Five Classics in his conservative Kobunjigaku. In the face of his duality—the methodology he introduced as a conservative Confucianist and the innovative interpretation of Confucianism presented as a result—the question arises of which side of him indeed would receive more emphasis. One of the scholars who attached great importance to the groundbreaking aspects of his interpretation of Confucianism was Kaiho Seiryō 海保青陵 (1755–1817), a disciple of Sorai.

Seiryō was influenced by Sorai’s perspective to capture the actual situation in Tokugawa Japan, and he advocated the theory to govern the society and ease the people (Keisei Saimin-ron 経世済民論), which extended the positive view of the pursuit of profit from Soraigaku. Furthermore, he advanced Sorai’s concept, which affirmed the pursuit of profit, and developed a utilitarian logic that viewed profit (i.e., economic rationality) as tianli. However, while Sorai, as a Confucian, pursued the Way of prior kings, which he considered the essence of Confucianism, Seiryō deviated from Confucianism and prioritised the practicality of political analysis by focusing on theories that were compatible with the current world, thereby reducing the authority of Confucius’ argument and the Way of sages. In other words, Soraigaku became the ideological foundation of Seiryō’s thought, setting aside the objective of Sorai to grasp more faithfully the teachings of Confucius.

The ideological influence of Soraigaku on Seiryō’s thought reveals its methodological significance as well. Criticising the Neo-Confucianist approach and understandings of Confucianism, Sorai developed his interpretation, which he believed was truer to the teachings of Confucius. In other words, the rise of Soraigaku has significant implications for subsequent diverse critical debates on the interpretation of Confucianism and provided the solid foundation of unfettered and rigorous discussions that led to the development of academic fields in Japan. Moreover, it is important to note that the government system of the Tokugawa shogunate, in which Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism were not officially adopted as its governing ideology, played a role in the development of free and varied academic disciplines including Soraigaku based on a critical review of Neo-Confucianism.

Bibliography

De Bary, Wm. Theodore, Gluck, Carol and Tiedemann, Arthur, Sources of Japanese Tradition: 1600–2000 (New York, 2005).

Lidin, Olof G., ‘Ogyū Sorai: Confucian Conservative Reformer: From Journey to Kai to Discourse on Government’, in Chun-chieh Huang and John A. Tucker (eds.), Dao Companion to Japanese Confucian Philosophy (Heidelberg, 2014), pp. 165–182.

Maruyama, Masao 丸山眞男, Nihon Seiji Shisō Shi Kenkyū 日本政治思想史研究 (Tokyo, 1952).

Kuranami, Seiji 蔵並省自 (ed.), Kaiho Seiryō Zenshū 海保青陵全集 (Tokyo, 1976).

Yoshikawa, Kōjirō 吉川幸次郎 (ed.), Nihon Shisō Taikei 36: Ogyū Sorai 日本思想体系36 荻生徂徠 (Tokyo, 1973).

[1] Kōjirō Yoshikawa (ed.), Nihon Shisō Taikei 36: Ogyū Sorai (Tokyo, 1973), pp. 13–14.

[2] Ibid., p. 473.