Author: d24

Convergence or Collision: The interplay between Chinese tradition and Protestantism in Taiping ideology

Taiping ideology utilised elements of both Chinese and Western religious tradition in a bid to establish a Heavenly Kingdom on earth. This was inevitable in a society with heavily ingrained values of mandated authority being exposed to new systems of communal identity and conduct. Applying Protestant Christianity to this context led to the Taiping movement becoming a fusion of revolutionary innovation and the traditional dynastic cycle, though the practical success of this would be limited.

A clear example of this convergence is the structure of authority imposed by the leader of the movement, Hong Xiquan. The Taiping organisational system with the Heavenly Father (God), Jesus (the Heavenly Elder Brother) and Hong (the Heavenly Younger Brother) demonstrates a continuation of Confucian familial hierarchy ideals as a source of power. Hong sought to derive personal legitimation by presenting himself as both a messianic figure and a senior part of the holy family. While it could be said that this inverted the Confucian emphasis on filial obedience by prioritising loyalty to God and rulers above that of the family, ultimately it is more convincing to interpret this as an intentional coalescence of political and religious moral authority within familial structures that people could identify with and devote themselves to. What Western and Qing observers both saw in Taiping religion at the time therefore was a ‘form of Christianity influenced in part by Chinese native sectarian traditions’._1

 Furthermore, the Taipings used the traditional vocabulary of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ and the dynastic cycle to frame their argument that the current imperial system needed to be destroyed and replaced with the new Kingdom of Heaven on earth. Famine and economic depression in the 1840s, harsh taxation, and weakness in the face of foreign incursions had undermined the authority of the imperial government and opened discussions about the loss of the Mandate of Heaven. The Taipings could therefore justify their revolution as being part of a longer cyclical tradition of uprising and new governance. Their very name, translating to ‘Great Peace’ evoked a time of perfect harmony and order similarly championed by earlier reformers and millenarian movements._2 Also, the Tiantiao Shu, the official declaration of Taiping creed widely circulated in 1852, claims that ancient monarchs and people in China long ago had also worshiped the Christian God in accordance with the ‘great Way’ before ‘erroneously follow[ing] the devil’s path’._3 This further demonstrates the perceived need to construct a wider legitimising narrative around the Taiping righteously returning China to its original holy state.

Many of the commandments in the Tiantiao Shu were in line with Protestant fundamentalist advocation of a simple faith, such as prohibitions against opium smoking and gambling, that would have appealed to the inherent puritanism of Chinese peasantry. This can also be seen in the Youxue Shi, which provided simple formulations of the basic religious and moral principles followers of the Taiping were expected to follow. The very phrasing and structure of this document is evocative of the San Zi Jing, a Confucian teaching device for children that was designed for easy memorisation and recitation. In a similar way to how Confucian tenets were often learnt by rote, the Ten Heavenly Commandments, the core of the Taiping ethical code, were often memorised by Taiping followers for the purpose of self-cultivation, even if they were relatively ill-informed on other scripture or practice._4 Therefore, although the Taipings were often critical of Confucianism’s associations with the established elite, there were many references in their core texts, not only in terms of social and political values but in the very organisation and phrasing, that was in direct reference and emulation of Confucian and traditional Chinese convention.

This argument must, however, not be overstated, as I do acknowledge that Taiping ideology did take some clear divergences from established tradition. For instance, the Taiping’s ideas about monotheism drastically diverged from the old cult of Heaven that was traditionally under the remit of the rulers; instead, the religion they offered was one that was more accessible for all, one where the pious individual could have their own direct relationship with God. Furthermore, conservative Confucians like Zeng Guofan would not have approved of the level of economic regulation the Taiping advocated for, including an economic egalitarianism that would predate the later Chinese Communist movement. Though these ideas were largely disseminated in texts such as Tianchao tianmu zhidu which set out plans for the strict militaristic organisation of society, they were never put into effect in Taiping-controlled areas despite their popularity amongst the peasantry._5 This, along with the fact that the structure of the system they posit is reminiscent of traditional order and balance earlier Chinese thinkers advocated for, indicates that there was a fundamental incompatibility, or at least an inconsistency, in the Taiping’s attempt to be innovative while adhering to an earlier traditional value system.

In this way, the Taiping’s fusion of traditional established values and new conceptions of social organisation was ultimately unsuccessful in creating the utopia they sought. While the movement was very appealing to those struggling economically, opposed to the Manchu government, or seeking security amidst shifts that were occurring with foreign incursions (rallying points for prior dynastic movements), in the end a failure to enlist external support, such as from the West, or maintain a stable political leadership would see the Taiping Rebellion collapse. Instead, the defenders of tradition would prevail, at least for the short term.

  1. O’Reilly, Thomas, The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom: Rebellion and the Blasphemy of Empire, (Seattle, 2014), p. 117 [↩]
  2. De Bary, W. T., Lufrano, Richard John, Wing-tsit Chan and John Berthrong, Sources of Chinese Tradition: From 1600 Through the Twentieth Century, (New York, 2000), p.214. [↩]
  3. Tiantiao Shu, quoted in Sources of Chinese Tradition, p.219. [↩]
  4. Kilcourse, C. S. Taiping Theology: the Localisation of Christianity in China, 1843-64, (New York, 2016), p.120 [↩]
  5. De Bary, p.224 [↩]

Nannü: He-Yin Zhen’s call for revolution

The preeminent anarcho-feminist He-Yin Zhen constructed her critique in an early twentieth century China marked by turbulent political, social and cultural reinvention. Her article On the Question of Women’s Liberation utilises the analytical term nannü to frame the ideological and historical bases of institutionally gendered social relations. This lens challenges contemporary structural hierarchies, arguing that they must be dismantled at their very root through a radical social revolution in order for true liberation to be achieved.

In The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts of Transnational Theory, Lydia Liu, Rebecca Karl and Dorothy Ko discuss and contextualise He-Yin Zhen’s theories, many of which were published in her journal Natural Justice. Firstly, He-Yin’s work represented a fundamental challenge to the conventional ideological foundations of patriarchal society, including that of progressive Chinese male intellectuals who also wrote about women’s rights. For instance, she critiqued Jin Tianhe’s The Women’s Bell for framing the struggle for equality within a nationalist rhetoric of self-strengthening._((Liu, Lydia He, Rebecca E. Karl, Dorothy Ko (ed.) The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts in Transnational Theory (New York, 2013), p.7.)) The feminist movement from this perspective became a means of reforming China in line with Western ideas of gender equality to the ultimate ends of restoring the country’s global prominence as a modern nation, rather than for the sole sake of bettering the lives of women. He-Yin Zhen, on the other hand saw the emerging movement as a chance to deconstruct traditional conceptions of gender as a source of power and inequality, not as a means of enabling women to become better agents of the nationalist cause, but in order for women to gain true independence and freedom in their own right. For instance, she brought these ideas into practice by incorporating her maternal surname with her traditional patrilineal surname, thus including the female element of her identity in a traditional conventionalised space.

While these divergences demonstrate the range of perspectives prevalent in China at the time, this argument can perhaps be taken further than Liu, Karl and Ko go by positing that Chinese male intellectuals like Tianhe and Liang Qichao should not be defined as ‘feminists’ at all. While they may advocate for reforms that have characteristics that further women’s rights, such as ending the practice of foot binding or endorsing women’s education, their ultimate motivation to strengthen China undermines the core characteristic of feminism that believes in equality as a sufficient goal in itself. He-Yin expresses this point succinctly when she writes of ‘men’s pursuit of self-distinction in the name of women’s liberation’_((He-Yin Zhen, ‘Question of Women’s Liberation”, in The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts in Transnational Theory (New York, 2013) p.60)), where these men critique the traditions that do not conform with their nationalist perspective and emulate Western powers in a manner that perpetuates the very social and structural hierarchy He-Yin seeks to overturn._((Hershatter, Gail, ‘Disturbances, 1840-1900’, in Women and China’s Revolutions (Maryland, 2018), p.84)).

Liu, Karl and Ko also discuss He-Yin’s anarchism and her attack on the misconception that the state could be anything but a system that perpetuates oppression._((Liu et al. The Birth of Chinese Feminism, p.23)) He-Yin’s anarchism and feminism were fundamentally intertwined. Unjust social relations of wealth, law and rule underpin a society where women are systematically excluded and subordinated in the patriarchal capitalist social hierarchy. Her theory of shengi critiques capitalism, coloniality and state and imperial traditions by foregrounding the fundamental role of nannü within each of these systems._((ibid., p.22))  This feminist attack on the state as a reproducer of conditions that benefit only the powerful and wealthy diverges from the majority of her contemporary radicals and reformers, who largely sought to exchange the imperial dynastic regime with a republic. He-Yin instead called upon women to be the agents of their own liberation. She argued that only with such genuine motivation to uproot systems of material oppression will the power structures that currently exist not be repeated, and women could be freed from the commodification of their bodies._(ibid., p.25))

He-Yin Zhen therefore takes an innovative feminist-anarchic standpoint by advocating for a social revolution that relieves society of the oppression within the current state of nannü. Liu, Karl and Ko’s explanation of the difficulties in attempting to literally translate the conceptual term nannü is thus an opportunity for scholars to question institutionalised, largely western, terms of reference and acknowledge the discursive multiplicity in the global formation of feminist theory._(ibid., p.10)) He-Yin argues that social hierarchies have spanned class, age, gender and ethnicity, and this ties in too within the skewed scholarship surrounding the feminist movement. Only by opening up the field to new terms and frame of reference that acknowledge their individual historical and social contexts can unilateral claims to social truth or historical reality be avoided.