Ishiwara Kanji’s national defense state was the idea of remodeling the Empire of Japan along a military controlled political order with a planned economy in preparation for an inevitable war with one or all the great powers. I wish to look at how the National Defense State treated the relation between civilian and military government and its contrast to the politics of the late Japanese Empire. Ishiwara had, unlike many other Japanese thinkers, an important position of power in most of major events of Japanese politics in the 1930s and I think it’s interesting to consider to what extent the National Defence State was part of a broader trend in the Japanese army.
Mark R. Peattie argues that the traditional European ideas of fascist or communist is unhelpful to understand Japanese interwar society and Ishiwara Kanji.1 (Peattie, p.254) Peattie’s main points is that Ishiwara’s imagined national defense state unlike a typical fascist state, lacked a military subordinate to a direct central dictator and the glorification of war. I think the National defense states share more similarities than differences to fascist rule Italy and Germany, but that it would be wrong to assume these ideas were imported from Europe. The cause of Japanese militarism was deeply imbedded into the state already by the Meiji constitution and it is important to see Ishiwara as part of a larger movement of statism in the 1930s following thinkers like Kita Ikki and Shumei Okawa.
What makes Ishiwara interesting is his focus on the role of the military. Formally he would place the military and civil administration apart as two distinct entities of the state. Yet in practical terms the military would overrule the civilian government.
Partially it can be explained with the justification of the Meiji emperor’s “Imperial Rescript to soldiers and sailors” the military were considered outside politics and the public opinion only charged with the duty of protecting the state. The rescript, as James L. McClain puts it, said that the soldier’s role was “To be loyal was to stand outside the fray of the political arena”. (McClain, p.202) Ishiwara, and several other high-ranking army officers, interpreted this as the military had a duty to administer the protection of society without involvement from the civilian or “political” government. In the age of total war the army needed to mobilize civilian industry and resources to such an extent that it would have to be assured of its proper use. When challenged on financial concerns by a civilian official Ishikawa replied, “If the finance minister should declare that the five-year plan could not be completed, then the government should replace him with someone who could complete it.”(Peattie, p. 250) There was no doubt Ishiwara thought the military had the legitimacy to intervene in all affairs of the state because of the threat of war. The army clad in the justification of protecting the empire and serving the emperor would thus work as a ruling body outside of any control or administration. While not being controlled by a single dictator like a fascist state, its power would be held by a small clique of leading officers and channeled through a religious figurehead emperor and a bureaucratic civilian government. The military would not be subject to any obligation other than war.
If this sounds familiar within Japanese history, it’s because it was the political situation within the Japanese government just two years after the outbreak of war in China. One could even argue that military rule had been already assumed in 1932 with the May 15th incident and the death of party governments so that Ishiwara was designing the National Defense State in a political climate of military supremacy. The military with the army and navy ministries could prevent any government to form without their approval, effectively determining all important matters of policy. (McClain, p.424) Under the later cabinet of Konoe Fumimaro from (1940-41) then Hideki Tojo (1941-44) the military ruled without any political opposition. (McClain, p. 456) It would be over disagreement on foreign policy and long-term goals that Ishiwara would a vocal critic of official army policy. The way of ruling the state through the military was based on the same political order he imagined his National Defense State implementing.
It is then interesting to ask if the political design of the National Defense State was made for practical or ideological reasons. I think the urgent matter of preparation to secure a National Defence state in East Asia was the only goal and exploiting an already established system was certainly the path of least resistance. Ishiwara was an opportunist throughout his career. E.g. the planning of the Manchuria incident and his attempt at the exploitation of martial law during the 26th February crisis. But this is not enough to prove anything beyond speculation.
A state with a military dominated political structure, justification of power because of imminent war and legitimacy through the emperor. While similarities appear, there are a lot of unanswered questions about the National Defense State. What was the role of the Emperor? Who would lead the military? How would it prevent rivalry between the branches of the military? It would require a further in-depth study on Ishiwara to accurately prove his ambitions when it came to Japanese society and the governing of the state. Thus, it is hard without additional perspective to determine the full implication of his ideological connection to the established militarist order when Ishiwara wrote about the National Defense State in 1935.
P.S Japanese historians have in recent years emphasized the positive aspects of Ishiwara, but there is little written on him in English literature outside of Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s confrontation with the West.
I avoided the ideas of the East Asian League organization formed in 1939 and just focusing on the ideas of the National Defense State. This is because I think his ideas had changed significantly by the founding of the EAL in 1939.
Bibliography:
McClain, James L., Japan, A modern history, W.W. Norton, (New York, London, 2001)
Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s confrontation with the West, Princeton University Press, (Princeton, N.J., 1975)