Taiping ideology utilised elements of both Chinese and Western religious tradition in a bid to establish a Heavenly Kingdom on earth. This was inevitable in a society with heavily ingrained values of mandated authority being exposed to new systems of communal identity and conduct. Applying Protestant Christianity to this context led to the Taiping movement becoming a fusion of revolutionary innovation and the traditional dynastic cycle, though the practical success of this would be limited.
A clear example of this convergence is the structure of authority imposed by the leader of the movement, Hong Xiquan. The Taiping organisational system with the Heavenly Father (God), Jesus (the Heavenly Elder Brother) and Hong (the Heavenly Younger Brother) demonstrates a continuation of Confucian familial hierarchy ideals as a source of power. Hong sought to derive personal legitimation by presenting himself as both a messianic figure and a senior part of the holy family. While it could be said that this inverted the Confucian emphasis on filial obedience by prioritising loyalty to God and rulers above that of the family, ultimately it is more convincing to interpret this as an intentional coalescence of political and religious moral authority within familial structures that people could identify with and devote themselves to. What Western and Qing observers both saw in Taiping religion at the time therefore was a ‘form of Christianity influenced in part by Chinese native sectarian traditions’._1
Furthermore, the Taipings used the traditional vocabulary of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ and the dynastic cycle to frame their argument that the current imperial system needed to be destroyed and replaced with the new Kingdom of Heaven on earth. Famine and economic depression in the 1840s, harsh taxation, and weakness in the face of foreign incursions had undermined the authority of the imperial government and opened discussions about the loss of the Mandate of Heaven. The Taipings could therefore justify their revolution as being part of a longer cyclical tradition of uprising and new governance. Their very name, translating to ‘Great Peace’ evoked a time of perfect harmony and order similarly championed by earlier reformers and millenarian movements._2 Also, the Tiantiao Shu, the official declaration of Taiping creed widely circulated in 1852, claims that ancient monarchs and people in China long ago had also worshiped the Christian God in accordance with the ‘great Way’ before ‘erroneously follow[ing] the devil’s path’._3 This further demonstrates the perceived need to construct a wider legitimising narrative around the Taiping righteously returning China to its original holy state.
Many of the commandments in the Tiantiao Shu were in line with Protestant fundamentalist advocation of a simple faith, such as prohibitions against opium smoking and gambling, that would have appealed to the inherent puritanism of Chinese peasantry. This can also be seen in the Youxue Shi, which provided simple formulations of the basic religious and moral principles followers of the Taiping were expected to follow. The very phrasing and structure of this document is evocative of the San Zi Jing, a Confucian teaching device for children that was designed for easy memorisation and recitation. In a similar way to how Confucian tenets were often learnt by rote, the Ten Heavenly Commandments, the core of the Taiping ethical code, were often memorised by Taiping followers for the purpose of self-cultivation, even if they were relatively ill-informed on other scripture or practice._4 Therefore, although the Taipings were often critical of Confucianism’s associations with the established elite, there were many references in their core texts, not only in terms of social and political values but in the very organisation and phrasing, that was in direct reference and emulation of Confucian and traditional Chinese convention.
This argument must, however, not be overstated, as I do acknowledge that Taiping ideology did take some clear divergences from established tradition. For instance, the Taiping’s ideas about monotheism drastically diverged from the old cult of Heaven that was traditionally under the remit of the rulers; instead, the religion they offered was one that was more accessible for all, one where the pious individual could have their own direct relationship with God. Furthermore, conservative Confucians like Zeng Guofan would not have approved of the level of economic regulation the Taiping advocated for, including an economic egalitarianism that would predate the later Chinese Communist movement. Though these ideas were largely disseminated in texts such as Tianchao tianmu zhidu which set out plans for the strict militaristic organisation of society, they were never put into effect in Taiping-controlled areas despite their popularity amongst the peasantry._5 This, along with the fact that the structure of the system they posit is reminiscent of traditional order and balance earlier Chinese thinkers advocated for, indicates that there was a fundamental incompatibility, or at least an inconsistency, in the Taiping’s attempt to be innovative while adhering to an earlier traditional value system.
In this way, the Taiping’s fusion of traditional established values and new conceptions of social organisation was ultimately unsuccessful in creating the utopia they sought. While the movement was very appealing to those struggling economically, opposed to the Manchu government, or seeking security amidst shifts that were occurring with foreign incursions (rallying points for prior dynastic movements), in the end a failure to enlist external support, such as from the West, or maintain a stable political leadership would see the Taiping Rebellion collapse. Instead, the defenders of tradition would prevail, at least for the short term.
- O’Reilly, Thomas, The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom: Rebellion and the Blasphemy of Empire, (Seattle, 2014), p. 117 [↩]
- De Bary, W. T., Lufrano, Richard John, Wing-tsit Chan and John Berthrong, Sources of Chinese Tradition: From 1600 Through the Twentieth Century, (New York, 2000), p.214. [↩]
- Tiantiao Shu, quoted in Sources of Chinese Tradition, p.219. [↩]
- Kilcourse, C. S. Taiping Theology: the Localisation of Christianity in China, 1843-64, (New York, 2016), p.120 [↩]
- De Bary, p.224 [↩]