Month: November 2024

Resituating Esperanto in East Asian world imaginaries

Esperanto, a ‘planned’, universal language created by Ludovic Zamenhof in 1887, enjoyed particular popularity in Japan and, to a lesser extent, China in the early twentieth century; Japan was home to the largest Esperanto community outside Europe in the 1920s and 1930s.1 Developing in the paradoxical era of the early twentieth century which involved the simultaneous intensification of nationalism and the emergence of ideas of internationalism, the universalism and ahistoricity of Esperanto meant it was envisioned as a transnational medium to connect all peoples on a non-hierarchical, international basis whilst preserving national identities.

Traditionally, the focus on either cosmopolitanism introduced through interaction with the West, or Pan-Asianism as the reactionary other leaves less space for the appraisal of Asian forms of cosmopolitan internationalism. Esperanto’s popularity in Asia should arguably be viewed in terms of what it represented and its fusion with ideas developing out of Japan and Asia of universalism, global humanity, and world integration: for example Kang Youwei’s visions of world unity from China2 or Kotoku Shusui’s anti-imperialist critique of the Russo-Japanese War as part of the Nonwar movement and his utopian imaginations of transnational sokuin dojo (compassion or empathy).3 Consequently, Esperanto provides a frame through which to examine Asian conceptions of ‘worldism’, which derived as much from indigenous imaginations as ideas transposed from the outside.

In the ‘worldist’ imagination, whose roots are traced back to the Nonwar movement by Kanishi, utopian peace could never emerge through cooperation between nation-states. Instead, they advocated a more total vision of heimen (‘the people’) as a global, transnational construct that “transcended nation-state borders”.4 Esperanto must be viewed through this complexity; its popularity acted as a manifestation or exemplification of an alternative visions of world unity emerging from Asia which embraced cultural diversity and cosmopolitanism and transcended the (Western) system of international relations. In this light, the European roots of Esperanto and its inscribed Eurocentrism are of less immediate relevance, as it is argued that it not necessarily the content of Esperanto that mattered, but more what it symbolically represented. As Rapley rightly emphasises, Esperanto represented both a medium of global communication and, critically, an idea or ideology of world unification.5 ‘Worldism’, of which Esperanto is imagined as a constituent part, takes the world (‘sohei’) and ‘the people’ (‘heimen’), in the abstract sense, as its fundamental basis, rather than the nation or ‘the people’ with the emphasis on ‘the’. As Chan notes, historicising Esperanto brings to light its importance in China as a propaganda medium against both Japanese imperialism and, for the Communist Party, in the civil war against the Nationalists.6 In Japan itself, Konishi argues that it should be considered as part of anti-imperial resistance, part of projections of world order that equally contested Japanese state participation in, on the one hand, Western ‘international relations’ based on the primacy of territorial sovereignty and, on the other, anti-colonial (yet often imperialist) pan-Asian constructions of an Asian collective ‘other’.7

This is not to deny the significance of transnational connections and networks of intellectual exchange; imaginations of internationalism and cosmopolitanism are impossible to conceive in closed spaces and are thus inherently products of transnationalism. Yet, at the same time, reframing Esperanto in this way, as an idea which fused with preexisting and emerging conceptions of world unity, an endpoint for East Asian cosmopolitan imaginaries, helps to rebalance transnational relations between East and West, and highlights that, for some, Esperanto marked a useful endpoint for their ‘worldist’ visions, rather than being the starting point for a new Asian cosmopolitanism. East Asia, especially Japan, was a receptive audience to Esperanto not just because it represented something new, but also because it could be integrated into local imaginations of ‘worldism’.

  1. Ian Rapley, ‘A Language for Asia? Transnational Encounters in the Japanese Esperanto Movement, 1906-1928’, in Pedro Iacobelli, Danton Leary and Shinnosuke Takahashi (eds.), Transnational Japan as History: Empire, Migration, and Social Movements (London, 2016), p.167. [↩]
  2. Kang Youwei and Laurence G. Thompson, Ta T’ung Shu: The One-World Philosophy of K’ang Yu-wei (London, 1958). [↩]
  3. Sho Kanishi, ‘Translingual Word Order: Language without Culture in Post-Russo-Japanese War Japan’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 72:1 (2013), p.96. [↩]
  4.  Ibid., p.99 [↩]
  5. Rapley, ‘A Language for Asia?’, p.170. [↩]
  6. Gerald Chan, ‘China and the Esperanto Movement’, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 15 (1986), p.11. [↩]
  7. Kanishi, ‘Translingual Word Order’, pp.91-114. [↩]

Esperanto: Universal Language or Failed Prophecy?

Imagine a global order free from national boundaries, where only a singular state governs the world- what language would its citizens communicate in? would we see the creation of one, universal language? This question is addressed in many utopian theories that conceptualise such a nation-free world. K’ang Yu-Wei, a prominent Chinese political thinker in the late  Qing period, proposes the notion of a universal language in Ta t’ung Shu– his book arguing for an ideal ‘one-world’ state free from conflict. He claims that such a world will have a ‘Universal Parliament’ and one of its responsibilities would be to introduce a ‘new system’ of language which would serve as a ‘single way of expressing important ideas’.1

Before this new universal language can become the only language, he claims that an ideal scenario would be bilingualism: where citizens are fluent in the language of their own state, and the universal language.

Is this idea really utopian? Not quite. The early 20th century witnessed the development of a worldwide interest in Esperanto- an artificial language created by Ludwig Zamenhof, intended to allow speakers of different native tongues to converse with one another. This interest particularly grew amongst internationalist groups, that pushed for the transcendence of national boundaries, and the adoption of a ‘cosmopolitan’ global identity.2

So, was Yu-Wei prophetic in his idea of a universal language? Not quite. While Esperanto captures Yu-Wei’s idea of a new universal language, it didn’t live up to its potential. Moreover, if any language comes close to what Yu-Wei hoped for, it is English: not only is it one of the most popular language in the world, it also fits the description of the kind of bilingualism Yu-Wei anticipated. 

Given that the interest in Esperanto as a global language (as well as a tool for transnational communication) was present in the 20th century, why did it lose to English in the race for linguistic hegemony? I argue that this loss can be attributed to the success of British imperialism as a dominant force in shaping global order at the time.

Kim S. Young, in a study tracking the spread of Esperanto across the world in the 20th century, mentions that International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) dedicated to Esperanto were the primary method of facilitating its growth (which was initially significant).3 However, he argues that while this method did foster the growth of globalist sentiment across the world in a rapid manner, it focused on Esperanto very generally; as a consequence, the growth of Esperantist organisations was sporadic. INGOs with more specialised interests and functions took over the responsibility of pushing globalist ideas, while the Esperantist INGOs dwindled, with occasional lukewarm attempts at revival.4  This somewhat informal, unofficial interest in Esperanto is what allowed for British Imperialism to take centre-stage in the proliferation of English.5

English isn’t the universal language Yu-Wei had in mind; he hoped for a world order established on equality, one that is free from conflicts and divisions. To characterise English as Yu-Wei’s ideal universal language, then, would be inaccurate, since its popularity was a result of a world order with a very clear power imbalance.

Would it be fair to say that the proliferation of Esperanto in a more rigorous, formal manner via government institutions would have resulted in it becoming a universal language as intended by Yu-Wei? we cannot say for sure. A possible cause for Esperanto’s failure that remains unexplored in this piece is its linguistic strength- its cleared Indo-European linguistic origins may have hampered its ability to take over as a universal language. These origins are also reflective of the power imbalance which I claimed is present in English’s popularity. The quest for an all-encompassing utopian universal language, thus, persists.

 

  1. Yu-Wei, K’ang, and Laurence G. Thompson. Ta t’ung Shu: The One-World Philosophy of K’ang Yu-Wei. Reprint. Routledge, 2007. pp. 92-94 [↩]
  2. Young, S. Kim“Constructing a Global Identity: The Role of Esperanto.” in Boli, John, George M Thomas (eds.) Constructing World Culture International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999. [↩]
  3. Ibid., pp. 127-129 [↩]
  4. Ibid., pp.144-145 [↩]
  5. Ibid., pp. 146-148 [↩]

Mark Lincicome’s ‘Imperial Subjects as Global Citizens’

Mark Lincicome’s Imperial Subjects as Global Citizens offers an account of the development of the doctrine of international education, spanning a century from the 1880s to the 1980s.1  He presents a radical reunderstanding of Japan’s pre-war education system, which he believes had previously only been written about as one that taught nationalism and militarism. His work seeks to bring to light the nuance and opposition that this system faced throughout the period. Furthermore, he argues that internationalism has been overlooked as a Japanese ideology, and his thorough analysis of the movement’s history certainly does it justice. However, one could argue that his work is overly conceptual, and fails to deal with the more practical consequences of educational reform.

To give a brief summary, the movement of international education begins in the 1870s, when reformers such as Tokutomi Soho, Egi Kazuyuki, and Saionji Konmichi argued that teaching of foreign languages and learning of other cultures should be implemented into the education system. However, these campaigns are swiftly condemned by the Meiji government and fail to take off. Only in the period of Taisho Democracy, the ‘high-water mark’ of the philosophy, do prominent writes and reformers set up institutions and physical schools which put this doctrine into effect.2 He pays particular attention to the thinkers of Noguchi Entaro, Sawayanagi Masataro, Shimonaka Yasaburo and Harada Minoru, and their organisations such as the International Education Society of Japan and the All-Japan League for World Federation. As their names suggest, these organisations were focused on encouraging collaboration, integration and familiarity in global education. Noguchi, in particular, wrote that a mutual understanding and point-of-contact between cultures would lead to global peace, the ultimate goal of humanity.

However, as Japan’s invasions and colonisations of parts of Asia grow, the doctrine begins to conform to the propaganda of the military government and espouse nationalist, imperialist and militarist sentiments. Noguchi becomes a ‘chauvinistic ultra-nationalist’ and dedicates his public writings to defending Japan’s imperialism; while Shimonaka writes that educators must reform Japan from within, removing European influence and realising Japan’s goal of conquering the eight corners of the world.3

Following the end of the Second World War the movement had another revival – or, perhaps, a renaissance of the 1920s – and once again becomes a movement advocating for global peace, prosperity and connectedness. Shimonaka, despite being ‘purged’ in 1947, championed world peace, nuclear disarmament and the liberation of colonised peoples in Asia and Africa until his death.4

Lincicome’s book mostly fails to engage with what one might consider the most important part of education; the children. He does not write about the number of children being taught according to the principles of the reformists, nor the impact their organisations had on the education system. Ultimately, it is an intellectual history of around a dozen thinkers spanning a century. For a study of the ramifications of the Japanese education which has been in use for the past century, perhaps another book is required; but for a deep analysis of one of Japan’s forgotten yet most interesting ideologies, Lincicome’s history of internationalist education should not be missed.

  1. Lincicome, Mark. Imperial Subjects as Global Citizens: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Education in Japan (Lexington Books, 2009). [↩]
  2. Ibid, p. 87. [↩]
  3. Ibid, p. 91. [↩]
  4. Ibid, p. 116. [↩]

Esperanto and the Non-War Movement – Japan’s view on the globe

The first global concept of cosmopolitanism begat in classical Greece, with their view of cultural idealism that would transcend the constraints of traditional locales. But without a institutionalized organizational frame, their beliefs were just that – an ideal.1 It would only be from the mid-nineteenth century onwards that a more institutionalized frame would form, one of the cognitive orientation – the language Esperanto.2 Instead of imagining a world which transcended national boundaries like the Greeks, nineteenth century cosmopolitans envisioned a common language that would promote global citizenship. Common language would give individuals attachment to a concept of world society and rid the world of problems such as miscommunication.3

 

In the case of the use of Esperanto in Japan, it would significantly develop in particular after the Russo-Japanese war, 1904-05. When introduced, it quickly begat a trend with the Japanese annual assessment of leading trends newspaper, the ‘Asahi shinbun’, enthusiastically following, themselves proclaimed, biggest craze of 1906.4 The idea of Esperanto would spread through the studies and discussion of elites and nonelites in noninstitutional spaces such as coffee shops and rural homes.5 It would be in these out of state influence hidden pockets that individuals would start to practice their imagination of world order and peace.

 

 

 

Indeed, Esperanto would challenge the image of the foreigner [gaijin] and enemy. During the Russo-Japanese war, 1904-1905, the notion of ‘worldism’ became distinct from the nation-state centered notion of world order and international relations.5 Esperanto began to be referred as a “world language” [sekaigo] in post Russo-Japanese war.6 This change came hand-in-hand with the invention of “the people”, an imagination of “heimen”, an idea of a people without the state as the subject. Unlike the Marxist proletarian masses of class struggle, this notion was birthed from the significant Non-War movement in Japan.6 And it is this Non-War movement, with its use of Esperanto, that would challenge the vision of the dehumanized version of the enemy.

 

 

 

The Non-War movement revolved greatly around the language and imagery of ‘heimen’, with ‘hei’ meaning ‘plains/ level or horizon’ and ‘min’ – ‘people’. ‘Heimen’ became a term embracing ‘everyone’.7 Non-War supporters viewed war as representing a retrogression of human progress and civilization. Instead, with the use of ‘heimen’, the notion could serve to replace the national, social and ethnic hierarchy with a concretized notion of humanity that extended beyond the territory of the nation-state.7

 

 

 

The Russian common people, as portrayed by one of the leading Japanese papers ‘Shiikan heim’, began to be drawn as instruments of exploitative elites and the government in Russia.8 Japanese readers would now discover that the demonized enemy was, in fact, an exploited people under the social and political elites, who were too much similar to their own national Japanese.

 

 

 

For Kotoku Shusui, one of the leading figures of the Non-War movement, empathy was a naturally occurring sentiments in all human beings and thus was the most natural foundation for the conduct of international relations. ‘Sokuin dojo’ – ‘happens to you’.7 He envisioned a more ethical transnational community based on the idea of the empathetic nature of human beings.7 He saw that patriotism and nationalism, the ‘othering’ of others, artificially bound and territorialized ethics.7

 

 

 

Overall, both the Non-War movement and the rise of Esperanto in Japan led to a change in perception of the foreign world which was out to get you. Both were important to reintroduce the factor of humanity in the minds of a people who were heavily militarized and alienated from global society. The world was not the enemy – language and empathy was the new language to communicate in, to understand one another and bring an end to war and strife. If only most Japanese leadership thought so too.

 

 

 

Biblgiography:

 

KONISHI, SHO. “Translingual World Order: Language without Culture in Post-Russo-Japanese War Japan.” The Journal of Asian Studies 72, no. 1 (2013): 91–114. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23357508.

 

John Boli and George M. Thomas, Constructing World Culture, “Constructing a Global Identity: The Role of Esperanto”, Stanford University Press, California (1999)

  1. John Boli and George M. Thomas, Constructing World Culture, “Constructing a Global Identity: The Role of Esperanto”, Stanford University Press, California (1999), p. 129. [↩]
  2. Boli, Thomas, Constructing World Culture, p. 129 [↩]
  3. Boli, Thomas, Constructing World Culture, pp. 129-130 [↩]
  4. Konishi, Sho. “Translingual World Order: Language without Culture in Post-Russo-Japanese War Japan.” The Journal of Asian Studies 72, no. 1 (2013), p. 91 [↩]
  5. Sho. Translingual World Order, p. 92. [↩] [↩]
  6. Sho. Translingual World Order, p. 94. [↩] [↩]
  7. Sho. Translingual World Order, p. 96. [↩] [↩] [↩] [↩] [↩]
  8. Boli, Thomas, Constructing World Culture, pp. 130 [↩]

Han Yongun: Universal Compassion and Socialism in ‘minjung’ Buddhism

Religion and socialism have not historically integrated into a coherent ideology. In the case of Korea in the 20th century, one Buddhist monk in particular attempted to merge Buddhist reform with socialist ideals to advocate both for the modern value of Buddhism and the national struggle for independence, blatantly disagreeing with the socialist summation of religion as unnecessary and distracting from the path to political freedom.

Han Yongun was a Korean Buddhist monk, poet, and political activist who advocated for Buddhist reform in the late 19th and early 20th century amidst Japan’s increasing involvement in the Korean government. Buddhism during this time was perceived as being against Korean nationalism and especially susceptible to Japanese collaboration, characterizing itself as an individual and disconnected religion which had no place in nationalist struggles or the pursuit of modernization. Han Yongun took it upon himself to adapt Buddhist principles and structures to better suit the modern challenges facing the Korean community, simultaneously re-integrating Buddhism into the national conversation and furthering his anti-colonial mission by utilizing socialist structures for the improvement of the nation. Ultimately, Han’s Buddhist reform efforts reflected specifically socialist principles, aiming for a socially engaged Buddhism which would respond to the needs of the oppressed.

One of the most important changes he made was to the idea that Buddhism was about individual salvation which left it disconnected from the civilian community. Han’s proposed reforms shifted Buddhism’s central tenets to reflect the social activism necessary for strengthening the population and cultivating a coherent identity, highlighting the importance of Buddhism in achieving the utopian ‘great unity’ of the world.1 Key to this reform was the concept of absolute equality and universal compassion–displaying that Buddhists should be simultaneously devoting themselves to internal development and contributing to the welfare of others.2 His treatise ‘On the Reformation of Korean Buddhism’ emphasized compassionate action and social responsibility, urging monks to engage with the suffering of the people based on the Mahayana ideal of the universal Buddha-nature–linking it specifically to equality which was recognized as a sign of modernity.3 Additionally, he aimed to make Buddhism as accessible as possible to the masses, specifically through the translation of Buddhist works into Korean.

From this point, it becomes clear how Han Yongun’s reforms aligned with socialism, particularly in addressing inequality and critiquing the oppressive systems which threatened Korea during this time. The influence of Liang Qichao–and through his works, key Western concepts of Social Darwinism–Han Yongun’s concepts of reform functioned within the Darwinian survival struggle on a global scale which led him to an engagement with socialist concepts. Han specifically displays this socialist influence in his advocacy for the redistribution of resources within the sangha, encouraging monasteries to support the poor and vulnerable. Han Yongun’s minjung Buddhism (Buddhism for the masses) addressed the concerns of Buddhism’s alignment with Japanese intervention by proposing self-government of the religious community, while also reaching out to those in need.4

He saw these two goals integrated through the restructuring and centralization of Buddhist institutions, establishing the sangha (Buddhist community) as independent from government regulation while providing for the lay community. In addressing the increasingly modernized environment of Korea, Han’s ‘Record on the Reformation of Korean Buddhism’ suggested “that Buddhism should be involved in making secure the lives of the minjung”, supporting the poor by generating income by running factories through the invested funds of Buddhist.5 By addressing the concerns of the Korean people, Han hoped to make Buddhism relevant to the national struggle, reshaping both socialist ideals and Buddhist concepts to modernize Buddhism as a philosophy and religion.

  1. Tikhonov, Vladimir and Miller, Owen, Selected Writings of Han Yongun: From Social Darwinism to Socialism with a Buddhist Face (Folkestone, 2008), p. 7, 9. [↩]
  2. Park, Pori, ‘A Korean Buddhist Response to Modernity: Manhae Han Yongun’s Doctrinal Reinterpretation for His Reformist Thought’ in Jin Y. Park (ed.) Makers of Modern Korean Buddhism (New York, 2010), p. 51. [↩]
  3. Tikhonov and Miller, Selected Writings of Han Yongun, p. 7. [↩]
  4. Park, ‘A Korean Buddhist Response to Modernity’, p. 49-50. [↩]
  5. Ibid., p. 48. [↩]