The Taiping Rebellion was a large-scale civil war in China between 1850-1864, in revolt against the perceived weakness of the Qing dynasty in the face of foreign incursion. Taiping ideology utilised elements of both Chinese and Western tradition to frame their goal of establishing a Heavenly Kingdom on earth, a theocratic monarchy in opposition to the Chinese dynastic empire. This post will discuss the Taiping’s attempts to unite ingrained cultural values with their radical ends, leading to a complex fusion between revolutionary innovation and established structures.
A clear example of this convergence is the structure of authority imposed by the leader of the movement, Hong Xiuquan. Thomas O’Reilly argues that Taiping religion at the time was a ‘form of Christianity influenced in part by Chinese native sectarian traditions’.1 The Taiping organisational system with the Heavenly Father (God), Jesus (the Heavenly Elder Brother) and Hong (the Heavenly Younger Brother) demonstrates a continuation of Confucian familial hierarchy as a source of power. Hong sought to derive personal legitimation by presenting himself as both a messianic figure and a senior member of the holy family. While it could be said that prioritising loyalty to God and rulers above that to one’s own family inverted the Confucian emphasis on filial obedience, ultimately it is more convincing to interpret this as an intentional coalescence of political and religious moral authority within relatable familial structures that people could devote themselves to.
Furthermore, the Taipings used the traditional vocabulary of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ to frame their argument that the current imperial system needed to be replaced with the new Kingdom of Heaven. Famine and economic depression in the 1840s, harsh taxation, and weakness against foreign interference undermined the authority of the imperial government and opened discussions about the loss of the Mandate. The Taipings could therefore justify their revolution as part of a longer cyclical tradition of uprising and new governance. Their very name, translating to ‘Great Peace’ evoked a time of perfect harmony and order similarly championed by earlier reformers and millenarian movements.2 Also, the Tiantiao Shu, the official declaration of Taiping creed circulated in 1852, claimed that ancient monarchs and people in China long ago had also worshiped the Christian God in accordance with the ‘Great Way’ before ‘erroneously follow[ing] the devil’s path’.3 This further demonstrates the perceived need to construct a wider legitimising narrative around the Taiping righteously returning China to its original holy state.
Moreover, although the Taipings were often critical of Confucianism’s associations with the established elite, there were times when the very organisation and phrasing of their own core texts was in direct reference to traditional Chinese convention. Many of the commandments in the Tiantiao Shu were in line with Protestant fundamentalist advocation of a simple faith, such as prohibitions against opium smoking and gambling, that would have appealed to the inherent puritanism of Chinese peasantry. Furthermore, the Youxue Shi provided simple formulations of the basic Protestant-inspired principles followers of the Taiping were expected to follow. The phrasing and structure of this document is however evocative of the San Zi Jing, a Confucian teaching device for children that was designed for easy memorisation and recitation.4 In a similar way to how Confucian tenets were often learnt by rote, the Ten Heavenly Commandments, the core of the Taiping ethical code, were often memorised by Taiping followers for the purpose of self-cultivation, even if they were relatively ill-informed on other scripture or practice. Therefore, although the Taipings were often critical of Confucianism’s associations with the established elite, there were many references in their core texts, not only in terms of social and political values but in the very organisation and phrasing, that was in direct reference and emulation of Confucian and traditional Chinese convention.
This argument must, however, not be overstated, as I do acknowledge that Taiping ideology did take some clear divergences from established Chinese tradition. For instance, the Taiping’s ideas about monotheism drastically diverged from the old cult of Heaven that was traditionally under the remit of the rulers; instead, the religion they offered was one that was more accessible for all, one where the pious individual could have their own direct relationship with God. Furthermore, conservative Confucians like Zeng Guofan would not have approved of the level of economic regulation the Taiping advocated for, including an economic egalitarianism that would predate the later Chinese Communist movement.5 This indicates that there was a fundamental incompatibility, or at least an inconsistency, in the Taiping’s attempt to be innovative while adhering to an earlier traditional value system.
The Taiping’s fusion of traditional established values and new conceptions of social organisation was ultimately unsuccessful in creating the utopia they sought. In the end, a failure to enlist external support or maintain a stable political leadership would see the Taiping Rebellion disintegrate and collapse.
- O’Reilly, Thomas, The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom: Rebellion and the Blasphemy of Empire, (Seattle, 2014), p. 117. [↩]
- De Bary, W. T., Lufrano, Richard John, Wing-tsit Chan and John Berthrong, Sources of Chinese Tradition: From 1600 Through the Twentieth Century, (New York, 2000), p.214. [↩]
- Tiantiao Shu, quoted in Sources of Chinese Tradition, p.219. [↩]
- Kilcourse, C. S. Taiping Theology: the Localisation of Christianity in China, 1843-64, (New York, 2016), p.120. [↩]
- De Bary, p.224. [↩]