Scholarly reaction to Jiang Qing has been mixed, which is to be expected considering his work appears to transcend an academic analysis of the role of ancient Confucian thought in modern-day China. Instead he makes sweeping proposals for the creation of new political structures that would revolutionise Chinese governance after decades under Mao. This article approaches the reception of his work and finds that his proposed political structures have incited an interesting reaction from those who seemingly stand against the homogenisation of governance along western liberal democratic lines.[1]
What Jiang Qing proposed was a wholesale reanalysis of the nature of governmental power in China and cited a Confucian idea of The Way of Humane Authority as a foundation for these changes. Under this new order, power would be divided equally between three parliamentary houses. The house of Confucian tradition, dealing with the matter of sacred legitimacy; the house of the people, dealing with the matter of popular legitimacy; and the house of the nation, dealing with the matter of cultural and historical legitimacy. At the core of this system was the rejection of the western political principle of the sovereignty of the people – in favour of a system in which the balance between the three aforementioned forms of legitimacy is strictly maintained.[2]
Reception to these ideas has been mixed, and those who see it in a positive light cite the uniqueness of the Chinese context and the care that must be given to avoid the wrongful application of western democracy to a strictly eastern context. Daniel A. Bell has taken this view and expounds the importance of incorporating cultural resources into the governance of China.[3] Both Daniel Bell and Ruiping Fan go as far as to suggest that such a movement toward a trilateral parliament has the potential to gain support in the future, should the right provisions and adaptations take place. It would seem that support for Jiang Qing rests on the assertion that the alternative, a western style liberal democracy founded on the sovereignty of the people, would not respect the cultural and religious heritage of the state of China. To follow in the footsteps of Japan and Korea in adopting a westernised system of separated powers would be to support the supremacy of a political philosophy that neither originated, nor holds sway, in China.
Opposition to Jiang Qing appears to be ideological in nature, and surrounds debates about Jiang’s interpretation of Confucianism. An example of such opposition is that of Li Minghui, who strikes down Jiang’s ideas as utopian. Li claims that in creating a dichotomy between mainland and Taiwanese Confucianism, Jiang is ignorant to the political aspects of the latter.[4] Far less lofty than those who support him, Jiang’s opposition seems to be less concerned with the practicality of his conception, and rather with how he has interpreted China’s ancient frameworks of politics and spirituality. Li goes on to claim that Jiang puts far too much emphasis on the political aspects of Confucianism and is ignorant to matters of morality and the mind.
As stated, the scholarly reaction to the work of Jiang Qing has been mixed, but I would argue that they largely miss the mark in terms of the impact and significance of what Jiang was at least attempting to achieve. Following decades of Maoist rule, China looked to the future and sought new mechanisms of government to redefine their position in the modern world. Jiang’s vision of a trilateral parliament that looked to China’s ancient heritage for legitimacy and foundation was one that presented an interesting and ironically forward-thinking solution to the problem of governance. Opposition centred around Jiang’s individual interpretation of Confucianism failed to grasp the significance of Jiang’s stand against ideas of western democracy that were creeping in. Standing against the homogeneity of political ideology along western lines was, at the very least, a fresh vision for China’s future.
[1] Jiang Qing, “From mind Confucianism to political Confucianism”, The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China, (Dordrecht, 2011), p.17.
[2] Jiang Qing, A Constitutional World Order, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Ruiping Fan (Princeton, 2015), p.29.
[3] Daniel A. Bell, “Jiang Qing’s Political Confucianism”, in Ruiping Fan (ed.), The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China, (Dordrecht, 2011), p.139.
[4] Li Minghui, “I disagree with the phrase “mainland new Confucianism””, Contemporary Chinese Thought 49:2, (2018), pp.100-112.