

# INTRODUCTION



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Today the role played by experts, expert knowledge and epistemic communities in international politics is manifest. Decision making in fields ranging from technology to the environment, from science to international security and from European Union integration to economic development is shaped by expert knowledge.<sup>1</sup> The politics of expertise are not a new phenomenon. This book examines expert networks and organizations in Europe, in Western Europe in particular, in the period between the mid-nineteenth century and the early 1930s, and demonstrates their relationship with policy-making processes at both the domestic and the international level especially with respect to the social reform movement. The volume explores the activities of networks and non-state actors beyond and below national borders that were particularly important for the dissemination of reform ideas and practices. Social scientists have often neglected the influence of these networks and the circulation of knowledge and expertise, despite the more recent discussions about their 'Atlantic crossings' analysed by the historian Daniel T. Rogers.<sup>2</sup> The dominance of the paradigm of the nation-state has, until recently, resulted in a focus on intergovernmental and diplomatic relations, and a consequent underestimation of the significance of transnational relations.<sup>3</sup>

Although the rise of networks of experts has been attributed by social scientists to 'the birth of a knowledge society' during the second half of the twentieth century,<sup>4</sup> as the chapters in this edited collection demonstrate, the contribution of expert knowledge to policy processes reaches back at least a century earlier. In the mid-nineteenth century, cultural, political, social and economic factors inspired contemporaries to believe in the overarching role of scientific and technological progress as a means to overcome the problems caused by rapid industrialization and social

change; scientific and technical experts became agents of the emergence of a transnational or, in some cases, supranational consciousness among European élites. Businesses, organizations and individuals that relied on or were involved in the movement of people and goods across borders had to react rapidly to new challenges that transgressed the realm of the nation-state. Their responses, evident in a variety of domains, ranged from social policies such as poor relief or schooling to the prevention of the spread of infectious diseases.

This book focuses on the transnational sphere as the space where encounters across national borders took place. New ideas were often framed and exchanged within transnational reform networks even though their intended context and purpose were to be found in reform policies at domestic (national) level or in international legislation. Ideas originated in a given place but circulated across national borders were discussed and modified in specific transnational contexts and might shape new legislation in locations at a distance from their origins. The process of transfer encompassed adaptation and modification to specific local or national contexts.<sup>5</sup>

As Akira Iriye and Madeleine Herren have argued, ‘soft power’ in international relations matters,<sup>6</sup> although its impact can be difficult to measure or locate in the diffuse setting of a transnational network (by contrast, perhaps, with an intergovernmental setting).<sup>7</sup> The transnational sphere materialized in a number of forms – examples in this volume include international organizations, gatherings of experts, international congresses, publications and journals. International congresses perfectly embody the transnational space. Here experts exchanged information, fields of specialization asserted their legitimacy and ‘bodies of knowledge and of know-how’<sup>8</sup> were created. On their return home, the participants attempted to put this knowledge and know-how into practice.<sup>9</sup> The function of such international congresses was similar to that of the French Academy of Science of the late *ancien régime*: scientists had provided reformist royal administrators with new techniques and the king had provided scientists with an institutional framework within which they could work. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, at least in most West European countries, the legitimacy of political actions was no longer solely determined by monarchs; the state had become the centre of the experts’ international activities.<sup>10</sup> Their organizations and institutions enabled encounters that explain the nation in terms of cross-national influences: they provided an arena in which experts often interacted as representatives of specific nation-states.<sup>11</sup> Even if many of these states were multinational empires, diplomatic endeavours sought to maintain the illusion of meetings between

more or less equal nations. The name of the League of Nations stands as a telling example of this spirit of parity, at a time when the quality of being a nation was not yet a universal principle open also to all non-European societies.

The contributions to this volume tackle two potentially contradictory but undoubtedly connected phenomena: on the one hand, the transnational consciousness of European élites and the role of many expert committees, groups and networks involved in the establishment of emerging global policies,<sup>12</sup> and on the other hand, the rise of the nation-state and nationalism during the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century.<sup>13</sup> In Condorcet's utopia of 1794, the *citoyen-savant* may have had no nation, but a century later experts journeying through Europe and beyond carried passports that identified them with a nation-state. Travelling by train and attending universal expositions and international congresses, these experts perceived themselves as members of a particular nation;<sup>14</sup> some even acted on behalf of or in agreement with their national governments.

For a number of scholars the second half of the nineteenth century was the era of a first 'global integration'.<sup>15</sup> They share the view that the bottom-up reconstruction of the fragments of a 'global community', as Iriye calls it, formed neither above nor against nation-states, but between and in collaboration with states. While we relate to this, we are somewhat sceptical about a concept of a 'global civil society' as defined by Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor. National sovereignty did not erode in the period between the 1840s and the 1930s, and the global dimension of this transnational community had not yet fully developed.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless a transnational sphere of exchanges, experiences and encounters across and beyond national borders did take shape in Europe during the long nineteenth century, in particular from the 1840s onwards. The intention of its participants was neither to suppress nor to supplant nation-states; it was often integral to their involvement that this transnational sphere coexisted with nation-states and with intergovernmental organizations.<sup>17</sup> As Patricia Clavin has stated: 'The "nation" does not stand in opposition to transnationalism as a border-crossing understanding of the latter term implies, but rather is an essential element in shaping the phenomenon'.<sup>18</sup> Just as recent work on internationalism in the interwar period tells us much about the national contexts from which that concept emerged, so too do transnational encounters in the nineteenth century cast their light on the national contexts from which they cannot be divorced.

The role of experts and the views of social progress they espoused must not be idealized. All the experts, networks and organizations analysed in

this book were a product of their time, their activities fostered or hampered by their specific national and/or international contexts. The ideologies that underpinned their actions were similarly time-specific: some individuals and groupings defended the superiority of European civilization, or ‘race’, when they encountered the non-European world;<sup>19</sup> others were in favour of the democratization of society and international relations<sup>20</sup> or wished to use their knowledge and utopian aspirations to save the world.<sup>21</sup> This volume explores the shared visions, habits, prejudices and practices of experts who were mostly bourgeois citizens. They were also generally men (very few women are among the main actors of the stories it tells) and they were mostly Christians (Protestant or Roman Catholic) but some had a (sometimes secular) Jewish background. Only a few Muslims, mainly officials from the Ottoman Empire who had studied in Western Europe or in a Western-style academic institution, were admitted to this transnational sphere.<sup>22</sup> Perhaps the main characteristic shared by nearly all of these experts was their belief in the ideals of scientific progress and social reform that made them deeply convinced of their ‘civilizing mission’ in and beyond Europe.

The essential nature of the transnational expert network both entices and challenges the historian. In the words of Madeleine Herren,

Transnational networks do not fit easily within an event-oriented conception of foreign policy and call for an expansion of the traditional cast-list of foreign-policy actors. Networks can rarely be fully mastered, since thematic variety is one of their essential features. They do not tie in closely either with the evolution of institutions or with relations between persons; they neither are the product of an evolutionary process of modernization nor can they be assigned to a pragmatic conception of politics.<sup>23</sup>

This volume cannot and does not provide an exhaustive account of all expert networks of social reform active during the period under consideration. Lest the picture of cooperation and engagement appear too rosy, we must also recognize that transnationalism had a dark side, which as yet has been much less studied by historians. Little attention has been paid to the networks of eugenicists or racist groups,<sup>24</sup> or to fascist, proto-fascist and other extreme right movements that emerged at the same time as progressive and philanthropic transnational networks.<sup>25</sup> The contributions to this volume cover varied material and follow different methodological approaches, but all examine the motives, actions and means of experts, networks and organizations as they sought to affect domestic and/or international politics during the period between the 1840s and the early 1930s. This common thread links all the chapters as they investigate why, when and how experts acted beyond national borders.

## Transnational Relations and Transnationalism

'Shaping the Transnational Sphere', the title of this book, points to the changing configurations and dynamics that occupied the permeable space situated between and beyond governments and intergovernmental relations and domestic politics.<sup>26</sup> These transnational networks were not independent of national societies or international politics. Each chapter recognizes the circulation of individuals, groups and ideas among nation-states, and analyses shifts through the local, nation-state and international levels. Like Patricia Clavin we recognize a certain degree of wooliness in the current usage of the terms 'transnational' and 'transnationalism' and we are aware that for many scholars, including the authors of the contributions to this volume, these terms have different – albeit not entirely incompatible – meanings.<sup>27</sup>

Some social scientists refer to transnational and transnationalism in order to identify the role of non-state corporate actors within world politics. In a famous 1971 issue of the journal *International Organization*, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye challenged the state-centric view of international relations of the so-called Realist School and urged scholars to study interactions across state boundaries, where at least one actor was not 'an agent of a government or an intergovernmental organization'.<sup>28</sup> Breaking with a functionalist approach to the study of global governance, the sociological approach of Marie-Laure Djelic and Sigrid Quack considers 'transnational communities'.<sup>29</sup> Already Raymond Aron referred to a *société transnationale* to signify interactions and connections other than interstate relations.<sup>30</sup> Other scholars think of transnationalism as the relations between individuals or groups belonging to different states or political units who migrate, trade, exchange ideas and join together to celebrate, compete or protest.<sup>31</sup>

Following the more recent global history turn of the past ten years or so, historians have developed a broad literature on transnational history.<sup>32</sup> It seems that historians adopt a transnational perspective primarily in order to study movements and forces that cut across national boundaries and include goods, people, ideas, words, capital, might and institutions ranging from the intergovernmental to the non-governmental and philanthropic.<sup>33</sup> Thus various studies have demonstrated how individuals – including experts – or institutions transferred ideas and practices into new contexts, bringing with them the baggage of former experiences, which, when unpacked at each new location, produced a complex set of echoes, transfers, circulations and interactions.<sup>34</sup> Transnational phenomena, they suggest, may or may not be the product of 'globalization',<sup>35</sup> nor are they necessarily or consistently progressive and cooperative in

character. Moreover, the existence of transnational networks of experts since the nineteenth century does not signal an ineluctable or unidirectional movement towards globalization. Transnational ties can dissolve some national barriers, while simultaneously strengthening or creating others.<sup>36</sup>

Pierre-Yves Saunier has defined transnational networks of experts as 'configurations' of individual and collective actors investing time, energy and social, economic or cultural resources in the establishment, maintenance and use of connections. Only this kind of interconnection takes place and propagates (circulates) specific items beyond national borders.<sup>37</sup> Readings, translations and quotations are evidence of an intertextual existence of a given interconnection or configuration. Visits, correspondence, and the formal and informal establishment of organizations prove the dynamic of an interactional community shared by its members. The actors of a given configuration establish patterns of interaction and a common discourse that serve as the basis of agreement, disagreement or even misunderstanding around notions, categories, processes or world views. They enhance the development of projects, trajectories and aspirations, and enable institutions to establish further connections. Some transnational networks of experts had ephemeral lives, others lived long, some struggled, others cohabited in time and space; some extended their connections and changed, diluted or extended their original purpose; some contracted but maintained their initial purpose.

This volume focuses on the use of knowledge, on when and why knowledge generated by experts acting in transnational spaces affected domestic and/or international politics. A number of contributors to this book use the concept of epistemic communities, borrowed from Peter Haas, to underline the ability of shared world views and common knowledge to unite different transnational actors.<sup>38</sup> Such commonality does not minimize the possible tensions that arise from, for example, specific professional knowledge cultures or particular national political contexts.<sup>39</sup> The nineteenth-century international congresses and institutions analysed here were arenas in which people came together in order to debate collectively issues that they identified as common threats or challenges to contemporary societies and to formulate concepts for possible joint actions. The existence of a transnational epistemic community did not necessarily entail consensus on the causes of a particular problem or on a concrete response to that problem. Rather, the member experts shared a more general belief that such specific issues were part of an overarching reform agenda for modern society and that a joint response was necessary in order to unite the knowledge of experts with the capacities for action held by policymakers in individual countries.

## Transnational Chronologies

The well-established narrative of the long nineteenth century points talks of the dominance of the emergence of the nation-state in parts of Europe, mainly Western Europe.<sup>40</sup> The contributors to this volume seek not to challenge this interpretation but to enrich and nuance the traditional narrative by investigating the contemporaneous creation of a transnational sphere alongside processes of nation-building.<sup>41</sup> The international congresses and other transnational networks that emerged in the mid nineteenth century provided a new space, distinct – on a qualitative level – from earlier forms of cooperation and contact, such as the societies and networks of correspondence of the Enlightenment.<sup>42</sup> By the beginning of the twentieth century, private and secular voluntary organizations whose main activities were humanitarian actions beyond national borders appeared as a Western model of organization directly or indirectly inspired by religious – missionary – organizations. Moreover, intergovernmental organizations emerged as nation-states proliferated. The nation-state as the organization model of societies reached its peak at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919, during which the League of Nations, the first purportedly ‘global’ intergovernmental organization, was created.

As historians we are aware that periodizations are problematic in that they have a certain arbitrary character, but at the same time they have a key analytical function. It is not our intention to present either the 1840s or the early 1930s as deep ruptures as far as transnational reform networks are concerned. Significant continuities do exist between the early nineteenth century and the 1840s as well as between the interwar period and the 1930s. For instance, the 1840s are a relevant starting point if one stresses the emergence of new forms of sociability and communication through the international fairs and congresses. However, religious and reform movements, such as prison reform or the anti-slavery movement, started much earlier.

Nevertheless, three different chronological phases seem to emerge from this volume for the evolution of the transnational sphere in Europe until its deep crises and near collapse in the 1930s. The first phase, from the 1840s to the 1870s, represented ‘the encyclopaedic moment’, a term coined by Christian Müller, one of the contributors to this volume. During these decades, gentlemanly networks of experts were established through the international conferences that met with increasing frequency in West European capitals. As Chris Leonhards and Nico Randeraad underline in their contribution, social reform proved to be an issue of particular importance around which this transnational sphere crystallized. In the 1860s and 1870s these networks tended to become more

professionalized, differentiated and organized as congresses took on more permanent structures and international associations of experts came into being. This evolution is analysed by Christian Müller in his article on the *Association Internationale pour le Progrès des Sciences Sociales*, founded in 1862, which propagated the internationalization of law. Martina Henze records parallel tendencies in her long-term analysis of the European penal reform movement. Similar chronological shifts can be found even in the case of the Jewish philanthropic organizations analysed by Tobias Brinkman. All four studies demonstrate the close relation between the general process of nationalization and the establishment of the transnational sphere; these two decades also saw the breakthrough of the national principle into European politics with the establishment of the Italian and German nation-states and the acceptance of Hungary and other East European nations as actors on the international stage.

The second phase can be dated from the 1880s to the outbreak of the First World War and constituted the heyday of internationalism within the emerging transnational sphere. These decades witnessed the proliferation of new congresses and expert-gatherings and, concomitantly, of new transnational networks and associations. Anne Rasmussen has defined this period as the 'organizational turning point' (*tournant organisateur*) of the internationalist movement.<sup>43</sup> The three leading forms of internationalism – political, juridical and humanitarian – were all affected, as was science with all its inherent intellectual practices. Within the humanitarian and juridical movements internationalism meant first and foremost the creation of an international society under the rule of law and supranational juridical institutions. Conferences at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 attempted to regulate this new international society, including the *vexata quaestio* of the international arbitration of conflicts, which was discussed at the 1907 conferences.<sup>44</sup> In the realm of the sciences the turn of the century saw an explosion in the number of scientific international associations and an associated fall in the number of national associations with analogous purpose.<sup>45</sup>

The identification of a turning point in the period 1880–1914 is not based on the creation of new structures alone, but also reflects a number of organizational projects intended as models of cohesion for the entirety of human society. In 1911 Paul Otlet talked of this 'era of globalization' (*l'ère de la mondialité*).<sup>46</sup> Internationalism was promoted as the universal model for a globalized society perceived as the peaceful gathering of all nations. The transnational association of national societies was an organizational principle, the fruit of the need to coordinate, unify, regulate and fight against the excesses of differentiation and their inherent disorder.<sup>47</sup> At this time and in this context, school reform, analysed in this volume by Damiano Matasci, became a crucial issue for transnational experts in

all Europe, for it seemed to constitute a key issue both for the intellectual progress of modern society and as a way to ease tensions within and between national societies.

During this second period the socialist Second International incarnated the inherent tensions of internationalist efforts in the realm of politics. The workers' movement set up the International Socialist Bureau and the Interparliamentary Socialist Commission, which was organized into national delegations,<sup>48</sup> but the socialist movement, and later the communist movement, also played a central role as a defining 'other' in the liberal internationalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the context of widespread discussion of the threat posed by the workers' movement, workplace accidents, industrial hygiene and social insurance became the focus of experts who were active internationally and hoped to be able to solve or at least attenuate the so-called international 'worker question', as Julia Moses demonstrates in her contribution to this book.

The influence of the 'internationalist' ideology was not felt in the labour movement alone; many other internationalist political movements also organized themselves during this second phase.<sup>49</sup> Aspirations for world peace, to be attained by the creation of a world government or a federal structure of sovereign nations, could be encountered among circles of transnational experts that included the *Fédération Internationale de la Libre-Pensée* created in 1880, the first Zionist Congress, which took place in 1897, the first International Masonic Congress, held in 1889, and the first Internationalist Positivist Congress, in 1908. Among these universalist movements were also religious groupings that activated various collective forms of organization, such as the World's Parliament of Religions that met in Chicago in 1893. As Vincent Viaene shows in his contribution, the ideas of international cooperation and progress and the proliferation of expert knowledge also affected the more conservative churches, including the Catholic Church.

One of the embodiments of this period was the *Annuaire de la Vie Internationale*, the journal founded by Alfred Fried and his associates Paul Otlet and Henri La Fontaine in 1905, and published for the first time by the Institut International de Bibliographie and the Institut International de la Paix in 1908–9.<sup>50</sup> In the introductory article of the issue entitled 'La Science de l'Internationalisme' Fried claimed that the newborn science of internationalism had international cooperation as its goal and was not opposed to nations and nationalism. Fried saw internationalism as the natural continuation and pinnacle of nationalism, its highest degree of social organization. Fried's (liberal) internationalism, which antagonized nationalism as well as international socialism and communism, was a new form of regulation, the consequence of technological progress (*machinisme*) and

the product of civilization. In Fried's view internationalism manifested itself in the institutionalization of organizations, either permanent or occasional (i.e. conferences, congresses, expositions, expeditions and scientific observations), that pursued a specific goal.<sup>51</sup> In his article in the same issue Paul Otlet outlined a typology of the international organization that paid considerable attention to transnational networks of experts.<sup>52</sup> In his view these networks and international associations did not on the whole lead ineluctably to the homogenization of international life; national elements could be both unified as well as juxtaposed with an international system.

The third phase in the evolution of transnationalism started with the creation of the League of Nations after the First World War. With its numerous affiliated associations and official committees, the League brought a new and important dynamic into the transnational sphere, although most of these new institutions, like the International Labour Organization analysed by Sandrine Kott, were based on well-established networks of the pre-war era. As Dominique Marshall's examination of the League of Nations' Child Welfare Committee shows, arenas in which expert politics were at play often overlapped, creating a complex web of activities. This intense interconnectedness did not prevent internal and external rivalries. In their discussion of humanitarian actions carried out by relief organizations in Poland in the interwar period, Shaloma Gauthier, Francesca Piana and Davide Rodogno underline the marked tensions and diverging goals of different actors despite their shared practices, tactics and sometimes even ideologies. In addition to opening up new fields and creating new networks and institutions, the existence of the League also forced transnational actors who had been active before the war to adjust to a new environment. Katharina Rietzler describes how U.S. philanthropic organizations like the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which in the years before 1914 had tried to 'plug' itself into existing peace movement networks in Europe, changed course markedly after the First World War to follow a more institutionalized approach that was in line with broader developments within international politics.

Far from being historically homogenous, the interwar period was shaken at its core by the rise of totalitarian regimes during the 1930s that tore apart some of the well-established expert networks and institutions. The exclusion of many specialists for political or racial reasons, and not only in Germany, had greatly affected the work of various committees and institutions long before the League of Nations entered a period of hibernation during wartime. The deep transformations of the transnational sphere during the 1930s, the Second World War and the post-1945 period with its globalization during the process of decolonialization, which have been discussed by numerous historians,<sup>53</sup> lie, however, beyond the scope of this book.

Nevertheless, a number of significant continuities concerning men and women, institutions and practices do exist between the interwar period and the post-1945 era. In the domains of social welfare, public health, agriculture and education, for instance, many experts of the postwar era had previous experiences in the colonial territories of their respective home countries.<sup>54</sup> The example of the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) of the League of Nations is a good case in point. Grounded in Article 22 of the League's Covenant, it was comprised of individuals who were to oversee fourteen territories that were being administered by various mandatory powers, to ensure the 'material and moral welfare' of the local inhabitants. Chosen for their merit and former work experience, the experts on the PMC examined documents submitted both by the mandatory power and by the local inhabitants. When focusing on the background of these experts, it becomes evident that many of these individuals were in fact former colonial administrators and their nationality played into their selection.<sup>55</sup> Another example is that of U.S. philanthropic organizations like the Rockefeller Foundation or the Near East Relief. These institutions hired agricultural, social welfare and other educational experts who had a previous experience in the Philippines to carry out surveys, write reports and recommend the most adequate policies to be enforced in the countries where they operated. Some other experts had been working within the United States as experts of 'negro education' in domestic 'under-developed' areas of the country, such as the Mississippi area.<sup>56</sup> However, such continuities in the men and women who undertook humanitarian, social and public health, and educational programmes, which bridge the aftermath of the First World War and the interwar period with the Second World War and its aftermath are not yet well studied. The transition of personnel from the League of Nations to the United Nations, the persistence of practices forged during the interwar period, including the role of technical assistance,<sup>57</sup> as well as visions of the organization's future, such as the Bruce Report (mentioned in Dominique Marshall's chapter) provide an interesting field for future research.<sup>58</sup>

In this respect, the Second World War cannot be deemed as the mere turning point that transformed the transnational sphere. The UN and even the present-day EU were not entirely invented after 1945 and most recent research on the ECSC, EEC/EC/EU has highlighted strong continuities in transnational 'governance' across the Second World War as in the case of the actual cartel policies of the ECSC as opposed to the 'Americanization' of the treaty and especially its institutional and anti-cartel provisions. For all these reasons the question of continuities versus discontinuities between the interwar period and the post-1945 period remains an open question.

## Experts

Against this chronological background, the contributions to this collection explore the shaping of the transnational sphere around three thematic axes: actors, organizations, and issues of social reform. The first four chapters are grouped to reflect their focus on the experts themselves. The majority of nineteenth-century transnational experts were members of the academically trained modern professions, often lawyers, physicians or statisticians. The expertise of participants from other social backgrounds might be based on practical knowledge; some were self-appointed experts. Some contributors to transnational conversations had a governmental mandate or an official position in the administration; others tried to influence the policy of the state from within the public sphere. Experts could participate in international gatherings in a range of guises,<sup>59</sup> as defender of the interests of a particular profession or religious congregation, as an ordinary citizen, or as an agent working either against or for a national government, or as a civil servant of an international organization. In some cases, the earlier involvement of an expert in a specific transnational network resulted in that expert's appointment to an intergovernmental organization.<sup>60</sup> The growth of the modern state, the spread of the model of academic professions and the increasing importance that science played in public life during the nineteenth century helped experts to acquire a social status and broad public recognition that they had lacked during preceding centuries.<sup>61</sup> In this context, the broad transnational networks and contacts that these new elites established during the second half of the nineteenth century were central to their ambitions to become a key component in a general movement of the progress of science.<sup>62</sup> The comparison of examples from various nations and the discussion of international 'best practice' were intrinsic elements of an identity that helped experts to legitimize their position within a specific national context.

The chapters in the first section of this book demonstrate the means adopted by expert actors to differentiate themselves from the old elites that up until the First World War had largely dominated European society and international affairs.<sup>63</sup> One underlying question concerns how experts challenged (or worked alongside) pre-existing forms of transnational exchange established by monarchical regimes, nobility and churches during the early modern period. Several authors acknowledge the contribution of scientific exchange and political collaboration by bourgeois experts to the increasing significance of the nation as a conceptual framework of knowledge in Europe and beyond.<sup>64</sup> By focusing on the transnational networks of bourgeois reform experts,

however, the book sheds new light on the view frequently encountered in recent historiography that the European bourgeoisie were mere agents of nationalization.

## Networks

Networks did not suddenly appear as a new form of social organization after 1800. Before the nineteenth century, networks had provided channels for personal interaction and reciprocal support, as could be found, for example, in charities, philanthropic circles or societies. From the 1840s, however, their form, scope and composition proved very different, shaping and shaped by their new transnational context. The second section of the book considers both institutionalized forms of cooperation and less formalized means of transnational exchange between reformers, such as international congresses.

The term network is applied here as an analytical tool to conceptualize relationships within and between institutions and organizations. Networks are often idealized as egalitarian or flat forms of organization and are distinct from hierarchies since, in theory, they lack an ultimate arbiter. Networks are considered to be a set of interconnected nodes<sup>65</sup> and flexible, adaptive structures that can expand to incorporate new nodes by reconfiguring themselves. Most contributions to this volume map the nodal points of a network or networks while bearing in mind Charles Maier's observation that the nation is one of the nodes that operates upon transnational networks, which it distorts in the process.<sup>66</sup> Like Ian Tyrrell, the contributions in this section recognize the role of networks as both sites and conduits of power.<sup>67</sup> A network amplifies and disseminates ideas to an extent that could not be achieved by individuals or institutions alone. Moreover, a network confers legitimacy and pools authority and legitimacy for its members. The attributes of the network explain why experts who tried to influence and change domestic and international policies gathered together.

A number of contributions to this volume emphasize the often close connections between the activities of expert networks and existing national governments. Moreover, in many cases the line between state apparatus and transnational network was not clearly drawn. Transnational networks of experts were never completely independent of national governments. The attention devoted by the authors to the social origins of members of a transnational network of experts illuminates possible common denominators among the members of a given group. Some authors also shed light on the changing role of gender relations in the second half of the

nineteenth century and the early twentieth century as female participation in public politics and official life grew. Gender influenced the professional habits of the actors, underpinning a substantial difference between almost exclusively male national representatives and the broader transnational public sphere.

## Issues

The chapters in the third part of the book examine the changing ‘economy of public interest’ (Georg Franck) though their focus on particular topics of social reform that brought experts together and justified public action across borders.<sup>68</sup> Issues such as the reform of public education and of the school system incited non-state actors and experts to federate transnationally even though they might have differed substantially on the concrete policies that could result. Consequently, transnational actors became experts in given fields of action and set up transnational epistemic communities in areas such as school reform and humanitarian relief. By the second half of the nineteenth century, such issues were increasingly perceived as general problems of modern society that were beyond the capacity of individual states; governments seemed unwilling or unable to tackle them. As a result, civil societies seized the responsibility and initiative to cooperate transnationally. Against the backdrop of the changing faces of war, for example, the transnational sphere engaged significantly in international humanitarian relief, which developed around the international Red Cross movement in the 1860s.<sup>69</sup>

But no single key could mobilize transnational civil society for a longer time. A constellation of factors that included both the media and pressure groups shaped contemporaries’ perceptions of societal problems and the needs for social reform. The willingness or unwillingness of nation-states and policymakers to appropriate particular fields of action often determined how reform agendas were dealt with on a transnational level. This section focuses on the changing factors of transnational mobilization that pushed specific issues in the fore of public debates on social reforms in different times. It will therefore help to understand the sometimes volatile aspects of the transnational sphere and its collective actions, which were driven by other dynamics than just the professional interests or the social status of its members.<sup>70</sup>

Adding a historical dimension to the ongoing debates, the different contributions of this book will thus allow for a better understanding of the complex transnational public sphere today, in which the processes of political, administrative and judicial decision making in international

organizations are connected with national parliaments, organized civil society, the mass media and the internet, and hence with the stakeholders of global governance.

## Notes

1. L. Lima, 'Note Critique. Les Frontières de l'Expertise', *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie* 126(1) (2009): 149–55.
2. D.T. Rogers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Boston 1999). See also the broad discussion of the book in the review symposium organized by the internet list H-SHGAPE, 3 Nov 1999 to 4 Nov 1999 – Special issue (1999–89), at: <http://www.h-net.org/~shgape/disclist/rogers.html> [12 Jul 2012].
3. T. Bender, *A Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History* (New York 2006); S. Conrad, *Globalisierung und Nation im Deutschen Kaiserreich* (Munich 2006).
4. P. Drucker, *The Future of Industrial Man* (New York 1965); D. Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York 1973, foreword 1999); N. Stehr and R. Ericson, 'The Culture and Power of Knowledge in Modern Societies' in Stehr and Ericson, *The Culture and Power of Knowledge: Inquiries into Contemporary Societies* (Berlin 1992), 3–19. For a historical critique of this discourse see J. Vogel, 'Von der Wissenschafts- zur Wissensgeschichte. Für eine Historisierung der "Wissensgesellschaft"', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 30 (2004): 639–60.
5. P.-Y. Saunier, 'Circulations, connexions et espaces transnationaux', *Genèses* 57(4) (2004): 110–26.
6. Soft power refers to the ability to obtain what one wants through persuasion or co-optation. The phrase was coined by Joseph Nye in the 1990 book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* and further developed in his *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, published in 2004. Soft power stands in contrast to hard power, which refers to the use of coercion or force. In international relations, soft power is wielded by states as well as non-state actors, including international organizations (governmental and non-governmental). On the importance of soft power and the role of non-state actors in international politics see A. Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley 2002), 2–3. For a different, more nuanced, view see M. Herren, *Internationale Organisationen seit 1865. Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung* (Darmstadt 2009), 8–11.
7. Patricia Clavin has written, 'Transnational connections need to be separated out from the attempt to dominate, on the one hand, and the will and ability to resist, on the other' ('Introduction: Conceptualising Internationalism between the World Wars', in *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars*, ed. D. Laqua [London 2011], 4).
8. The expression 'corps de savoirs et de savoir-faire' is borrowed from historian Eric Brian; see full reference in the next footnote.
9. E. Brian, 'Transactions statistiques au XIXe siècle. Mouvements internationaux de capitaux symboliques', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 145 (2002): 34–46, at 39.
10. *Ibid.*, 39.

11. For a detailed discussion of cross-national history, see D. Cohen and M. O'Connor (eds), *Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective* (New York 2004).
12. M. Geyer and J. Paulmann (eds), *The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford 2001); M. Herren, *Hintertüren zur Macht. Internationalismus und modernisierungsorientierte Aussenpolitik in Belgien, der Schweiz und den USA 1865–1914* (Munich 2000).
13. M. Hroch, *Das Europa der Nationen. Die moderne Nationsbildung im europäischen Vergleich* (Göttingen 2005); E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge 1990).
14. A. Rasmussen, 'Les Congrès internationaux liés aux Expositions universelles de Paris (1867–1900)', *Mil neuf cent. Revue d'histoire intellectuelle* 7 (1989): 23–44.
15. J. Osterhammel and N.P. Petersson, *Geschichte der Globalisierung. Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen* (Munich 2003), 50–55, 60–63; C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden and Oxford 2004), 312–22; C.S. Maier, 'Transformations of Territoriality, 1600–2000' in *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, eds G. Budde, S. Conrad and O. Janz (Göttingen 2006), 32–55, at 37 and 42.
16. H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor, 'Introducing Global Civil Society' in *Global Civil Society 2001*, eds Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor (Oxford 2001). For a critical view of the concept see L. Amore and P. Langley, 'Ambiguities of Global Civil Society', *Review of International Studies* 30 (2004): 489–510; T. Davies, 'The Rise and Fall of Transnational Civil Society' (paper, Thirty-first Annual Conference of the British International Studies Association, Cork, 2006); A. Drainville, 'The Fetishism of Global Civil Society: Global Governance, Transnational Urbanism and Sustainable Capitalism in the World Economy' in *Transnationalism from Below*, eds M.P. Smith and L.E. Guarnizo (London 1998); B. Pouligny, 'Acteurs et enjeux d'un processus équivoque: la naissance d'une "internationale civile"', *Critique Internationale* 10(13) (2001): 160–76; J. Siméant, 'Des mouvements sociaux et globaux. Sur les mouvements sociaux transnationaux dans quelques ouvrages récents' (paper, 8e Congrès de l'Association Française de Science Politique (AFSP), 15–18 Sep. 2005). Further works on transnational networks that also hint, directly or indirectly, at the concept of a 'global civil society' are M. Keck and K. Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca 1998); S. Khagram, J.V. Riker and K. Sikkink (eds), *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Society Movements, Networks, and Norms* (Minneapolis 2002); I.K. Richter, S. Berking and R. Müller-Schmid (eds), *Building a Transnational Civil Society: Global Issues and Global Actors* (Basingstoke 2007); M. Shaw, 'Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movement Approach', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 23(3) (1994): 647–67; J. Smith, *Social Movements for Global Democracy* (Baltimore 2008); N. Srinivas, *Against Non-Governmental Organizations? A Critical Perspective on their Management* (London 2011); S. Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (Cambridge 2005).
17. Iriye, *Global Community*, 9–36; Bayly, *Birth of the Modern World*, 237. Bayly states the 'paradox' that the nineteenth century saw both 'the triumph of the nation-state . . . and the plethora of voluntary associations, reform societies, and moral crusades, now increasingly organized at both a national and an international level' (ibid., 243).
18. Clavin, 'Introduction: Conceptualising Internationalism', 3.
19. D. van Laak, 'Detours around Africa: The Connection between Developing Colonies and Integrating Europe' in *Materializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe*, eds A. Badenoch and A. Fickers (Basingstoke 2010), 27–43; V. Lipphardt, 'Knowing Europe, Europeanising Knowledge: The Making of "Homo Europaeus" in

- the Life Sciences' in *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches*, eds M. Conway and K.K. Patel (London 2010), 64–83; P. Overath and P. Krassnitzer (eds), *Bevölkerungsfragen. Prozesse des Wissenstransfers in Deutschland und Frankreich (1870–1939)* (Cologne 2007).
20. S. Kesper-Biermann and P. Overath (eds), *Die Internationalisierung von Strafrechtswissenschaft und Kriminalpolitik (1870–1930). Deutschland im Vergleich* (Berlin 2007); J. Dülffer, 'Efforts to Reform the International System and Peace Movements before 1914', *Peace & Change* 14 (1989): 25–45; J. Fisch, 'Internationalizing Civilisation by Dissolving International Society: The Status of Non-European Territories in Nineteenth-Century International Law' in Geyer and Paulmann, *Mechanics of Internationalism*, 235–59.
  21. M. Donald, 'Workers of the World Unite? Exploring the Enigma of the Second International' in Geyer and Paulmann, *Mechanics of Internationalism*, 177–205; S.-L. Hoffmann, *Politics of Sociability: Freemasonry and German Civil Society 1840–1918* (Ann Arbor 2007); S.-L. Hoffmann, *Civil Society, 1750–1914* (Basingstoke 2006).
  22. See for instance, for the example of the international sanitary conferences, V. Huber, 'Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary Conferences on Cholera, 1851 to 1894', *Historical Journal* 49(2) (2006): 453–76.
  23. M. Herren, '"Outwardly . . . an Innocuous Conference Authority": National Socialism and the Logistics of International Information Management', *German History* 20(1) (2002): 70.
  24. Overath and Krassnitzer, *Bevölkerungsfragen*.
  25. M. Deflem, 'The Logic of Nazification: The Case of the International Criminal Police Commission ("Interpol")', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43(32) (2002): 21–44; Herren, '"Outwardly . . . an Innocuous Conference Authority"', 67–92.
  26. M. Schroer, *Räume, Orte, Grenzen. Auf dem Weg zu einer Soziologie des Raums* (Frankfurt am Main 2006), 189–222.
  27. P. Clavin, 'Introduction: Defining Transnationalism', *Contemporary European History* 14(4) (2005): 421–39, esp. 433.
  28. R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, 'Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction', *International Organization* 25 (1971): 329–49; and R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye (eds), *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA 1981). See also T. Risse-Kappen (ed.), *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Relations* (Cambridge 1995).
  29. M.-L. Djelic and S. Quack, *Transnational Communities Shaping Global Economic Governance* (Cambridge 2010). For a persuasive and exhaustive review of their book see P. Grosser, 'Les communautés dans la gouvernance mondiale', *La Vie des idées* 31 (Jan. 2011). <http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Les-communautes-dans-la.html>.
  30. R. Aron, *Paix et guerre entre les Nations* (Paris 1962, Calmann-Lévy edition, 1984), 122. R. Aron, 'Qu'est-ce qu'une théorie des relations internationales?' *Revue Française de Science Politique* 17(5) (1967): 837–61, at 849: 'La société transnationale (ou transétatique) serait la véritable société internationale que les organisations supranationales réglementeraient progressivement, la compétition militaire entre les Etats perdant peu à peu de sa virulence et de sa portée. Je souhaite qu'il en soit ainsi demain.'
  31. T. Faist and E. Özveren, *Transnational Social Spaces: Agents, Networks and Institutions* (Ashgate 2004); S. Batliwala and L.D. Brown, *Transnational Civil Society: An Introduction* (Bloomfield, CT 2006); C.-C. Lai (ed.), *Adam Smith across Nations: Translations and Receptions of The Wealth of Nations* (Oxford 2000); M. van der Linden, *Transnational Labour History: Explorations* (Ashgate 2002); I. Tyrrell, *Woman's World, Woman's Empire: The*

- Woman's Christian Temperance Union in International Perspective, 1880–1930* (Chapel Hill 1991); C. Charle, J. Schriewer and P. Wagner (eds), *Transnational Intellectual Networks: Forms of Academic Knowledge and the Search for Cultural Identities* (Frankfurt am Main 2004).
32. See the inspirational synthesis of these approaches in A. Iriye and P.-Y. Saunier (eds), *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History: From the Mid-19th Century to the Present Day* (Basingstoke 2009). See also Bayly, *Birth of the Modern World*; J. Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich 2009); and M. Middell, 'Kulturtransfer und transnationale Geschichte' in *Dimensionen der Kultur- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Festschrift für Hannes Siegrist*, ed. Middell (Leipzig 2007), 49–69.
  33. K.K. Patel, *Transnational as a Perspective: A View from and despite Florence*, <http://www.transnationalhistory.com/discussion.aspx?id=1740> (accessed 18 Dec. 2010). According to Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier, the editors/authors of the Palgrave dictionary, transnational history is a specific historical perspective. Kiran Klaus Patel wonders if the community of transnational historians agree with that interpretation. So far, many in the field would rather define transnational history as a level of research, a method, or maybe even a paradigm. Patel adheres to the Palgrave dictionary definition of the transnational as a perspective establishing a relationship between the historian and the past. See also K.K. Patel, *Nach der Nationalfixiertheit. Perspektiven einer transnationalen Geschichte* (Berlin 2004).
  34. M. Espagne, *Les transferts culturels franco-allemands* (Paris 1999); M. Werner and B. Zimmermann, 'Beyond Comparison: *Histoire croisée* and the Challenge of Reflexivity', *History and Theory* 45 (2006): 30–50; M. Werner and B. Zimmermann (eds), *De la comparaison à l'histoire croisée* (Paris 2004).
  35. M. Middell and K. Naumann, 'Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization', *Journal of Global History* 5 (2010): 149–70.
  36. Clavin, 'Introduction: Defining Transnationalism', 31.
  37. Saunier, 'Circulations, connexions et espaces transnationaux', 110–26.
  38. P.M. Haas, 'Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination', *International Organization* 46(1) (1992): 1–35.
  39. For a critical analysis of the concept of epistemic communities, see Y. Viltard, 'L'étrange carrière du concept d'épistémè en science politique', *Raisons politiques* 23 (2006): 195–201; S. Kott, 'Une "communauté épistémique" du social? Experts de l'OIT et internationalisation des politiques sociales dans l'entre-deux-guerres', *Genèses* 71 (2008): 26–46.
  40. This classic vision of the nineteenth century, very common in most historical narratives, has been nuanced lately by the recognition that numerous so-called nation-states were indeed multinational empires. See, among others, J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen, *Empires und Nationalstaaten im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen 2009).
  41. For the twentieth century, see G.-R. Horn and P. Kenney (eds), *Transnational Moments of Change: Europe 1945, 1968, 1989* (Lanham, MD 2004).
  42. A. Carneiro, A. Simoes and M.P. Diogo, 'Enlightenment Science in Portugal: The Estrangeirados and their Communication Networks', *Social Studies of Science* 30(4) (2000): 591–619, at 593; R. van Dülmen, *The Society of the Enlightenment: The Rise of the Middle Class and Enlightenment Culture in Germany* (Cambridge 1992); K. Raj and M. Terrall (eds), 'Circulation and Locality', special issue of *The British Journal for the History of Science* 43 (2010); D. Roche, *Les circulations dans l'Europe moderne* (Paris 2011).

43. A. Rasmussen, 'Tournant, inflexions, ruptures: le moment internationaliste' in 'Y a-t-il des tournants historiques? 1905 et le nationalisme', special issue of *Mil Neuf Cent. Revue d'Histoire Intellectuelle* 19(1) (2001): 27–41.
44. J. Dülffer, *Regeln gegen den Krieg? Die Haager Friedenskonferenzen 1899 und 1907 in der internationalen Politik* (Frankfurt 1981).
45. E. Fuchs, 'The Politics of the Republic of Learning: Intellectual Scientific Congresses in Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Latin America' in *Across Cultural Borders: Historiography in Global Perspective*, eds E. Fuchs and B. Stuchtey (Boulder 2002), 205–44.
46. P. Otlet, 'L'Union des Associations Internationales et la constitution d'un Centre International', *Annuaire de la Vie Internationale, 1910–1911* (Brussels 1911), 29–63, at 29.
47. Rasmussen, 'Tournant, inflexions, ruptures', 36.
48. G. Candar, 'Socialisme, nationalisme et tournant', *Mil Neuf Cent. Revue d'Histoire Intellectuelle* 19(1) (2001): 97–108.
49. Geyer and Paulmann, *Mechanics of Internationalism*.
50. *Annuaire de la Vie Internationale 1908–1909* (Brussels 1909).
51. A. Fried, 'La Science de l'Internationalisme', *Annuaire* (1909): 23–28.
52. P. Otlet, 'L'Organisation Internationale et les Associations Internationales', *Annuaire*, (1909): 28–165; Donald, 'Workers of the World Unite?'.
53. See, for instance, Irye, *Global Community*; Herren, *Internationale Organisationen*; G.-Horn and Kenney (eds.), *Transnational Moments of Chance*.
54. See, for instance, 'Modernizing Missions: Approaches to "Developing" the Non-Western World after 1945', special issue of *Journal of Modern European History* 8 (2010), edited by A. Eckert, S. Malinowski and C.R. Unger.
55. Joseph M. Hodge, 'British Colonial Expertise, Post-Colonial Careerism and the Early History of International Development', 24–46; and his monograph, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens, OH 2007).
56. D. Rodogno, *From Relief to Rehabilitation: The Near East Relief's Humanitarian Programs during the Interwar Period*, unpublished paper presented at the New York University, Remarque Institute, on 12 Mar. 2012.
57. D. Webster, 'Development Advisors in a Time of Cold War and Decolonization: The United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 1950–59', *Journal of Global History* 6 (2011), 249–72.
58. M. Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*, (Princeton 2009).
59. See, for instance, the examples related in the article by Chris Leonhards and Nico Randeraad in this book.
60. See, for instance, the articles by Sandrine Kott and Dominique Marshall.
61. B. Belhoste, *La formation d'une technocratie. L'Ecole polytechnique et ses élèves de la Révolution au Second Empire* (Paris 2003); N. and J. Dhombres, *Naissance d'un nouveau pouvoir: sciences et savants en France 1793–1824* (Paris 1989).
62. A. Daum, *Wissenschaftspopularisierung im 19. Jahrhundert. Bürgerliche Kultur, naturwissenschaftliche Bildung und die deutsche Öffentlichkeit, 1848–1914* (2nd edn, Munich 2002).
63. A.J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (New York 1981); J. Paulmann, *Pomp und Politik: Monarchenbegegnungen in Europa zwischen Ancien Régime und Erstem Weltkrieg* (Paderborn 2000).
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- natural space, politics and society. R. Jessen and J. Vogel (eds), *Wissenschaft und Nation in der europäischen Geschichte* (Frankfurt am Main 2002).
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  66. C.S. Maier, *Reflections on Transnational History*, Forum edited by K.H. Jaraush, posted on 23 Jan. 2006, <http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-german&month=0601&week=d&msg=fz4or79bUjZXO9rM/LT0ZQ&user=&pw> (accessed 17 Jan. 2011).
  67. I. Tyrrell, 'Reflections on the Transnational Turn in United States History: Theory and Practice', *Journal of Global History* 4 (2009): 453–74, at 467.
  68. G. Frank, *Ökonomie der Aufmerksamkeit. Ein Entwurf* (Munich 1998).
  69. D. Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire 1815–1914* (Princeton 2012).
  70. For the role of issues as federators of public action see, among others, D. Cefai and D. Trom (eds), *Les formes de l'action collective. Mobilisations dans des arènes publiques* (Paris 2001); P. Laborier and D. Trom (eds), *Historicité de l'action publique* (Paris 2003); L. Thévenot, 'L'action comme engagement' in *L'analyse de la singularité d'action*, ed. J.-M. Barbier (Paris 2000), 213–38.